On 1/26/22 17:02, Kerim Aydin via agora-business wrote:
> On 1/26/2022 1:47 PM, Rose Strong via agora-business wrote:
>> I support.
> With 2 support, I group-file a motion to reconsider CFJ 3938.
>
> Gratuitous arguments:
>
> CFJs on the ratification of playerhood without consent:
>
> https://faculty.washington.edu/kerim/nomic/cases/?3455
> https://faculty.washington.edu/kerim/nomic/cases/?3583
>
> Other than just "that's the precedent" (which can always be reevaluated),
> the "no ratification of inconsistencies" clause in R1551 is important to
> read as deferring to lower-powered rules to define those inconsistencies.
>
> For example, if we attempted to ratify the document "this carrot is a
> player", accepting that ratification would lead to a cascade of
> inconsistencies - if the carrot is a player, they must be a person, but
> they don't fit the definition of "person", so how does a carrot provide
> consent and do person-like things, etc. It would be a mess, and we would
> end up tracking all sorts of weird exceptions that don't meet the
> definitions in the rules, and it completely robs the text of the rules of
> their R217-granted primacy. This is the purpose of the R1551
> inconsistencies clause, to prevent that from happening. So it's important
> that those sorts of impossible-by-definition ratifications fail.
>
> As per R869, binding a "non-consenting person" to playerhood is as
> impossible as binding a carrot, so it should be treated the same way.
>
> Gratuitous Evidence:
>
> Rule 1551/21 (Power=3.2)
> Ratification
>
> When a document or statement (hereafter "document") is ratified,
> rules to the contrary notwithstanding, the gamestate is modified
> to what it would be if, at the time the ratified document was
> published, the gamestate had been minimally modified to make the
> ratified document as true and accurate as possible; however, if
> the document explicitly specifies a different past time as being
> the time the document was true, the specified time is used to
> determine the minimal modifications. Such a modification cannot
> add inconsistencies between the gamestate and the rules, and it
> cannot include rule changes unless the ratified document
> explicitly and unambiguously recites either the changes or the
> resulting properties of the rule(s). If no such modification is
> possible, or multiple substantially distinct possible
> modifications would be equally appropriate, the ratification
> fails.
>
> An internally inconsistent document generally cannot be ratified;
> however, if such a document can be divided into a summary section
> and a main section, where the only purpose of the summary section
> is to summarize information in the main section, and the main
> section is internally consistent, ratification of the document
> proceeds as if it contained only the main section.
>
> Text purportedly about previous instances of ratification (e.g. a
> report's date of last ratification) is excluded from ratification.
> The rules may define additional information that is considered to
> be part of the document for the purposes of ratification; such
> definitions are secured at a Power Threshold of 3.
>
> Ratification is secured with Power Threshold 3.
>
>
> Previous discussion:
>
>> On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 3:52 PM Kerim Aydin via agora-business <
>> agora-busin...@agoranomic.org> wrote:
>>
>>> I intend, with 2 Support, to group-file a motion to reconsider CFJ 3938.
>>>
>>>
>>> Prior to CFJ 3583 cited below, CFJ 3455 independently says the same thing
>>> - no ratification of registration without consent, due to R1551's
>>> "inconsistencies cause ratification to fail" clause:
>>>
>>> https://faculty.washington.edu/kerim/nomic/cases/?3455
>>>
>>> -G.
>>>
>>> On 1/26/2022 11:43 AM, Kerim Aydin wrote:
>>>> On 1/26/2022 11:16 AM, Kerim Aydin wrote:
>>>>> On 1/25/2022 6:20 PM, Jason Cobb via agora-business wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/21/22 11:38, Kerim Aydin via agora-official wrote:
>>>>>> 1. Ratify without objection that "Hillary Rodham Clinton is a player."
>>>>>> Ratification is at power 3.1 and overpowers the restriction on consent
>>>>>> in Rule 869/48.
>>>>> This step doesn't work by explicit precedent, so this whole argument may
>>>>> need repair. If I remember the precedent correctly (will dig for it
>>>>> later), the power=3.1 rule explicitly says that ratification fails if
>>> it
>>>>> "adds inconsistencies between gamestate and rules" and the CFJ
>>> precedent I
>>>>> remember stated that ratifying a non-consenting person into playerhood
>>>>> would create that kind of inconsistency, and fail.
>>>>>
>>>>> -G.
>>>>>
>>>> It's CFJ 3583 that I was thinking of:
>>>>
>>>> https://faculty.washington.edu/kerim/nomic/cases/?3583
>>>>
>>>> (the ratification rule isn't quoted in that judgement but I checked and
>>> it
>>>> was power=3.1 at the time).
