Re: Combine similar patterns

[anand kumar]

Hi

 

Please find the attached input.dat and output.dat

 

Thanks in advance for the help

 

Regards

Anand

Xavier Noria <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

On Mar 29, 2006, at 12:32, anand kumar wrote:

> Please find the file as an attachment with this mail

Well, that didn't look like a simplification at all. I asked for
another example with simplified notation because we already have an
idea of the actual input and because you need to provide the
*expected output* as well, which will be easier to produce and
understand that way.

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<r>
<c>main, par sa nature, emploie |successivement dans chacune de |ses recherches 
trois m\l=e'\thodes |de philosopher, dont le caract\l=e`\re |est 
essentiellement diff\l=e'\rent |m\l=e^\me radicalement oppos\l=e'\: |d'abord la 
m\l=e'\thode th\l=e'\ologique, |ensuite la m\l=e'\thode m\l=e'\taphysique, |et 
enfin la m\l=e'\thode positive.'' |<I>Cours&dot; de Philosophie |Positive,</I> 
1830, Vol&dot; i. p&dot; 3.</c>
<c>to the width of the generalizations which |experiences have determined; and 
they |change just as gradually as experiences |accumulate. The integration of 
causal |agencies, originally thought of as multi-tudinous |and local, but 
finally believed to |be one and universal, is a process which |involves the 
passing through all intermediate |steps between these extremes; |and any 
appearance of stages can be but |superficial. Supposed concrete and individual 
|causal agencies, coalesce in the |mind as fast as groups of phenomena are 
|assimilated, or seen to be similarly caused. |Along with their coalescence, 
comes a |greater extension of their individualities, |and a concomitant loss of 
distinctness in |their individualities. Gradually, by continuance |of such 
coalescences, causal |agencies become, in thought, diffused and |indefinite. 
And eventually, without any |change in the nature of the process, there |is 
reached the consciousness of a universal |causal agency, which cannot be 
conceived.<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr></c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``Le syst\l=e`\me th\l=e'\ologique est |parvenu \l=a`\ la plus haute 
perfection |dont il soit susceptible, |quand il a substitu\l=e'\ l'action 
|providentielle d'un \l=e^\tre unique |au jeu vari\l=e'\ des nombreuses 
|divinit\l=e'\s ind\l=e'\pendantes qui avaient |\l=e'\t\l=e'\ imagin\l=e'\es 
primitivement. |De m\l=e^\me, le dernier |terme du syst\l=e`\me metaphysique</c>
<c>As the progress of thought is one, so is |the end one. There are not three 
possible |terminal conceptions; but only a single |terminal conception. When 
the theological |idea of the providential action of one |being, is developed to 
its ultimate form, |by the absorption of all independent |secondary agencies, 
it becomes the conception |of a being immanent in all phenomena; |and the 
reduction of it to this</c>
</r>
›
<f1>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> A clear illustration of this process, is furnished by the 
recent mental integration |of Heat, Light, Electricity, etc&dot;, as modes of 
molecular motion. If |we go a step back, we see that the modern conception of 
Electricity, resulted |from the integration in consciousness, of the two forms 
of it involved in the |galvanic battery and in the electric-machine. And going 
back to a still |earlier stage, we see how the conception of statical 
electricity, arose by the |coalescence in thought, of the previously-separate 
forces manifested in rubbed |amber, in rubbed glass, and in lightning. With 
such illustrations before |him, no one can, I think, doubt that the process has 
been the same from the |beginning.

^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> Possibly it will be said that M&dot; Comte himself admits 
that what he calls |the perfection of the positive system, will probably never 
be reached; and |that what he condemns is the inquiry into the <I>natures</I> 
of causes and not the |general recognition of cause. To the first of these 
allegations I reply that, as |I understand M&dot; Comte, the obstacle to the 
perfect realization of the positive |philosophy is the impossibility of 
carrying generalization so far as to reduce |all particular facts to cases of 
one general fact\p=m-\not the impossibility of

^C0^excluding the consciousness of cause. And to the second allegation I reply 
|that the essential principle of his philosophy is an avowed ignoring of cause 
|altogether. For if it is not, <I>what becomes of his alleged distinction 
between |the perfection of the positive system and the perfection of the 
metaphysical |system?</I> And here let me point out that, by affirming exactly 
the opposite to |that which M&dot; Comte thus affirms, I am excluded from the 
positive school. |If his own definition of positivism is to be taken, then, as 
I hold that what he |defines as positivism is an absolute impossibility, it is 
clear that I cannot be |what he calls a positivist.

^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> A friendly critic alleges that M&dot; Comte is not fairly 
represented by this |quotation, and that he is blamed by his biographer, M&dot; 
Littr\l=e'\, for his too-great |insistance on feeling as a motor of humanity. 
If in his ``Positive Politics,'' |which I presume is here referred to, M&dot; 
Comte abandons his original position, |so much the better. But I am here 
dealing with what is known as ``the |Positive Philosophy;'' and that the 
passage above quoted does not misrepresent |it, is proved by the fact that this 
doctrine is re-asserted at the |commencement of the Sociology.

