Re: [SPAM DETECT] Re: Combine similar patterns

[anand kumar]

Hi

 

Please find the file as an attachment with this mail

 

Regards

Anand

Xavier Noria <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

On Mar 29, 2006, at 12:01, anand kumar wrote:

> Yes, of course the code u have sent is very helpful and thanks for
> that. But the problem here is that in a single file there may be
> various number of foot notes i.e. ,………….so on. For all
> these the conventions are the same as told before. I am having
> problem in combining the relevant ones. Please help in this matter

I think we can go back to the simplification. Would you please send
an analogous simplified example that contains sections f1, f2, f3,
following the same structure as in the original data?

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<r>
<c>main, par sa nature, emploie |successivement dans chacune de |ses recherches 
trois m\l=e'\thodes |de philosopher, dont le caract\l=e`\re |est 
essentiellement diff\l=e'\rent |m\l=e^\me radicalement oppos\l=e'\: |d'abord la 
m\l=e'\thode th\l=e'\ologique, |ensuite la m\l=e'\thode m\l=e'\taphysique, |et 
enfin la m\l=e'\thode positive.'' |<I>Cours&dot; de Philosophie |Positive,</I> 
1830, Vol&dot; i. p&dot; 3.</c>
<c>to the width of the generalizations which |experiences have determined; and 
they |change just as gradually as experiences |accumulate. The integration of 
causal |agencies, originally thought of as multi-tudinous |and local, but 
finally believed to |be one and universal, is a process which |involves the 
passing through all intermediate |steps between these extremes; |and any 
appearance of stages can be but |superficial. Supposed concrete and individual 
|causal agencies, coalesce in the |mind as fast as groups of phenomena are 
|assimilated, or seen to be similarly caused. |Along with their coalescence, 
comes a |greater extension of their individualities, |and a concomitant loss of 
distinctness in |their individualities. Gradually, by continuance |of such 
coalescences, causal |agencies become, in thought, diffused and |indefinite. 
And eventually, without any |change in the nature of the process, there |is 
reached the consciousness of a universal |causal agency, which cannot be 
conceived.<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr></c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``Le syst\l=e`\me th\l=e'\ologique est |parvenu \l=a`\ la plus haute 
perfection |dont il soit susceptible, |quand il a substitu\l=e'\ l'action 
|providentielle d'un \l=e^\tre unique |au jeu vari\l=e'\ des nombreuses 
|divinit\l=e'\s ind\l=e'\pendantes qui avaient |\l=e'\t\l=e'\ imagin\l=e'\es 
primitivement. |De m\l=e^\me, le dernier |terme du syst\l=e`\me metaphysique</c>
<c>As the progress of thought is one, so is |the end one. There are not three 
possible |terminal conceptions; but only a single |terminal conception. When 
the theological |idea of the providential action of one |being, is developed to 
its ultimate form, |by the absorption of all independent |secondary agencies, 
it becomes the conception |of a being immanent in all phenomena; |and the 
reduction of it to this</c>
</r>
›
<f1>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> A clear illustration of this process, is furnished by the 
recent mental integration |of Heat, Light, Electricity, etc&dot;, as modes of 
molecular motion. If |we go a step back, we see that the modern conception of 
Electricity, resulted |from the integration in consciousness, of the two forms 
of it involved in the |galvanic battery and in the electric-machine. And going 
back to a still |earlier stage, we see how the conception of statical 
electricity, arose by the |coalescence in thought, of the previously-separate 
forces manifested in rubbed |amber, in rubbed glass, and in lightning. With 
such illustrations before |him, no one can, I think, doubt that the process has 
been the same from the |beginning.

