If you sign the revocation certificate in the compromised key, then the only way it can get revoked is if the owner of the key revokes it or it's been compromised... _MelloN_
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and the Web of Trust Ed Gerck
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and the Web of ... David Honig
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and the Web... Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and the... David Honig
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and... Bill Frantz
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and the Web... Dan Geer
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and the... David Honig
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and... P.J. Ponder
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers... David Honig
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyser... Ray Dillinger
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyser... Ted Lemon
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyser... Ray Dillinger
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyser... Derek Atkins
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyser... Ted Lemon
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyser... Ben Laurie
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyser... Derek Atkins
- Re: reflecting on PGP, keyser... Bodo Moeller
- More thoughts on Man in the ... Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: More thoughts on Man in ... Ben Laurie
- Re: More thoughts on Man in ... Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: More thoughts on Man in ... Ben Laurie