</f1>
›
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<r>
<c>consiste \l=a`\ concevoir, au lieu des |diff\l=e'\rentes entit\l=e'\s 
particuli\l=e`\res, |une seule grande entit\l=e'\ g\l=e'\n\l=e'\rale, |la 
<I>nature,</I> envisag\l=e'\e comme la |source unique de tous les 
ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes. |Pareillement, la perfection |du syst\l=e`\me positif, 
vers |laquelle il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il |soit tr\l=e`\s-probable qu'il ne 
|doive jamais l'atteindre, serait |de pouvoir se repr\l=e'\senter tous |les 
divers ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes observables |comme des cas particuliers |d'un seul 
fait g\l=e'\n\l=e'\ral, tel que |celui de la gravitation, par |exemple.'' 
p&dot; 5.</c>
<c>state, implies the fading-away, in thought, |of all those anthropomorphic 
attributes by |which the aboriginal idea was distinguished. |The alleged last 
term of the |metaphysical system\p=m-\the conception of a |single great general 
entity, <I>nature,</I> as the |source of all phenomena\p=m-\is a conception 
|identical with the previous one: the consciousness |of a single source which, 
in |coming to be regarded as universal, ceases |to be regarded as conceivable, 
differs in |nothing but name from the consciousness |of one being, manifested 
in all phenomena. |And similarly, that which is described as |the ideal state 
of science\p=m-\the power to |represent all observable phenomena as |particular 
cases of a single general fact, |implies the postulating of some ultimate 
|existence of which this single fact is |alleged; and the postulating of this 
|ultimate existence, involves a state of |consciousness indistinguishable from 
the |other two.</c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``. . . la perfection du syst\l=e`\me |positif, vers laquelle il |tend sans 
cesse, quoiqu'il soit |tr\l=e`\s-probable, qu'il ne doive |jamais l'atteindre, 
serait de |pouvoir se repr\l=e'\senter tous les |divers ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes 
observables |comme des cas particuliers d'un |seul fait g\l=e'\n\l=e'\ral. 
p&dot; 5. . . . . . |consid\l=e'\rant comme absolument |inaccessible, et vide 
de sens pour |nous la recherche de ce qu'on |appelle les <I>causes,</I> soit 
premi\l=e`\res, |soit finales.'' p&dot; 14.</c>
<c>Though along with the extension of |generalizations, and concomitant 
integration |of conceived causal agencies, the conceptions |of causal agencies 
grow more |indefinite; and though as they gradually |coalesce into a universal 
causal agency, |they cease to be representable in thought, |and are no longer 
supposed to be comprehensible; |yet the consciousness of <I>cause</I> |remains 
as dominant to the last as it was |at first; and can never be got rid of. The 
|consciousness of cause can be abolished |only by abolishing consciousness 
itself.<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> |(<I>First Principles,</I> \s=s\ 26.)</c>
</r>
›

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<r>
<c>``Ce n'est pas aux lecteurs |de cet ouvrage que je croirai |jamais devoir 
prouver que les |id\l=e'\es gouvernent et bouleversent |le monde, ou, en 
d'autres termes, |que tout le m\l=e'\canisme social |repose finalement sur des 
opinions. |Ils savent surtout que la |grande crise politique et morale |des 
soci\l=e'\t\l=e'\s actuelles tient, en |derni\l=e`\re analyse, \l=a`\ 
l'anarchie |intellectuelle.'' p&dot; 48.<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr></c>
<c>Ideas do not govern and overthrow the |world: the world is governed or 
overthrown |by feelings, to which ideas serve |only as guides. The social 
mechanism |does not rest finally on opinions; but |almost wholly on character. 
Not intellectual |anarchy, but moral antagonism, is |the cause of political 
crises. All social |phenomena are produced by the totality |of human emotions 
and beliefs; of which |the emotions are mainly pre-determined, |while the 
beliefs are mainly post-determined. |Men's desires are chiefly inherited; |but 
their beliefs are chiefly |acquired, and depend on surrounding conditions; |and 
the most important surrounding |conditions depend on the social state |which 
the prevalent desires have produced. |The social state at any time existing, is 
|the resultant of all the ambitions, self-interests, |fears, reverences, 
indignations, |sympathies, etc&dot;, of ancestral citizens and |existing 
citizens. The ideas current in |this social state, must, on the average, be 
|congruous with the feelings of citizens; |and therefore, on the average, with 
the |social state these feelings have produced. |Ideas wholly foreign to this 
social state</c>
</r>
›
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<r>
<c></c>
<c>cannot be evolved, and if introduced from |without, cannot get 
accepted\p=m-\or, if |accepted, die out when the temporary |phase of feeling 
which caused their acceptance, |ends. Hence, though advanced |ideas when once 
established, act on |society and aid its further advance; yet |the 
establishment of such ideas depends |on the fitness of the society for 
receiving |them. Practically, the popular character |and the social state, 
determine what ideas |shall be current; instead of the current |ideas 
determining the social state and the |character. The modification of men's 
|moral natures, caused by the continuous |discipline of social life, which 
adapts |them more and more to social relations, |is therefore the chief 
proximate cause of |social progress. (<I>Social Statics,</I> chap&dot; 
|XXX.)</c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``. . . je ne dois pas n\l=e'\gliger |d'indiquer d'avance, comme |une 
propri\l=e'\t\l=e'\ essentielle de |l'\l=e'\chelle encyclop\l=e'\dique que je 
|vais proposer, sa conformit\l=e'\ |g\l=e'\n\l=e'\rale avec l'ensemble de 
|l'histoire scientifique; en ce |sens, que, malgr\l=e'\ la 
simultan\l=e'\it\l=e'\ |r\l=e'\elle et continue du d\l=e'\veloppement |des 
diff\l=e'\rentes sciences, |celles qui seront class\l=e'\es comme 
|ant\l=e'\rieures seront, en effet, plus |anciennes et constamment plus 
|avanc\l=e'\es que celles pr\l=e'\sent\l=e'\es |comme post\l=e'\rieures.'' 
p&dot; 84. . . |. . . . . . ``Cet ordre est d\l=e'\termin\l=e'\ |par le 
degr\l=e'\ de simplicit\l=e'\, |ou, ce qui revient au |m\l=e^\me, par le 
degr\l=e'\ de g\l=e'\n\l=e'\ralit\l=e'\ |des ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes.'' p&dot; 
87.</c>
<c>The order in which the generalizations |of science are established, is 
determined |by the frequency and impressiveness with |which different classes 
of relations are |repeated in conscious experience; and |this depends, partly 
on <I>the directness with |which personal welfare is affected;</I> partly |on 
<I>the conspicuousness of one or both the |phenomena between which a relation 
is to be |perceived;</I> partly on <I>the absolute frequency |with which the 
relations occur;</I> partly on |their <I>relative frequency of occurrence;</I> 
|partly on their <I>degree of simplicity;</I> and |partly on their <I>degree of 
abstractness.</I> |(<I>First Principles,</I> 1st ed&dot;, \s=s\ 36; or 
otherwise |see <I>``Essay on Laws in General and |the Order of their 
Discovery.''</I>)</c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``En r\l=e'\sultat d\l=e'\finitif, la |math\l=e'\matique, l'astronomie, la 
|physique, la chimie, la physiologie, |et la physique sociale;</c>
<c>The sciences as arranged in this succession |specified by M&dot; Comte, 
<I>do not</I> |logically conform to the natural and invariable |hierarchy of 
phenomena; and</c>
</r>
›