</f1=c>
›
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<r>
<c>consiste \l=a`\ concevoir, au lieu des |diff\l=e'\rentes entit\l=e'\s 
particuli\l=e`\res, |une seule grande entit\l=e'\ g\l=e'\n\l=e'\rale, |la 
<I>nature,</I> envisag\l=e'\e comme la |source unique de tous les 
ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes. |Pareillement, la perfection |du syst\l=e`\me positif, 
vers |laquelle il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il |soit tr\l=e`\s-probable qu'il ne 
|doive jamais l'atteindre, serait |de pouvoir se repr\l=e'\senter tous |les 
divers ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes observables |comme des cas particuliers |d'un seul 
fait g\l=e'\n\l=e'\ral, tel que |celui de la gravitation, par |exemple.'' 
p&dot; 5.</c>
<c>state, implies the fading-away, in thought, |of all those anthropomorphic 
attributes by |which the aboriginal idea was distinguished. |The alleged last 
term of the |metaphysical system\p=m-\the conception of a |single great general 
entity, <I>nature,</I> as the |source of all phenomena\p=m-\is a conception 
|identical with the previous one: the consciousness |of a single source which, 
in |coming to be regarded as universal, ceases |to be regarded as conceivable, 
differs in |nothing but name from the consciousness |of one being, manifested 
in all phenomena. |And similarly, that which is described as |the ideal state 
of science\p=m-\the power to |represent all observable phenomena as |particular 
cases of a single general fact, |implies the postulating of some ultimate 
|existence of which this single fact is |alleged; and the postulating of this 
|ultimate existence, involves a state of |consciousness indistinguishable from 
the |other two.</c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``. . . la perfection du syst\l=e`\me |positif, vers laquelle il |tend sans 
cesse, quoiqu'il soit |tr\l=e`\s-probable, qu'il ne doive |jamais l'atteindre, 
serait de |pouvoir se repr\l=e'\senter tous les |divers ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes 
observables |comme des cas particuliers d'un |seul fait g\l=e'\n\l=e'\ral. 
p&dot; 5. . . . . . |consid\l=e'\rant comme absolument |inaccessible, et vide 
de sens pour |nous la recherche de ce qu'on |appelle les <I>causes,</I> soit 
premi\l=e`\res, |soit finales.'' p&dot; 14.</c>
<c>Though along with the extension of |generalizations, and concomitant 
integration |of conceived causal agencies, the conceptions |of causal agencies 
grow more |indefinite; and though as they gradually |coalesce into a universal 
causal agency, |they cease to be representable in thought, |and are no longer 
supposed to be comprehensible; |yet the consciousness of <I>cause</I> |remains 
as dominant to the last as it was |at first; and can never be got rid of. The 
|consciousness of cause can be abolished |only by abolishing consciousness 
itself.<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> |(<I>First Principles,</I> \s=s\ 26.)</c>
</r>
›
<f1=c>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> Possibly it will be said that M&dot; Comte himself admits 
that what he calls |the perfection of the positive system, will probably never 
be reached; and |that what he condemns is the inquiry into the <I>natures</I> 
of causes and not the |general recognition of cause. To the first of these 
allegations I reply that, as |I understand M&dot; Comte, the obstacle to the 
perfect realization of the positive |philosophy is the impossibility of 
carrying generalization so far as to reduce |all particular facts to cases of 
one general fact\p=m-\not the impossibility of
›
</f1=c>

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<r>
<c>``Ce n'est pas aux lecteurs |de cet ouvrage que je croirai |jamais devoir 
prouver que les |id\l=e'\es gouvernent et bouleversent |le monde, ou, en 
d'autres termes, |que tout le m\l=e'\canisme social |repose finalement sur des 
opinions. |Ils savent surtout que la |grande crise politique et morale |des 
soci\l=e'\t\l=e'\s actuelles tient, en |derni\l=e`\re analyse, \l=a`\ 
l'anarchie |intellectuelle.'' p&dot; 48.<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr></c>
<c>Ideas do not govern and overthrow the |world: the world is governed or 
overthrown |by feelings, to which ideas serve |only as guides. The social 
mechanism |does not rest finally on opinions; but |almost wholly on character. 
Not intellectual |anarchy, but moral antagonism, is |the cause of political 
crises. All social |phenomena are produced by the totality |of human emotions 
and beliefs; of which |the emotions are mainly pre-determined, |while the 
beliefs are mainly post-determined. |Men's desires are chiefly inherited; |but 
their beliefs are chiefly |acquired, and depend on surrounding conditions; |and 
the most important surrounding |conditions depend on the social state |which 
the prevalent desires have produced. |The social state at any time existing, is 
|the resultant of all the ambitions, self-interests, |fears, reverences, 
indignations, |sympathies, etc&dot;, of ancestral citizens and |existing 
citizens. The ideas current in |this social state, must, on the average, be 
|congruous with the feelings of citizens; |and therefore, on the average, with 
the |social state these feelings have produced. |Ideas wholly foreign to this 
social state</c>
</r>
›
<f1=c>
^C0^excluding the consciousness of cause. And to the second allegation I reply 
|that the essential principle of his philosophy is an avowed ignoring of cause 
|altogether. For if it is not, <I>what becomes of his alleged distinction 
between |the perfection of the positive system and the perfection of the 
metaphysical |system?</I> And here let me point out that, by affirming exactly 
the opposite to |that which M&dot; Comte thus affirms, I am excluded from the 
positive school. |If his own definition of positivism is to be taken, then, as 
I hold that what he |defines as positivism is an absolute impossibility, it is 
clear that I cannot be |what he calls a positivist.

