Toerless >The pledge simply needs to locate the voucher locally, and when it connects to the registrar, it can skip the step of retrieving the voucher because it already does trust the registrar as it has the voucher locally.
The pledge may have the voucher locally, but how will it know that the domain it is going to register is the real owner. It may be some other domain. For that, I suggested use of public key of owners in the digital invoice which can be used to verify the signed acceptance sent by JRC. Once pledge and JRC have verified each other, enrolment can go on using EST. I want to eliminate the communication overhead or MASA itself. Toerless>I think those solutions are not ideal because they do introduce another new "touch" to the pledge. Anyway manufacturer is installing an IDevID, they can also install a digital invoice (or voucher). Toerless> The BRSKI document does allude to these options but does not necessarily detail them well enough for every uninitiated reader to understand the options. Why leave something to someone's imagination. All necessary details/angles/options can be entailed if it's provisioned in the BRSKI already so that no stone is left unturned. @Michael: You mentioned "Yes, it does, at the cost of making every device in the warehouse unique to a > specific customer. If I may make an analogy to distribution of movies, > you are suggesting that netflix go back to mailing DVDs to people." When a device is manufactured, it will only have IDevID. But when a device is sold; before shipping, digital invoice may be embedded in it. In this way the device may lie in the warehouse for years but unless it has been sold, it is not unique to a customer. Michael"> Ultimately, it's not the JRC which is suspicious of who the Pledge's > owner is, it's the Pledge which does not know who owns it." I assure you that pledge can verify the JRC using the public key put in the digital invoice and using it to verify the digitally signed acceptance note from JRC. Regards, Anoop -----Original Message----- From: Toerless Eckert [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 10 July 2018 12:00 To: Michael Richardson <[email protected]> Cc: Anoop Kumar Pandey <[email protected]>; [email protected] Subject: Re: [Anima] Revision of scope of MASA in the BRSKI - Reg Anoop: To rephrase from Michaels reply: You do not need any BRSKI protocol or voucher changes to do what you want. The pledge simply needs to locate the voucher locally, and when it connects to the registrar, it can skip the step of retrieving the voucher because it already does trust the registrar as it has the voucher locally. In fact, you can even use RFC7030. If you already have a voucher locally, you do not need BRSKI for voucher signalling. IMHO, you still want BRSKI (instead of just RFC7030) because of the proxy and the enrolment telemetry. This just leaves the whole painfull question Michael brings up: "how the heck do we get vouchers onto devices in the real world" ? This is IMHO where everybodies favourite options for managing "offline vouchers" come into play. There are a lot of vendor solutions where you feed those nodes information such as vouchers via USB sticks, or temporarily connected cellphones to the pledge. I think those solutions are not ideal because they do introduce another new "touch" to the pledge. But there are also simply a lot of options how to get the voucher into the registrar without having to use an online BRSKI-MASA connection. And then you just need to send the voucher from the registrar to the pledge using BRSKI: No new "touch" on the pledge, no BRSKI-MASA connection! The BRSKI document does allude to these options but does not necessarily detail them well enough for every uninitiated reader to understand the options. Followup documents refining individual interesting workflows would certainly be useful IMHO (contributor, not WG chair hat on). Cheers Toerless On Sat, Jul 07, 2018 at 02:58:52PM -0400, Michael Richardson wrote: > > Anoop Kumar Pandey < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> wrote: > > When a device is purchased in real world, usually an invoice is issued in the > > name of the purchaser with stamp of vendor/manufacturer. > > > I propose that similarly, a digital invoice can be issued which will contain > > the public key(s) of the <domain owner(s)/JRC(s)> and digitally signed by the > > manufacturer. The digital invoice may be embedded in the pledge along with > > the IDevID. > > That's an interesting idea, perhaps you could write it up in the form > of an Internet-Draft? Then I could make sure that I fully understand > your proposal. > > It seems very difficult to make digitally signed invoices occur in the > real world, given the constrained of the supply chain. Still, BRSKI > makes provisions for higher security if the supply chain is integrated. > > I once proposed something similar using signed certficates: > > <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/6tisch-security/2kObJLkLlhuI-HU9> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/6tisch-security/2kObJLkLlhuI-HU9 > s5yqfRm0n00 > > In effect, the voucher artifact that we created in RFC8366 replaces > these certificates with purpose built signed artifacts that expresses > what the invoice attempts to express. > > > When a pledge starts the registration process, it will present the digital > > invoice along with IDevID. The JRC can verify the digital signature of the > > manufacturer on the digital invoice and sent a signed note of acceptance to > > the pledge. The pledge can verify the signed note using the public key(s) > > mentioned in the digital invoice, thereby verifying its true owner. > > A pledge which has sat in a warehouse for a year before being sold to > an owner will not have the invoice on it yet. That's okay, because > the invoice, being digitally signed, could be retrieved from another > place, and that's effectively what the BRSKI-MASA protocol *does*. > > If the invoice needs to be loaded into the Pledge via a > secure-out-of-band mechanism, (i.e. during the manufacturing process), > then the Pledge could also be fully configured, and could include a > simple PSK too. This is the approach which is being used in draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security. > > Ultimately, it's not the JRC which is suspicious of who the Pledge's > owner is, it's the Pledge which does not know who owns it. > > > This process with eliminate all the communication overhead with MASA and > > multiple level verification (voucher request, voucher, telemetry etc at > > JRC/MASA/Pledge). > > Yes, it does, at the cost of making every device in the warehouse unique to a > specific customer. If I may make an analogy to distribution of movies, > you are suggesting that netflix go back to mailing DVDs to people. > > > From security point of view: Given that the digital invoice is digitally > > signed by manufacturer, the public key of domain owner embedded in the > > digital invoice can???t be changed, otherwise verification of digital signature > > of manufacturer at JRC end will fail. > > > Requesting you to give your comments as it will simplify the protocol. > > > P.S.: As you had earlier mentioned ???On resale, the device should be put > > through a factory reset to clear things. The MASA will have to be willing to > > issue a new voucher to the new domain owner..???; here also, manufacturer may > > issue a new digital invoice in case of resale. > > yes, that's true. But, since you said that the invoice is in the > Pledge, the manufacturer would have to take the device back to do that. > > The reason for all the JRC,MASA etc, is so that we do not need to have > the manufacturer touch the device a second time. > > -- > ] Never tell me the odds! | ipv6 mesh networks [ > ] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works | network architect [ > ] <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] <http://www.sandelman.ca/> http://www.sandelman.ca/ | ruby on rails [ > > > -- > Michael Richardson < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]>, Sandelman Software Works > -= IPv6 IoT consulting =- > > > > _______________________________________________ > Anima mailing list > <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima -- --- <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ C-DAC is on Social-Media too. 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