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^C0^against which he more especially urges his objections. In |chapters 
entitled ``Partial Differentiation of Subject and |Object,'' ``Completed 
Differentiation of Subject and |Object,'' and ``Developed Conception of the 
Object,'' I have |endeavoured, as these titles imply, to trace up the gradual 
|establishment of this fundamental antithesis in a developing |intelligence. It 
appeared to me, and still appears, that for |coherent thinking there must be 
excluded at the outset, |not only whatever implies acquired knowledge of 
objective |existence, but also whatever implies acquired knowledge |of 
subjective existence. At the close of the chapter preceding |those just named, 
as well as in <I>First Principles,</I> |where this process of differentiation 
was more briefly |indicated, I recognized, and emphatically enlarged upon, the 
|difficulty of carrying out such an inquiry: pointing out |that in any attempts 
we make to observe the way in which |subject and object become distinguished, 
we inevitably use |those faculties and conceptions which have grown up while 
|the differentiation of the two has been going on. In trying |to discern the 
initial stages of the process, we carry with |us all the products which belong 
to the final stage, and |cannot free ourselves from them. In <I>First 
Principles</I> |(\s=s\ 43) I have pointed out that the words <I>impressions</I> 
and |<I>ideas,</I> the term <I>sensation,</I> the phrase <I>state of 
consciousness,</I> |severally involve large systems of beliefs; and that if we 
|allow ourselves to recognize their connotations we inevitably |reason 
circularly. And in the closing sentence of the |chapter preceding those above 
named, I have said\p=m-\

<q>
^F0^``Though in every illustration taken we shall have tacitly to posit an 
|external existence, and in every reference to states of consciousness we shall 
|have to posit an internal existence which has these states; yet, as before, we 
|must ignore these implications.''

</q>
^F0^I should have thought that, with all these cautions before |him, Prof&dot; 
Green would not have fallen into the error of |supposing that in the argument 
thereupon commenced, the |phrase ``states of consciousness'' is used with all 
its |ordinary implications. I should have thought that, as in |
›
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^C0^a note appended to the outset of the argument I have |referred to the 
parallel argument in <I>First Principles,</I> where |I have used the phrase 
``manifestations of existence'' |instead of ``states of consciousness,'' as the 
least objectionable; |and as the argument in the <I>Psychology</I> is 
definitely |described in this note as a re-statement in a different form |of 
the argument in <I>First Principles;</I> he would have seen |that in the phrase 
``states of consciousness,'' as used |throughout this chapter, was to be 
included no more |meaning than was included in the phrase ``manifestations |of 
existence.''<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> I should have thought he would have seen |that 
the purpose of the chapter was passively to watch, |with no greater 
intelligence than is implied in watching, |how the manifestations or states, 
vivid and faint, comport |themselves: excluding all thought of their 
meanings\p=m-\all |interpretations of them. Nevertheless, Prof&dot; Green 
charges |me with having, at the outset of the examination, invalidated |my 
argument by implying, in the terms I use, certain |products of developed 
consciousness.<lr=f2>\s=d\</lr> He contends that |my division of the ``states 
of consciousness,'' or, as I elsewhere |term them, ``manifestations of 
existence,'' into vivid |and faint, is vitiated from the first by including 
along with |the vivid ones those faint ones needful to constitute them 
|perceptions, in the ordinary sense of the word. Because, |describing all I 
passively watch, I speak of a distant headland, |