</f1=c>
›
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<r>
<c></c>
<c>cannot be evolved, and if introduced from |without, cannot get 
accepted\p=m-\or, if |accepted, die out when the temporary |phase of feeling 
which caused their acceptance, |ends. Hence, though advanced |ideas when once 
established, act on |society and aid its further advance; yet |the 
establishment of such ideas depends |on the fitness of the society for 
receiving |them. Practically, the popular character |and the social state, 
determine what ideas |shall be current; instead of the current |ideas 
determining the social state and the |character. The modification of men's 
|moral natures, caused by the continuous |discipline of social life, which 
adapts |them more and more to social relations, |is therefore the chief 
proximate cause of |social progress. (<I>Social Statics,</I> chap&dot; 
|XXX.)</c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``. . . je ne dois pas n\l=e'\gliger |d'indiquer d'avance, comme |une 
propri\l=e'\t\l=e'\ essentielle de |l'\l=e'\chelle encyclop\l=e'\dique que je 
|vais proposer, sa conformit\l=e'\ |g\l=e'\n\l=e'\rale avec l'ensemble de 
|l'histoire scientifique; en ce |sens, que, malgr\l=e'\ la 
simultan\l=e'\it\l=e'\ |r\l=e'\elle et continue du d\l=e'\veloppement |des 
diff\l=e'\rentes sciences, |celles qui seront class\l=e'\es comme 
|ant\l=e'\rieures seront, en effet, plus |anciennes et constamment plus 
|avanc\l=e'\es que celles pr\l=e'\sent\l=e'\es |comme post\l=e'\rieures.'' 
p&dot; 84. . . |. . . . . . ``Cet ordre est d\l=e'\termin\l=e'\ |par le 
degr\l=e'\ de simplicit\l=e'\, |ou, ce qui revient au |m\l=e^\me, par le 
degr\l=e'\ de g\l=e'\n\l=e'\ralit\l=e'\ |des ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes.'' p&dot; 
87.</c>
<c>The order in which the generalizations |of science are established, is 
determined |by the frequency and impressiveness with |which different classes 
of relations are |repeated in conscious experience; and |this depends, partly 
on <I>the directness with |which personal welfare is affected;</I> partly |on 
<I>the conspicuousness of one or both the |phenomena between which a relation 
is to be |perceived;</I> partly on <I>the absolute frequency |with which the 
relations occur;</I> partly on |their <I>relative frequency of occurrence;</I> 
|partly on their <I>degree of simplicity;</I> and |partly on their <I>degree of 
abstractness.</I> |(<I>First Principles,</I> 1st ed&dot;, \s=s\ 36; or 
otherwise |see <I>``Essay on Laws in General and |the Order of their 
Discovery.''</I>)</c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``En r\l=e'\sultat d\l=e'\finitif, la |math\l=e'\matique, l'astronomie, la 
|physique, la chimie, la physiologie, |et la physique sociale;</c>
<c>The sciences as arranged in this succession |specified by M&dot; Comte, 
<I>do not</I> |logically conform to the natural and invariable |hierarchy of 
phenomena; and</c>
</r>
›
<f1=c>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> A friendly critic alleges that M&dot; Comte is not fairly 
represented by this |quotation, and that he is blamed by his biographer, M&dot; 
Littr\l=e'\, for his too-great |insistance on feeling as a motor of humanity. 
If in his ``Positive Politics,'' |which I presume is here referred to, M&dot; 
Comte abandons his original position, |so much the better. But I am here 
dealing with what is known as ``the |Positive Philosophy;'' and that the 
passage above quoted does not misrepresent |it, is proved by the fact that this 
doctrine is re-asserted at the |commencement of the Sociology.

