On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 12:12 AM, Bradley Denby via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > That's right, the idea is to choose Dandelion relays independently from > whether they support Dandelion. If the chosen nodes do not support > Dandelion, then the transactions are fluffed. Otherwise, the transactions > are relayed along a stem.
I don't see any problem with doing that... Although an additional countermeasure we're likely to take against attacks on partial deployment is that we'd likely make the wallet's use of stem forwarding be a configuration option which is initially hidden and set to off. In a subsistent release after dandelion propagation is widely deployed we'd unhide the option and default it to on. This way users don't begin using it until the deployment is relatively dense. I believe this approach is a is sufficient such that it could always select out-peers that were dandelion capable without harm, but at the same time I also don't see a reason that we can't do both. (in fact, for privacy reasons we might want to three-stage the deployment, with the use of dandelion by wallets having a setting of off, sometimes, or always so that attackers can't so easily correlate the use of dandelion with upgrades.) _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