<fn>
<f2>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> If I am asked why here I used the phrase ``states of 
consciousness'' |rather than ``manifestations of existence,'' though I had 
previously preferred |the last to the first, I give as my reason the desire to 
maintain |continuity of language with the preceding chapter, ``The Dynamics of 
|Consciousness.'' In that chapter an examination of consciousness had been 
|made with the view of ascertaining what principle of cohesion determines |our 
beliefs, as preliminary to observing how this principle operates in 
|establishing the beliefs in subject and object. But on proceeding to do this, 
|the phrase ``state of consciousness'' was supposed, like the phrase 
``manifestation |of existence,'' not to be used as anything more than a name by 
|which to distinguish this or that form of being, as an undeveloped receptivity 
|would become aware of it, while yet self and not-self were undistinguished.

^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> <I>Contemporary Review,</I> March, 1878, p&dot; 753.

^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> <I>Contemporary Review,</I> December, 1877, p&dot; 44.
</f2>
<f3>
^F0^<no>\s=d\</no> <I>Contemporary Review,</I> December, 1877, pp&dot; 49, 50.

^F0^<no>\s=d\</no> <I>Ibid&dot;,</I> March, 1878, p&dot; 755.
</f3>
›
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^C0^of waves, of boats, &c&dot;, he actually supposes me to be |speaking of 
those developed cognitions under which these |are classed as such and such 
objects. What would he have |me do? It is impossible to give any such account 
of the |process as I have attempted, without using names for |things and 
actions. The various manifestations, vivid and |faint, which in the case 
described impose themselves on |my receptivity, must be indicated in some way; 
and the |words indicating them inevitably carry with them their |respective 
connotations. What more can I do than warn |the reader that all these 
connotations must be ignored, and |that attention must be paid exclusively to 
the manifestations |themselves, and the modes in which they comport themselves. 
|At the stage described in this ``partial differentiation,'' |while I suppose 
myself as yet unconscious of my |own individuality and of a world as separate 
from it, the |obvious implication is, that what I name ``states of 
consciousness,'' |because this is the current term for them, are |to have no 
interpretations whatever put upon them; but |that their characters and modes of 
behaviour are to be |observed, as they might be while yet there had been none 
|of that organization of experiences which makes things |known in the ordinary 
sense. It is true that, thus misinterpreting |me in December, Prof&dot; Green, 
writing again |in March, puts into the mouth of an imagined advocate the |true 
statement of my view;<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> though he (Prof&dot; Green) then 
|proceeds to deny that I can mean what this imagined |advocate rightly says I 
mean: taking occasion to allege |that I use the phrase ``states of 
consciousness'' ``to give a |philosophical character'' to what would else seem 
``written |too much after the fashion of a newspaper 
correspondent.''<lr=f2>\s=d\</lr> |Even, however, had he admitted that intended 
meaning |which he sees, but denies, the rectification would have been |somewhat 
unsatisfactory, coming three months after various |
›
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^C0^absurdities, based on his misinterpretation, had been |ascribed to me.

^F0^But the most serious allegation made by Mr&dot; Hodgson |against Prof&dot; 
Green, and which I here repeat, is that he |habitually says I regard the object 
as constituted by ``the |aggregate of vivid states of consciousness,'' in face 
of the |conspicuous fact that I identify the object with the <I>nexus</I> |of 
this aggregate. In his defence Prof&dot; Green says\p=m-\

<q>
^F0^``If I had made any attempt to show that Mr&dot; Spencer believes the 
|object to be no more than an aggregate of vivid states of consciousness, 
|Mr&dot; Hodgson's complaint, that I ignore certain passages in which a 
contrary |persuasion is stated, would have been to the purpose.''

</q>
^C0^Let us look at the facts. Treating of the relation between |my view and the 
idealistic and sceptical views, he imagines |addresses made to me by Berkeley 
and Hume. ```You |agree with me,' Berkeley might say, `that when we speak |of 
the external world we are speaking of certain lively |ideas connected in a 
certain manner;'''<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> and this identification |of the world 
with ideas, I am tacitly represented as |accepting. Again, Hume is supposed to 
say to me\p=m-\``You |agree with me that what we call the world is a series of 
|impressions;''<lr=f2>\s=d\</lr> and here, as before, I am supposed silently 
|to acquiesce in this as a true statement of my view. |Similarly throughout his 
argument, Prof&dot; Green continually |states or implies that the object is, in 
my belief, constituted |by the vivid aggregate of states of consciousness. At 
the |outset of his second article,<lr=f3>\s=dd\</lr> he says of me:\p=m-\``He 
there'' |\[in the <I>Principles of Psychology</I>\] ``identifies the object 
with |a certain aggregate of vivid states of consciousness, which |he makes out 
to be independent of another aggregate, |consisting of faint states, and 
identified with the subject.'' |And admitting that he thus describes my view, 
he nevertheless |alleges that he does not misrepresent me, because, |as he 
says,<lr=f4>\s=s\</lr> ``there is scarcely a page of my article in |