</f1>

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^C0^against which he more especially urges his objections. In |chapters 
entitled ``Partial Differentiation of Subject and |Object,'' ``Completed 
Differentiation of Subject and |Object,'' and ``Developed Conception of the 
Object,'' I have |endeavoured, as these titles imply, to trace up the gradual 
|establishment of this fundamental antithesis in a developing |intelligence. It 
appeared to me, and still appears, that for |coherent thinking there must be 
excluded at the outset, |not only whatever implies acquired knowledge of 
objective |existence, but also whatever implies acquired knowledge |of 
subjective existence. At the close of the chapter preceding |those just named, 
as well as in <I>First Principles,</I> |where this process of differentiation 
was more briefly |indicated, I recognized, and emphatically enlarged upon, the 
|difficulty of carrying out such an inquiry: pointing out |that in any attempts 
we make to observe the way in which |subject and object become distinguished, 
we inevitably use |those faculties and conceptions which have grown up while 
|the differentiation of the two has been going on. In trying |to discern the 
initial stages of the process, we carry with |us all the products which belong 
to the final stage, and |cannot free ourselves from them. In <I>First 
Principles</I> |(\s=s\ 43) I have pointed out that the words <I>impressions</I> 
and |<I>ideas,</I> the term <I>sensation,</I> the phrase <I>state of 
consciousness,</I> |severally involve large systems of beliefs; and that if we 
|allow ourselves to recognize their connotations we inevitably |reason 
circularly. And in the closing sentence of the |chapter preceding those above 
named, I have said\p=m-\

<q>
^F0^``Though in every illustration taken we shall have tacitly to posit an 
|external existence, and in every reference to states of consciousness we shall 
|have to posit an internal existence which has these states; yet, as before, we 
|must ignore these implications.''

</q>
^F0^I should have thought that, with all these cautions before |him, Prof&dot; 
Green would not have fallen into the error of |supposing that in the argument 
thereupon commenced, the |phrase ``states of consciousness'' is used with all 
its |ordinary implications. I should have thought that, as in |
›
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^C0^a note appended to the outset of the argument I have |referred to the 
parallel argument in <I>First Principles,</I> where |I have used the phrase 
``manifestations of existence'' |instead of ``states of consciousness,'' as the 
least objectionable; |and as the argument in the <I>Psychology</I> is 
definitely |described in this note as a re-statement in a different form |of 
the argument in <I>First Principles;</I> he would have seen |that in the phrase 
``states of consciousness,'' as used |throughout this chapter, was to be 
included no more |meaning than was included in the phrase ``manifestations |of 
existence.''<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> I should have thought he would have seen |that 
the purpose of the chapter was passively to watch, |with no greater 
intelligence than is implied in watching, |how the manifestations or states, 
vivid and faint, comport |themselves: excluding all thought of their 
meanings\p=m-\all |interpretations of them. Nevertheless, Prof&dot; Green 
charges |me with having, at the outset of the examination, invalidated |my 
argument by implying, in the terms I use, certain |products of developed 
consciousness.<lr=f2>\s=d\</lr> He contends that |my division of the ``states 
of consciousness,'' or, as I elsewhere |term them, ``manifestations of 
existence,'' into vivid |and faint, is vitiated from the first by including 
along with |the vivid ones those faint ones needful to constitute them 
|perceptions, in the ordinary sense of the word. Because, |describing all I 
passively watch, I speak of a distant headland, |

<fn>
<f2>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> If I am asked why here I used the phrase ``states of 
consciousness'' |rather than ``manifestations of existence,'' though I had 
previously preferred |the last to the first, I give as my reason the desire to 
maintain |continuity of language with the preceding chapter, ``The Dynamics of 
|Consciousness.'' In that chapter an examination of consciousness had been 
|made with the view of ascertaining what principle of cohesion determines |our 
beliefs, as preliminary to observing how this principle operates in 
|establishing the beliefs in subject and object. But on proceeding to do this, 
|the phrase ``state of consciousness'' was supposed, like the phrase 
``manifestation |of existence,'' not to be used as anything more than a name by 
|which to distinguish this or that form of being, as an undeveloped receptivity 
|would become aware of it, while yet self and not-self were undistinguished.

