Jacob Hrbek schreef op do 02-12-2021 om 03:58 [+0000]: > Arkenfox <https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js> is a community > maintained user.js file used for browser hardening. > > Proposing to implement it's configuration in GNU Guix's IceCat > mainly: [...]
These things might be useful, but wouldn't IceCat's mailing lists be more appropriate for suggesting different configuration defaults? (See https://www.gnu.org/software/gnuzilla/ for the mailing lists of IceCat and other GNUzilla software.) > Additional configuration should be defined in guix-home with sane > default [...] I don't think guix home is necessary for this, wouldn't some kind of parametrised packages be sufficient? E.g., something like: (packages->manifest ;; This creates a wrapper around ticecat instructing the firefox ;; derivative to use the supplied user.js instead of wherever firefox ;; normally goes looking for things. (I don't know how to do that, ;; but should be possible?) (icecat-with-configuration ; (defined in gnu packages gnuzilla) #:user.js arkenfox ; defined in (gnu packages gnuzilla) #:package the-base-icecat-package)) ; by default icecat, but any firefox derivative will do emacs other-packages ...) That could be useful for both "guix shell --manifest=manifest.scm" and guix home users. > [...] so that the browser can be a sufficient replacement for Tor > Browser Bundle. The Tor project advised against using anything but their Tor Browser, to avoid fingerprinting. It also advised against customisation, for the same reasons. I cannot find the web page explaining the details, but <https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-14/> comes close. Tor makes modifications to the browser, so simply modifying some settings isn't sufficient. Also, from the arkenfox/user.js README: ‘Note that we do not recommend connecting over Tor on Firefox. Use the Tor Browser if your threat model calls for it, or for accessing hidden services.’ Greetings, Maxime.