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<r>
<c>main, par sa nature, emploie |successivement dans chacune de |ses recherches 
trois m\l=e'\thodes |de philosopher, dont le caract\l=e`\re |est 
essentiellement diff\l=e'\rent |m\l=e^\me radicalement oppos\l=e'\: |d'abord la 
m\l=e'\thode th\l=e'\ologique, |ensuite la m\l=e'\thode m\l=e'\taphysique, |et 
enfin la m\l=e'\thode positive.'' |<I>Cours&dot; de Philosophie |Positive,</I> 
1830, Vol&dot; i. p&dot; 3.</c>
<c>to the width of the generalizations which |experiences have determined; and 
they |change just as gradually as experiences |accumulate. The integration of 
causal |agencies, originally thought of as multi-tudinous |and local, but 
finally believed to |be one and universal, is a process which |involves the 
passing through all intermediate |steps between these extremes; |and any 
appearance of stages can be but |superficial. Supposed concrete and individual 
|causal agencies, coalesce in the |mind as fast as groups of phenomena are 
|assimilated, or seen to be similarly caused. |Along with their coalescence, 
comes a |greater extension of their individualities, |and a concomitant loss of 
distinctness in |their individualities. Gradually, by continuance |of such 
coalescences, causal |agencies become, in thought, diffused and |indefinite. 
And eventually, without any |change in the nature of the process, there |is 
reached the consciousness of a universal |causal agency, which cannot be 
conceived.<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr></c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``Le syst\l=e`\me th\l=e'\ologique est |parvenu \l=a`\ la plus haute 
perfection |dont il soit susceptible, |quand il a substitu\l=e'\ l'action 
|providentielle d'un \l=e^\tre unique |au jeu vari\l=e'\ des nombreuses 
|divinit\l=e'\s ind\l=e'\pendantes qui avaient |\l=e'\t\l=e'\ imagin\l=e'\es 
primitivement. |De m\l=e^\me, le dernier |terme du syst\l=e`\me metaphysique</c>
<c>As the progress of thought is one, so is |the end one. There are not three 
possible |terminal conceptions; but only a single |terminal conception. When 
the theological |idea of the providential action of one |being, is developed to 
its ultimate form, |by the absorption of all independent |secondary agencies, 
it becomes the conception |of a being immanent in all phenomena; |and the 
reduction of it to this</c>
</r>
›
<f1>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> A clear illustration of this process, is furnished by the 
recent mental integration |of Heat, Light, Electricity, etc&dot;, as modes of 
molecular motion. If |we go a step back, we see that the modern conception of 
Electricity, resulted |from the integration in consciousness, of the two forms 
of it involved in the |galvanic battery and in the electric-machine. And going 
back to a still |earlier stage, we see how the conception of statical 
electricity, arose by the |coalescence in thought, of the previously-separate 
forces manifested in rubbed |amber, in rubbed glass, and in lightning. With 
such illustrations before |him, no one can, I think, doubt that the process has 
been the same from the |beginning.

</f1=c>
›
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<r>
<c>consiste \l=a`\ concevoir, au lieu des |diff\l=e'\rentes entit\l=e'\s 
particuli\l=e`\res, |une seule grande entit\l=e'\ g\l=e'\n\l=e'\rale, |la 
<I>nature,</I> envisag\l=e'\e comme la |source unique de tous les 
ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes. |Pareillement, la perfection |du syst\l=e`\me positif, 
vers |laquelle il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il |soit tr\l=e`\s-probable qu'il ne 
|doive jamais l'atteindre, serait |de pouvoir se repr\l=e'\senter tous |les 
divers ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes observables |comme des cas particuliers |d'un seul 
fait g\l=e'\n\l=e'\ral, tel que |celui de la gravitation, par |exemple.'' 
p&dot; 5.</c>
<c>state, implies the fading-away, in thought, |of all those anthropomorphic 
attributes by |which the aboriginal idea was distinguished. |The alleged last 
term of the |metaphysical system\p=m-\the conception of a |single great general 
entity, <I>nature,</I> as the |source of all phenomena\p=m-\is a conception 
|identical with the previous one: the consciousness |of a single source which, 
in |coming to be regarded as universal, ceases |to be regarded as conceivable, 
differs in |nothing but name from the consciousness |of one being, manifested 
in all phenomena. |And similarly, that which is described as |the ideal state 
of science\p=m-\the power to |represent all observable phenomena as |particular 
cases of a single general fact, |implies the postulating of some ultimate 
|existence of which this single fact is |alleged; and the postulating of this 
|ultimate existence, involves a state of |consciousness indistinguishable from 
the |other two.</c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``. . . la perfection du syst\l=e`\me |positif, vers laquelle il |tend sans 
cesse, quoiqu'il soit |tr\l=e`\s-probable, qu'il ne doive |jamais l'atteindre, 
serait de |pouvoir se repr\l=e'\senter tous les |divers ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes 
observables |comme des cas particuliers d'un |seul fait g\l=e'\n\l=e'\ral. 
p&dot; 5. . . . . . |consid\l=e'\rant comme absolument |inaccessible, et vide 
de sens pour |nous la recherche de ce qu'on |appelle les <I>causes,</I> soit 
premi\l=e`\res, |soit finales.'' p&dot; 14.</c>
<c>Though along with the extension of |generalizations, and concomitant 
integration |of conceived causal agencies, the conceptions |of causal agencies 
grow more |indefinite; and though as they gradually |coalesce into a universal 
causal agency, |they cease to be representable in thought, |and are no longer 
supposed to be comprehensible; |yet the consciousness of <I>cause</I> |remains 
as dominant to the last as it was |at first; and can never be got rid of. The 
|consciousness of cause can be abolished |only by abolishing consciousness 
itself.<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> |(<I>First Principles,</I> \s=s\ 26.)</c>
</r>
›
<f1=c>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> Possibly it will be said that M&dot; Comte himself admits 
that what he calls |the perfection of the positive system, will probably never 
be reached; and |that what he condemns is the inquiry into the <I>natures</I> 
of causes and not the |general recognition of cause. To the first of these 
allegations I reply that, as |I understand M&dot; Comte, the obstacle to the 
perfect realization of the positive |philosophy is the impossibility of 
carrying generalization so far as to reduce |all particular facts to cases of 
one general fact\p=m-\not the impossibility of
›
</f1=c>