</f2=c>
<f3>
^F0^<no>\s=d\</no> <I>Contemporary Review,</I> December, 1877, pp&dot; 49, 50.

</f3=c>
›
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^C0^of waves, of boats, &c&dot;, he actually supposes me to be |speaking of 
those developed cognitions under which these |are classed as such and such 
objects. What would he have |me do? It is impossible to give any such account 
of the |process as I have attempted, without using names for |things and 
actions. The various manifestations, vivid and |faint, which in the case 
described impose themselves on |my receptivity, must be indicated in some way; 
and the |words indicating them inevitably carry with them their |respective 
connotations. What more can I do than warn |the reader that all these 
connotations must be ignored, and |that attention must be paid exclusively to 
the manifestations |themselves, and the modes in which they comport themselves. 
|At the stage described in this ``partial differentiation,'' |while I suppose 
myself as yet unconscious of my |own individuality and of a world as separate 
from it, the |obvious implication is, that what I name ``states of 
consciousness,'' |because this is the current term for them, are |to have no 
interpretations whatever put upon them; but |that their characters and modes of 
behaviour are to be |observed, as they might be while yet there had been none 
|of that organization of experiences which makes things |known in the ordinary 
sense. It is true that, thus misinterpreting |me in December, Prof&dot; Green, 
writing again |in March, puts into the mouth of an imagined advocate the |true 
statement of my view;<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> though he (Prof&dot; Green) then 
|proceeds to deny that I can mean what this imagined |advocate rightly says I 
mean: taking occasion to allege |that I use the phrase ``states of 
consciousness'' ``to give a |philosophical character'' to what would else seem 
``written |too much after the fashion of a newspaper 
correspondent.''<lr=f2>\s=d\</lr> |Even, however, had he admitted that intended 
meaning |which he sees, but denies, the rectification would have been |somewhat 
unsatisfactory, coming three months after various |

<fn>
<f2=c>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> <I>Contemporary Review,</I> March, 1878, p&dot; 753.

</f2=c>
<f3=c>
^F0^<no>\s=d\</no> <I>Ibid&dot;,</I> March, 1878, p&dot; 755.

</f3>
›
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^C0^absurdities, based on his misinterpretation, had been |ascribed to me.

^F0^But the most serious allegation made by Mr&dot; Hodgson |against Prof&dot; 
Green, and which I here repeat, is that he |habitually says I regard the object 
as constituted by ``the |aggregate of vivid states of consciousness,'' in face 
of the |conspicuous fact that I identify the object with the <I>nexus</I> |of 
this aggregate. In his defence Prof&dot; Green says\p=m-\

<q>
^F0^``If I had made any attempt to show that Mr&dot; Spencer believes the 
|object to be no more than an aggregate of vivid states of consciousness, 
|Mr&dot; Hodgson's complaint, that I ignore certain passages in which a 
contrary |persuasion is stated, would have been to the purpose.''

</q>
^C0^Let us look at the facts. Treating of the relation between |my view and the 
idealistic and sceptical views, he imagines |addresses made to me by Berkeley 
and Hume. ```You |agree with me,' Berkeley might say, `that when we speak |of 
the external world we are speaking of certain lively |ideas connected in a 
certain manner;'''<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> and this identification |of the world 
with ideas, I am tacitly represented as |accepting. Again, Hume is supposed to 
say to me\p=m-\``You |agree with me that what we call the world is a series of 
|impressions;''<lr=f2>\s=d\</lr> and here, as before, I am supposed silently 
|to acquiesce in this as a true statement of my view. |Similarly throughout his 
argument, Prof&dot; Green continually |states or implies that the object is, in 
my belief, constituted |by the vivid aggregate of states of consciousness. At 
the |outset of his second article,<lr=f3>\s=dd\</lr> he says of me:\p=m-\``He 
there'' |\[in the <I>Principles of Psychology</I>\] ``identifies the object 
with |a certain aggregate of vivid states of consciousness, which |he makes out 
to be independent of another aggregate, |consisting of faint states, and 
identified with the subject.'' |And admitting that he thus describes my view, 
he nevertheless |alleges that he does not misrepresent me, because, |as he 
says,<lr=f4>\s=s\</lr> ``there is scarcely a page of my article in |

<fn>
<f2=c>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> <I>Contemporary Review,</I> December, 1877, p&dot; 44.

</f2>


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