quote: > > but then you remove the implication that a node has to give both public > > and private IPs to a peer. If it's part of a batch of "addr"s, it could be > > my own hidden service ID, but it could also be one that I learned from > > someone else and is now propagating, for anyone to bootstrap with Tor > > hidden service peers if they'd like. > > > > Hmm. So you mean that we pick a set of peers we believe to not be sybils of > each other, but they might give us hidden services run by other people? I > need to think about that. If they're getting the hidden services just from > addr announcements themselves, then you just punt the issue up a layer - > what stops me generating 10000 hidden service keys that all map to my same > malicious node, announcing them, and then waiting for the traffic to > arrive? If clearnet nodes inform of their own hidden service IDs, that > issue is avoided. >
Considering that the clearnet sybil protection also relies on scaling up the resource requirements for an attacker, why not require hidden service addresses following a certain pattern, like a fixed prefix? Essentially also a PoW scheme... > My goal here is not necessarily to hide P2P nodes - we still need lots of > clearnet P2P nodes for the forseeable future no matter what. What would you consider as the main merits of clearnet nodes? Best regards, Isidor ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CenturyLink Cloud: The Leader in Enterprise Cloud Services. Learn Why More Businesses Are Choosing CenturyLink Cloud For Critical Workloads, Development Environments & Everything In Between. Get a Quote or Start a Free Trial Today. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=119420431&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