~APG 0020147
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~TXT 
<r>
<c>``Ce n'est pas aux lecteurs |de cet ouvrage que je croirai |jamais devoir 
prouver que les |id\l=e'\es gouvernent et bouleversent |le monde, ou, en 
d'autres termes, |que tout le m\l=e'\canisme social |repose finalement sur des 
opinions. |Ils savent surtout que la |grande crise politique et morale |des 
soci\l=e'\t\l=e'\s actuelles tient, en |derni\l=e`\re analyse, \l=a`\ 
l'anarchie |intellectuelle.'' p&dot; 48.<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr></c>
<c>Ideas do not govern and overthrow the |world: the world is governed or 
overthrown |by feelings, to which ideas serve |only as guides. The social 
mechanism |does not rest finally on opinions; but |almost wholly on character. 
Not intellectual |anarchy, but moral antagonism, is |the cause of political 
crises. All social |phenomena are produced by the totality |of human emotions 
and beliefs; of which |the emotions are mainly pre-determined, |while the 
beliefs are mainly post-determined. |Men's desires are chiefly inherited; |but 
their beliefs are chiefly |acquired, and depend on surrounding conditions; |and 
the most important surrounding |conditions depend on the social state |which 
the prevalent desires have produced. |The social state at any time existing, is 
|the resultant of all the ambitions, self-interests, |fears, reverences, 
indignations, |sympathies, etc&dot;, of ancestral citizens and |existing 
citizens. The ideas current in |this social state, must, on the average, be 
|congruous with the feelings of citizens; |and therefore, on the average, with 
the |social state these feelings have produced. |Ideas wholly foreign to this 
social state</c>
</r>
›
<f1=c>
^C0^excluding the consciousness of cause. And to the second allegation I reply 
|that the essential principle of his philosophy is an avowed ignoring of cause 
|altogether. For if it is not, <I>what becomes of his alleged distinction 
between |the perfection of the positive system and the perfection of the 
metaphysical |system?</I> And here let me point out that, by affirming exactly 
the opposite to |that which M&dot; Comte thus affirms, I am excluded from the 
positive school. |If his own definition of positivism is to be taken, then, as 
I hold that what he |defines as positivism is an absolute impossibility, it is 
clear that I cannot be |what he calls a positivist.

</f1=c>
›
~APG 0020148
~SPG 129                 
~TXT 
<r>
<c></c>
<c>cannot be evolved, and if introduced from |without, cannot get 
accepted\p=m-\or, if |accepted, die out when the temporary |phase of feeling 
which caused their acceptance, |ends. Hence, though advanced |ideas when once 
established, act on |society and aid its further advance; yet |the 
establishment of such ideas depends |on the fitness of the society for 
receiving |them. Practically, the popular character |and the social state, 
determine what ideas |shall be current; instead of the current |ideas 
determining the social state and the |character. The modification of men's 
|moral natures, caused by the continuous |discipline of social life, which 
adapts |them more and more to social relations, |is therefore the chief 
proximate cause of |social progress. (<I>Social Statics,</I> chap&dot; 
|XXX.)</c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``. . . je ne dois pas n\l=e'\gliger |d'indiquer d'avance, comme |une 
propri\l=e'\t\l=e'\ essentielle de |l'\l=e'\chelle encyclop\l=e'\dique que je 
|vais proposer, sa conformit\l=e'\ |g\l=e'\n\l=e'\rale avec l'ensemble de 
|l'histoire scientifique; en ce |sens, que, malgr\l=e'\ la 
simultan\l=e'\it\l=e'\ |r\l=e'\elle et continue du d\l=e'\veloppement |des 
diff\l=e'\rentes sciences, |celles qui seront class\l=e'\es comme 
|ant\l=e'\rieures seront, en effet, plus |anciennes et constamment plus 
|avanc\l=e'\es que celles pr\l=e'\sent\l=e'\es |comme post\l=e'\rieures.'' 
p&dot; 84. . . |. . . . . . ``Cet ordre est d\l=e'\termin\l=e'\ |par le 
degr\l=e'\ de simplicit\l=e'\, |ou, ce qui revient au |m\l=e^\me, par le 
degr\l=e'\ de g\l=e'\n\l=e'\ralit\l=e'\ |des ph\l=e'\nom\l=e`\nes.'' p&dot; 
87.</c>
<c>The order in which the generalizations |of science are established, is 
determined |by the frequency and impressiveness with |which different classes 
of relations are |repeated in conscious experience; and |this depends, partly 
on <I>the directness with |which personal welfare is affected;</I> partly |on 
<I>the conspicuousness of one or both the |phenomena between which a relation 
is to be |perceived;</I> partly on <I>the absolute frequency |with which the 
relations occur;</I> partly on |their <I>relative frequency of occurrence;</I> 
|partly on their <I>degree of simplicity;</I> and |partly on their <I>degree of 
abstractness.</I> |(<I>First Principles,</I> 1st ed&dot;, \s=s\ 36; or 
otherwise |see <I>``Essay on Laws in General and |the Order of their 
Discovery.''</I>)</c>
</r>
<r>
<c>``En r\l=e'\sultat d\l=e'\finitif, la |math\l=e'\matique, l'astronomie, la 
|physique, la chimie, la physiologie, |et la physique sociale;</c>
<c>The sciences as arranged in this succession |specified by M&dot; Comte, 
<I>do not</I> |logically conform to the natural and invariable |hierarchy of 
phenomena; and</c>
</r>
›
<f1=c>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> A friendly critic alleges that M&dot; Comte is not fairly 
represented by this |quotation, and that he is blamed by his biographer, M&dot; 
Littr\l=e'\, for his too-great |insistance on feeling as a motor of humanity. 
If in his ``Positive Politics,'' |which I presume is here referred to, M&dot; 
Comte abandons his original position, |so much the better. But I am here 
dealing with what is known as ``the |Positive Philosophy;'' and that the 
passage above quoted does not misrepresent |it, is proved by the fact that this 
doctrine is re-asserted at the |commencement of the Sociology.

