Authors,

While reviewing this document during AUTH48 
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9761.html and other formats), please 
resolve the following questions, which are also in the XML file.

1) <!-- [rfced] For clarity, we have updated the title and the first 
sentence of the  Abstract from the combined abbreviation
"(D)TLS" to "TLS and DTLS". Afterwards, "D(TLS)" will be used in the
document. 

Original:
   This memo extends the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
   specification to allow manufacturers to define (D)TLS profile
   parameters.

Current:
   This memo extends the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
   specification to allow manufacturers to define TLS and DTLS profile
   parameters
-->


2) <!-- [rfced] Please insert any keywords (beyond those that appear in
the title) for use on https://www.rfc-editor.org/search. -->


3) <!-- [rfced] We have rephrased "non-malware" in the text below. Please let us
know if you refer otherwise.

Original:
   Malware often reuses certain libraries, and there are notable
   differences in how malware uses encryption compared to non-malware.

Current:
   Malware often reuses certain libraries, and there are notable
   differences in how malware uses encryption compared to software
   that is not malware.
 -->


4) <!-- [rfced] Please clarify the following sentence. We note that DDR is
defined in RFC 9462, and DNR is defined in RFC 9463. We also note that
RFC 9463 is cited for DNR later in this document. May we update the text 
as shown below?

Original:
   *  Using an alternative DNS server (via encrypted transport) to avoid
      detection by malware DNS filtering services [malware-doh].
      Specifically, malware may not use the Do53 or encrypted DNS server
      provided by the local network (DHCP, DNR [RFC9462] or DDR
      [RFC9462]).

Perhaps:

   * Using an alternative DNS server (via encrypted transport) to avoid
     detection by malware DNS filtering services [malware-doh]. Specifically,
     malware may not use the Do53 or encrypted DNS server provided by the
     local network (DHCP, Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR)
     [RFC9463], or Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR) [RFC9462]).
-->


5) <!-- [rfced] We find that the phrase "layers 3 and 4 Access Control Lists" 
may
be difficult for readers to interpret. May we rephrase it as below
for readability?

Original: 
      This is superior to the layers 3 and 4 Access Control Lists
      (ACLs) of Manufacturer Usage Description Specification (MUD)
      [RFC8520] which are not suitable for broad communication patterns.

Perhaps: 
     This is superior to the Access Control Lists (ACLs) of 
     Layers 3 and 4 in "Manufacturer Usage Description Specification" 
     [RFC8520], which are not suitable for broad communication patterns.
-->


6) <!-- [rfced] How may this sentence be rephrased for readability?
Specifically: Does "to identify the IoT manufacturer no longer supports 
the device" mean 
(A) "to indicate that the IoT manufacturer no longer supports the device" or
(B) "to identify which IoT manufacturer no longer supports the device" or
otherwise?

Original:
   However, if the IoT device has reached end-of-life and the IoT
   manufacturer will not issue a firmware or software update to the IoT
   device or will not update the MUD file, the "is-supported" attribute
   defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC8520] can be used by the MUD manager to
   identify the IoT manufacturer no longer supports the device.

Perhaps (if option (A)):
   However, if the IoT device has reached end-of-life (EOL) and the IoT
   manufacturer will not issue a firmware or software update to the IoT
   device or will not update the MUD file, the "is-supported" attribute
   defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC8520] can be used by the MUD manager to
   indicate that the IoT manufacturer no longer supports the device.
-->


7) <!-- [rfced] May we update this sentence as follows? The "and in TLS 
to signal" part is unclear.

Original: 
      For example, a TLS client implementation can support different sets of
      algorithms for certificates and in TLS to signal the capabilities
      in "signature_algorithms_cert" and "signature_algorithms"
      extensions.

Perhaps: 
     For example, a TLS client implementation can support different sets
     of algorithms for certificates, and it can signal the capabilities in 
     the "signature_algorithms_cert" and "signature_algorithms" extensions.
-->


8) <!--[rfced] Note that the YANG modules have been updated per the
formatting option of pyang.  Please let us know any concerns.
--> 


9) <!--[rfced] Regarding the contact statement in the ietf-acl-tls 
and ietf-mud-tls YANG modules, would you like to add Dan Wing 
and Blake Anderson, i.e., to list all authors of this document?
(FYI, Tiru, your name has been updated to match your preference 
in past RFCs. Just let us know if updates are needed.)

Current:
        Author: Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
                kond...@gmail.com
-->


10) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "type" attribute of each sourcecode element
in the XML file to ensure correctness. If the current list of preferred
values for "type"
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/rpc/wiki/doku.php?id=sourcecode-types)
does not contain an applicable type, then feel free to let us know.
Also, it is acceptable to leave the "type" attribute not set.  
 -->


11) <!--[rfced] Is the expansion of TCAM accurate here?
(It was plural in the original; it is not plural currently.)

Original:
   While ACL technology is traditionally associated with fixed-length
   bit matching in hardware implementations, such as those found in
   TCAMs, the use of ACLs in software, ...

Current:
   While ACL technology is traditionally associated with fixed-length
   bit matching in hardware implementations, such as those found in
   Ternary Content-Addressable Memory (TCAM), the use of ACLs in
   software, ...
-->


12) <!-- [rfced] May this sentence be updated as follows?
Should the "messages" be singular to match the first stage?

