On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 10:12 PM, Tier Nolan <tier.no...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 7:32 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wui...@gmail.com> > wrote: >> >> If you trust hashrate for determining which UTXO set is valid, a 51% >> attack becomes worse in that you can be made to believe a version of >> history which is in fact invalid. > > > If there are invalidation proofs, then this isn't strictly true.
I'm aware of fraud proofs, and they're a very cool idea. They allow you to leverage some "herd immunity" in the system (assuming you'll be told about invalid data you received without actually validating it). However, they are certainly not the same thing as zero trust security a fully validating node offers. For example, a sybil attack that hides the actual best chain + fraud proofs from you, plus being fed a chain that commits to an invalid UTXO set. There are many ideas that make attacks harder, and they're probably good ideas to deploy, but there is little that achieves the security of a full node. (well, perhaps a zero-knowledge proof of having run the validation code against the claimed chain tip to produce the known UTXO set...). -- Pieter ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Put Bad Developers to Shame Dominate Development with Jenkins Continuous Integration Continuously Automate Build, Test & Deployment Start a new project now. Try Jenkins in the cloud. http://p.sf.net/sfu/13600_Cloudbees _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