</f1>

~DNO 357
~APG 0020345
~SPG 326                 
~TXT 
^C0^against which he more especially urges his objections. In |chapters 
entitled ``Partial Differentiation of Subject and |Object,'' ``Completed 
Differentiation of Subject and |Object,'' and ``Developed Conception of the 
Object,'' I have |endeavoured, as these titles imply, to trace up the gradual 
|establishment of this fundamental antithesis in a developing |intelligence. It 
appeared to me, and still appears, that for |coherent thinking there must be 
excluded at the outset, |not only whatever implies acquired knowledge of 
objective |existence, but also whatever implies acquired knowledge |of 
subjective existence. At the close of the chapter preceding |those just named, 
as well as in <I>First Principles,</I> |where this process of differentiation 
was more briefly |indicated, I recognized, and emphatically enlarged upon, the 
|difficulty of carrying out such an inquiry: pointing out |that in any attempts 
we make to observe the way in which |subject and object become distinguished, 
we inevitably use |those faculties and conceptions which have grown up while 
|the differentiation of the two has been going on. In trying |to discern the 
initial stages of the process, we carry with |us all the products which belong 
to the final stage, and |cannot free ourselves from them. In <I>First 
Principles</I> |(\s=s\ 43) I have pointed out that the words <I>impressions</I> 
and |<I>ideas,</I> the term <I>sensation,</I> the phrase <I>state of 
consciousness,</I> |severally involve large systems of beliefs; and that if we 
|allow ourselves to recognize their connotations we inevitably |reason 
circularly. And in the closing sentence of the |chapter preceding those above 
named, I have said\p=m-\

<q>
^F0^``Though in every illustration taken we shall have tacitly to posit an 
|external existence, and in every reference to states of consciousness we shall 
|have to posit an internal existence which has these states; yet, as before, we 
|must ignore these implications.''

</q>
^F0^I should have thought that, with all these cautions before |him, Prof&dot; 
Green would not have fallen into the error of |supposing that in the argument 
thereupon commenced, the |phrase ``states of consciousness'' is used with all 
its |ordinary implications. I should have thought that, as in |
›
~APG 0020346
~SPG 327                 
~TXT 
^C0^a note appended to the outset of the argument I have |referred to the 
parallel argument in <I>First Principles,</I> where |I have used the phrase 
``manifestations of existence'' |instead of ``states of consciousness,'' as the 
least objectionable; |and as the argument in the <I>Psychology</I> is 
definitely |described in this note as a re-statement in a different form |of 
the argument in <I>First Principles;</I> he would have seen |that in the phrase 
``states of consciousness,'' as used |throughout this chapter, was to be 
included no more |meaning than was included in the phrase ``manifestations |of 
existence.''<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> I should have thought he would have seen |that 
the purpose of the chapter was passively to watch, |with no greater 
intelligence than is implied in watching, |how the manifestations or states, 
vivid and faint, comport |themselves: excluding all thought of their 
meanings\p=m-\all |interpretations of them. Nevertheless, Prof&dot; Green 
charges |me with having, at the outset of the examination, invalidated |my 
argument by implying, in the terms I use, certain |products of developed 
consciousness.<lr=f2>\s=d\</lr> He contends that |my division of the ``states 
of consciousness,'' or, as I elsewhere |term them, ``manifestations of 
existence,'' into vivid |and faint, is vitiated from the first by including 
along with |the vivid ones those faint ones needful to constitute them 
|perceptions, in the ordinary sense of the word. Because, |describing all I 
passively watch, I speak of a distant headland, |

<fn>
<f2>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> If I am asked why here I used the phrase ``states of 
consciousness'' |rather than ``manifestations of existence,'' though I had 
previously preferred |the last to the first, I give as my reason the desire to 
maintain |continuity of language with the preceding chapter, ``The Dynamics of 
|Consciousness.'' In that chapter an examination of consciousness had been 
|made with the view of ascertaining what principle of cohesion determines |our 
beliefs, as preliminary to observing how this principle operates in 
|establishing the beliefs in subject and object. But on proceeding to do this, 
|the phrase ``state of consciousness'' was supposed, like the phrase 
``manifestation |of existence,'' not to be used as anything more than a name by 
|which to distinguish this or that form of being, as an undeveloped receptivity 
|would become aware of it, while yet self and not-self were undistinguished.