Original: 
   ACL matching would be performed in two stages:
   first, by filtering clear-text TLS handshake message and second, by
   filtering after decrypting the TLS handshake messages.

Perhaps (if singular):
   ACL matching would be performed in two stages:
   first, by filtering the clear-text TLS handshake message; second, by
   filtering after decrypting the TLS handshake message.

Or (if singular, and putting the steps of the second stage in order): 
   ACL matching would be performed in two stages:
   first, by filtering the clear-text TLS handshake message; second, by
   decrypting the TLS handshake message then filtering it once more.
-->


13) <!-- [rfced] Because of your note that the template in rfc8407bis
has been used, we will update this paragraph (which appears in Sections
9.2, 9.3, and 9.4) to match Section 3.7.1 of rfc8407bis as follows.
Please let us know if that is not what you intended.

Original:
   This section follows the template defined in Section 3.7.1 of
   [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis].

   The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data
   can possibly be accessed via network management protocols such as
   NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040].  These network management
   protocols are required to use a secure transport layer and mutual
   authentication, e.g., SSH [RFC6242] without the "none" authentication
   option, Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8446] with mutual X.509
   authentication, and HTTPS with HTTP authentication (Section 11 of
   [RFC9110]).

   The Network Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
   to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
   all available protocol operations and content.

Perhaps (following draft-ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis-22): 
   This section follows the template defined in Section 3.7.1 of
   [YANG-GUIDELINES].

   The "iana-tls-profile" YANG module defines a data model that is
   designed to be accessed via YANG-based management protocols, such as
   NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. These protocols have to
   use a secure transport layer (e.g., SSH [RFC4252], TLS [RFC8446], and
   QUIC [RFC9000]) and have to use mutual authentication.

   The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
   provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
   RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
   RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
-->


14) <!--[rfced] Table 3: For psk-key-exchange-mode, would you like the 
description to start with a capital letter, to be consistent with the 
other descriptions?  If so, we will ask IANA to update the registry
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/acl-tls) accordingly.

Current: pre-shared key exchange mode

Perhaps: Pre-shared key exchange mode
-->


15) <!-- [rfced] Please review the questions below regarding references in this
document.

a) Re: [X690], we added the URL
https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-200207-S/en.  However, it has been 
superseded by this version that was released in February 2021:
https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-202102-I/en. May we update this reference
to use the most current version?

Current:
   [X690]     ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, July 2002,
              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-200207-S/en>.


b) We note that there are no citations for [RFC8484] in this document. Please
let us know if there is a specific place in the document where we can cite
this RFC. Otherwise, we will remove this from the Informative References.

c) Re: [X501], this reference has been superseded
by the 2019 version of X.501 - available here:
https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.501-201910-I/en. May we update this reference
to use the most current version?  FYI, the URL for the
1993 version of this reference has been included in the reference.

Current:
   [X501]     "Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
              The Directory: Models", ITU-T Recommendation X.501,
              November 1993,
              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.501-199311-S/en>.

d) Re: [CRYPTO-VULNERABILITY], the information provided does not
match the information provided at the URL (which directs to an NSA
Cybersecurity Advisory with the title "Patch Critical Cryptographic 
Vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Clients and Servers" with a date of 14 
January 2020).

Upon further research, we found the following URL:
https://securityboulevard.com/2020/01/exploiting-the-windows-cryptoapi-vulnerability/.
 The
title, date, and author at this URL match the original reference information
provided. Is that the correct URL for this reference? Or should we update 
this reference to match the information provided at the original URL, 
i.e., the NSA Cybersecurity Advisory?  

Original:
   [cryto-vulnerability]
              Perez, B., "Exploiting the Windows CryptoAPI                      
       
              Vulnerability", January 2020,
              <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/14/2002234275/-1/-1/0/
              CSA-WINDOWS-10-CRYPT-LIB-20190114.PDF>.

e) FYI, we removed mention of "Cisco" from this reference,
as there is no mention of "Cisco" at this archived URL.
Please let us know if other changes are needed.

Original:
   [slowloris]
              Cisco, "Slowloris HTTP DoS",
              <https://web.archive.org/web/20150315054838/
              http://ha.ckers.org/slowloris/>.

Current:
   [SLOWLORIS]
              "Slowloris HTTP DoS", Wayback Machine archive,
              <https://web.archive.org/web/20150315054838/
              http://ha.ckers.org/slowloris/>.
-->


16) <!-- [rfced] Please review the following terms and let us know how we should
update. If there are no objections, we will use the form on the right for
consistency.

Cipher Suite vs. cipher suite
   [1 instance of "Cipher suite" at the start of a description
will remain as is.]

certificate message (1 instance) vs. Certificate message
  There is one instance of "certificate message" (lowercase 'c') in
"server certificate message" in Section 1. Should it be changed to 
"Certificate message"? Elsewhere it seems this document is using 
the term as defined in RFC 8446.
-->


Thank you.

RFC Editor/mc/ar


On Mar 10, 2025, at 10:10 PM, rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org wrote:

*****IMPORTANT*****

Updated 2025/03/10

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--------------

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--------------------------------------
RFC9761 (draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-tls-18)

Title            : Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) for TLS and DTLS 
Profiles for Internet of Things (IoT) Devices
Author(s)        : T. Reddy.K, D. Wing, B. Anderson
WG Chair(s)      : Henk Birkholz, Joe Clarke
Area Director(s) : Warren Kumari, Mahesh Jethanandani

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