>>>>
Revised draft judgement:
Arguments:
{
Per Rule 1689/6:
> Agora is ossified if it is IMPOSSIBLE for any reasonable
> combination of actions by players to cause arbitrary rule changes
> to be made and/or arbitrary proposals to be adopted within a
> four-week period.
First, I find that Agora is ossified if there are 0 players. If there
are 0 players, the set of "reasonable combinations of actions by
players" is 0, since the empty set can perform no actions, and therefore
there are no combinations of actions that can be performed (and
certainly none that can cause arbitrary rule changes). This does not
imply that, but for this provision, Agora would be forever locked if it
reached 0 players. A non-player could register and then perform actions,
but AIAN does not consider that possibility when determining if Agora is
ossified.
Next, let's consider the case of a single player. The following is a set
of actions performable by a single player that result in arbitrary rule
changes under the current rules:
1. Ratify without objection that "grok is a player." Grok has registered
multiple times, and eir most recent registration was ended by
deregistration for inactivity. E has therefore consented to be bound by
the rules and has not revoked that consent, so e CAN be bound by the
rules under Rule 869/48. A previous version of this judgement used
Hillary Rodham Clinton as the second person, but she has never consented
to the rules and thus cannot be registered by ratification under CFJ3583.
2. Ratify without objection that "There exists a proposal in the
Proposal Pool with id 99998, AI 1, author grok, title 'Do Nothing', no
coauthors, democratic class, and empty text."
3. Publish the following message: "I hereby resolve the Agoran decision
on whether to adopt Proposal 99998. It has no voters, and outcome FAILED
QUORUM." This will self-ratify such a decision into existence (and that
it was resolved) under Rule 2034/12, thus setting quorum to its minimum
of 2.
4. Wait 7 days for self-ratification.
5. Ratify without objection that "There exists a proposal in the
Proposal Pool with id 99999, AI 3, author grok, title 'Do Everything',
no coauthors, democratic class, and text [whatever is necessary]."
6. Publish the following message: "I hereby resolve the Agoran decision
on whether to adopt Proposal 99999. It has two voters (me and grok) both
voting FOR, and outcome ADOPTED." This will self-ratify such a decision
into existence, that it was resolved, and that the proposal took effect
under Rule 2034/12. This is consistent with the rules because quorum was
previously set to 2.
7. Wait 7 days for self-ratification.
This procedure would take less than 4 weeks and is reasonable for a
single player to perform. Thus Agora is not ossified if there is a
single player, and there is no lower number of players where Agora would
not be ossified. TRUE.
}
Evidence:
{
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 1698/6 (Power=4)
Agora Is A Nomic
Agora is ossified if it is IMPOSSIBLE for any reasonable
combination of actions by players to cause arbitrary rule changes
to be made and/or arbitrary proposals to be adopted within a
four-week period.
If, but for this rule, the net effect of a proposal would cause
Agora to become ossified, or would cause Agora to cease to exist,
it cannot take effect, rules to the contrary notwithstanding. If
any other single change or inseparable group of changes to the
gamestate would cause Agora to become ossified, or would cause
Agora to cease to exist, it is cancelled and does not occur, rules
to the contrary notwithstanding.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 869/48 (Power=3)
How to Join and Leave Agora
Any entity (including a group of confederated entities) that is or
ever was able to willingly communicate original ideas is a person.
Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, no other entities are
persons.
Questions about personhood are to be resolved equitably, with
regard for the good-faith of those involved and the customs of
honorable play.
Citizenship is a secured person switch with values Unregistered
(default) and Registered, tracked by the Registrar. A registered
person is a Player. To "register" someone is to flip that person's
Citizenship switch from Unregistered to Registered.
An Unregistered person CAN (unless explicitly forbidden or
prevented by the rules) register by publishing a message that
indicates reasonably clearly and reasonably unambiguously that e
intends to become a player at that time. No person can be a player
if e is part of another player or another player is part of em.
A player, acting as emself, CAN deregister (cease being a player)
by announcement. If e does so, e CANNOT register or be registered
for 30 days.
A person, by registering, agrees to abide by the Rules. The Rules
CANNOT otherwise bind a person to abide by any agreement without
that person's willful consent.
The Rules CANNOT compel non-players to act without their express
or reasonably implied consent. The rules CANNOT compel players to
unduly harass non-players. A non-person CANNOT be a player, rules
to the contrary notwithstanding.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 2034/12 (Power=3)
Vote Protection and Cutoff for Challenges
A public message purporting to resolve an Agoran decision is a
self-ratifying attestation that
1. such a decision existed,
2. it had the number of voters indicated,
3. it was resolved as indicated, and
4. (if the indicated outcome was to adopt a proposal) such a
proposal existed, was adopted, and, if it had not
previously taken effect, took effect.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
}
--
Jason Cobb
Assessor, Rulekeepor, Stonemason