</f2=c>
<f3>
^F0^<no>\s=d\</no> <I>Contemporary Review,</I> December, 1877, pp&dot; 49, 50.

</f3=c>
›
~APG 0020347
~SPG 328                 
~TXT 
^C0^of waves, of boats, &c&dot;, he actually supposes me to be |speaking of 
those developed cognitions under which these |are classed as such and such 
objects. What would he have |me do? It is impossible to give any such account 
of the |process as I have attempted, without using names for |things and 
actions. The various manifestations, vivid and |faint, which in the case 
described impose themselves on |my receptivity, must be indicated in some way; 
and the |words indicating them inevitably carry with them their |respective 
connotations. What more can I do than warn |the reader that all these 
connotations must be ignored, and |that attention must be paid exclusively to 
the manifestations |themselves, and the modes in which they comport themselves. 
|At the stage described in this ``partial differentiation,'' |while I suppose 
myself as yet unconscious of my |own individuality and of a world as separate 
from it, the |obvious implication is, that what I name ``states of 
consciousness,'' |because this is the current term for them, are |to have no 
interpretations whatever put upon them; but |that their characters and modes of 
behaviour are to be |observed, as they might be while yet there had been none 
|of that organization of experiences which makes things |known in the ordinary 
sense. It is true that, thus misinterpreting |me in December, Prof&dot; Green, 
writing again |in March, puts into the mouth of an imagined advocate the |true 
statement of my view;<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> though he (Prof&dot; Green) then 
|proceeds to deny that I can mean what this imagined |advocate rightly says I 
mean: taking occasion to allege |that I use the phrase ``states of 
consciousness'' ``to give a |philosophical character'' to what would else seem 
``written |too much after the fashion of a newspaper 
correspondent.''<lr=f2>\s=d\</lr> |Even, however, had he admitted that intended 
meaning |which he sees, but denies, the rectification would have been |somewhat 
unsatisfactory, coming three months after various |

<fn>
<f2=c>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> <I>Contemporary Review,</I> March, 1878, p&dot; 753.

</f2=c>
<f3=c>
^F0^<no>\s=d\</no> <I>Ibid&dot;,</I> March, 1878, p&dot; 755.

</f3>
›
~APG 0020348
~SPG 329                 
~TXT 
^C0^absurdities, based on his misinterpretation, had been |ascribed to me.

^F0^But the most serious allegation made by Mr&dot; Hodgson |against Prof&dot; 
Green, and which I here repeat, is that he |habitually says I regard the object 
as constituted by ``the |aggregate of vivid states of consciousness,'' in face 
of the |conspicuous fact that I identify the object with the <I>nexus</I> |of 
this aggregate. In his defence Prof&dot; Green says\p=m-\

<q>
^F0^``If I had made any attempt to show that Mr&dot; Spencer believes the 
|object to be no more than an aggregate of vivid states of consciousness, 
|Mr&dot; Hodgson's complaint, that I ignore certain passages in which a 
contrary |persuasion is stated, would have been to the purpose.''

</q>
^C0^Let us look at the facts. Treating of the relation between |my view and the 
idealistic and sceptical views, he imagines |addresses made to me by Berkeley 
and Hume. ```You |agree with me,' Berkeley might say, `that when we speak |of 
the external world we are speaking of certain lively |ideas connected in a 
certain manner;'''<lr=f1><R>*</R></lr> and this identification |of the world 
with ideas, I am tacitly represented as |accepting. Again, Hume is supposed to 
say to me\p=m-\``You |agree with me that what we call the world is a series of 
|impressions;''<lr=f2>\s=d\</lr> and here, as before, I am supposed silently 
|to acquiesce in this as a true statement of my view. |Similarly throughout his 
argument, Prof&dot; Green continually |states or implies that the object is, in 
my belief, constituted |by the vivid aggregate of states of consciousness. At 
the |outset of his second article,<lr=f3>\s=dd\</lr> he says of me:\p=m-\``He 
there'' |\[in the <I>Principles of Psychology</I>\] ``identifies the object 
with |a certain aggregate of vivid states of consciousness, which |he makes out 
to be independent of another aggregate, |consisting of faint states, and 
identified with the subject.'' |And admitting that he thus describes my view, 
he nevertheless |alleges that he does not misrepresent me, because, |as he 
says,<lr=f4>\s=s\</lr> ``there is scarcely a page of my article in |

<fn>
<f2=c>
^F0^<no><R>*</R></no> <I>Contemporary Review,</I> December, 1877, p&dot; 44.

</f2>


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