> -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On > Behalf Of Doug Pensinger > Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2006 12:44 AM > To: Killer Bs Discussion > Subject: Re: Is it just me.... > > Dan wrote: > > > I don't see it as that black and white. Our presence helped fuel the > > insurgence. The stupidity of the initial policy gave it a chance to > > flourish and grow. But, I don't see our leaving as ending it. > > You're right it isn't as cut and dried as I made it sound. > > > At the present time, the US is the controlling force in Iraq. It does > > have trouble suppressing the insurgency, no doubt, but it prevents other > > forces from being dominant. The present goals of the US, getting the > > Iraq armed > > forces trained to the point where they can at least hold their own with > > militias and insurgents and to nudge the political factions into a > > coalition > > government. > > Yes, we've heard that mantra for quite a while now and it becomes less and > less convincing. If we can't train an appreciable force after being there > three years, how long is it going to take?
Competent training people have been in place for less than a year. The response of the Iraqi military to the rise in sectarian violence was not disasterous. That's actually quite an improvement over earlier responses. >>But, they also see moderate Arab > > governments as enemies, or at least pawns of the US. They are not > > inherently opposed to the people of Iraq, but they are inherently > > opposed to Iraq developing into a moderate Arab state, such as Jordan. > > Do you believe that they will be able to recruit as easily once we leave? They? probably not. Sunni insurgents and militia, most definitely. > Do you think that they will become the dominant force? No. I think that if we left as quickly as possible, the strongest forces would be the various militia. They would be in a better position to nudge things into chaos under those circumstances...because the knowledge that there was a force for stability in Iraq stronger than any militia would be gone. A phased, planned withdrawal would not have the same effect, because it would be reasonable to see it as "we're handing responsibility off, now, we've done what we could" instead of "run away". >Do you think that they will attract as much financial support once we >are gone? After a great victory, yes. > > If that happens, and the parliament actually runs the company, then Bush > > would have succeeded in Iraq. > > If he is forced by congress and public pressure to withdraw, he'll get the > credit? In any case who cares who gets the credit? The purpose for my statement is that I think that the scenario you describe is far too optimistic....that it is optimistic enough to fit as a variation on Bush's view of how things would turn out. > > > > Tom Friedman had two very good columns on Iraq in the last couple of > > weeks. Unfortunately, he's now premium content at the NY Times, so I > > can't quote > > him exactly. In one of his columns he looks at three possible outcomes > > in Iraq. > > > > First, he states that there is still some chance that a coalition > > government will form, and the Iraqi troops will be well trained enough > > to be the > > strongest force in Iraq...at least enough to hold their own against > > insurgents and militias. This is the best possible outcome. > > > > Second, if we withdraw, and the outcome is civil strife/civil war, the > > middle outcome would be seen. It would be a mitigated disaster, if you > > would. The Iranian influence on the Shiites would be tempered by that > > natural Persian/Arab distrust (which goes back centuries). The > influence > > on/acceptability by the Sunni's by AQ would lesson, without the US to > > hold up as occupiers. The conflict would be bloody, with significant > > human > > rights violations by the militia common place (e.g. death squads, mass > > killings of civilians), but it would probably not draw in other nations. > > > > The third alternative is that we sit there and "babysit" the > > disintegration for years to come. We'll always hope that things will > > get better, but we'll still be identified as the one to make them worse. > > > > Obviously, this analysis tends to lead one to conclude that we can't > just > > stay in Iraq. Yet, it isn't a call for a quick, immediate withdrawal. > > Rather, it seems to call for a transition from the US being the > > controlling force to Iraqi forces controlling Iraq. Ideally, of course, > > it would be the forces belonging to the elected central government. > > More realistically, > > both militia power and the power of elected representatives would need > > to be considered in Iraq. That is probably the best case scenario we > > can now hope for. Worst case is a civil war that turns very ugly, > > drawing neighboring > > countries into the fight. I do not think the Sunni governments around > > Iraq would stand by and let Sunni civilians be killed by the tens of > > thousands, for example. > > > > One final point: it appears that we finally have competent people on the > > ground in Iraq. Training the Iraqi military and having an ambassador who > > actually understands the region are gigantic steps over our initial > > foolishness. If we implemented the present strategy, if Bush used the > > post war plan developed by the State Department from the very beginning, > > it is > > probable that things would be significantly better than they are now. > > Indeed, history may show that Bush succeeded, through his arrogance, in > > snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. > > I think what we've got now _is_ civil war, that our pressence exacerbates > the situation and that, as Buckley puts it "One can't doubt that the > American objective in Iraq has failed." I agree that the chances of even a very modest success in Iraq are low. To first order, I am talking about mitigating the extent of the failure, not success. This ties to my earlier point....if the scenario you suggest plays out, then we will have had a tremendous success, achieving most of our objective. I think that type of success is well beyond our reach. Whether we consider the present situation a civil war, or a sectarian strife that falls just short of a civil war is a question of definitions for me. There is a continuum of rising sectarian violence, along which we draw a line and call it a civil war above some point. There is no doubt that the sectarian violence has increased, with death squads and threats increasing. Yet, there are some indications that many religious and political leaders are afraid of what a full scale civil war will look like. In short, things can get much much worse. I think, as I said before, that the best we can hope for is a country where elected representatives and militia both have power...and there is some central government. I don't think withdrawing as quickly as possible would foster that. Neither do I think that, as Bush suggested, considering a withdrawal time long enough for it to be determined by some future president helpful....that's Tom's worst case scenario. I don't even think we need to announce a timetable....we just need to set one and let the Iraqi government know our plans. Charlie suggested that no one is arguing with a phased withdrawal. Maybe you are not talking about an immediate withdrawal, but the reference to the "last soldier to die for a mistake" led me to believe that you do favor getting out as fast as we can. Did I misunderstand? Dan M. _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
