Love the concept—I imagine many players (including me) had some vague plan of
writing this up at some point.
Feedback inline.
Gaelan
> On Jan 25, 2020, at 5:32 PM, Alexis Hunt via agora-discussion
> <agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote:
>
> This proto marks the beginning of my quests for reform in two large
> areas of the game, administrative discretion and ratification, as
> discussed previously. I may choose to write up a plan at some point
> and submit it as a thesis, but I may just fly by the seat of my pants.
>
> Proposal: Administrative Discretion. I. Statutory Instrumentation (AI=3)
> {{{
> [This first proposal is a reform to the core rules defining what rules
> are, with an aim to better supporting subordinate legal documents. The
> intent is to enact very little change to the game as it is actually
> played, and to operate mostly in the realm of supporting definitions.]
>
> If this proposal has had any provision vetoed, then the entire
> proposal has no effect.
>
> In this proposal, "I->S" is to amend a rule within the scope specified
> by replacing each instance of "an Instrument" with "a statute", and
> each other instance of "Instrument" with "statute". This is not a
> case-sensitive match, however, if the text being replaced has a
> leading capital, then so does the replacement.
>
> Enact a new power-3.01 rule entitled "Statutory Instrumentation
> Simultaneity", reading "Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, the
> proposal which enacted this rule CAN effect multiple rule changes,
> which it could otherwise effect individually, simultaneously. When it
> attempts to do so, if any single rule change it attempts is
> INEFFECTIVE, then so is the entire attempt." [This proposes to make
> multiple interlocking amendments to critical rules defining rules and
> the interactions between themselves. This mitigates a real risk that,
> during a series of sequential changes, the rules would be in a
> nonsensical or otherwise broken state. I considered trying to put in a
> special clause preserving the effect of the current rules on rule
> changes for the duration of the proposal, but that wouldn't preclude
> the possibility of some other aspect of the game, such as asset
> holdings, doing something weird in the in-between state. And only a
> persistent rule could elegantly paper over that small weird gap in
> time. I think simultaneity is the better choice.]
>
> Set the power of all non-rule entities, other than this proposal, to
> 0. [This is an important safety as the change to the definition of a
> rule would potentially cause old non-rule instruments to become rules.
> Best not to consider that.]
>
> Apply the following rule changes simultaneously:
>
> {{
> Amend Rule 1688 (Power) by replacing "An Instrument is an entity with
> positive Power." with "A statute is a document with positive Power."
> Apply I->S throughout the remainder of the rule.
>
> Amend rule 2140 (Power Controls Mutability) by replacing "set or
> modify any other substantive aspect of an instrument with power
> greater than its own. A 'substantive' aspect of an instrument is any
> aspect that affects the instrument's operation." with "set or modify
> any other substantive aspect of an instrument with power greater than
> its own except that, for greater certainty, the provisions of a rule
> with respect to what actions are and are not possible apply even to
> higher-powered ephemeral statutes except to the extent that they are
> overridden in accordance with other rules." and applying I->S
> throughout the rest of the rule.
>
> [I don't want to consider what it would mean if PCM prevents rules
> from interfering with higher-powered proposal. Let's pretend this is
> just clarifying something super obvious to everyone.]
>
> Apply I->S throughout Rule 105 (Rule Changes).
>
> Enact a new power-3 Rule entitled "Instruments" reading:
> {
> An instrument is a type of document, either ephemeral or enduring,
> that is defined as such by a body of law. An instrument's text, where
> otherwise permitted, can be amended from time to time.
>
> Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, an instrument other than a
> statute CANNOT become binding on a person without eir willful consent,
> however, consent can be given by implication. In particular,
> consenting to be bound to an instrument can imply consent to be bound
> by amendments to it and consent to be bound by other instruments.
I believe we state that registration is consent to be bound by the rules, so I
don’t think we need this exception. Maybe it’s useful as a failsafe?
> }
>
> Enact a new power-3 Rule entitled "Bodies of Law" reading:
> {
> A body of law is a collection of related instruments and bodies of law
> whose effects are collective and possibly interdependent, and which is
> defined as such by a body of law. The statutes of Agora form a body of
> law with unlimited scope. All other bodies of law are defined by a
> different body of law, in such a way as to be able to trace their
> origins back to the statutes of Agora. Two or more bodies of law may
> jointly define another body of law, but only each of them clearly
> expresses the intent to participate in a joint definition with each of
> the others. Otherwise, the definitions are separate, distinct, and
> unrelated.
>
> A body of law is governed by all bodies of law which, directly or
> indirectly, participate in its definition, as well as any body of law
> specified as governing it by any of its governing law. A body of law
> is subordinate to the law that governs it, and a body of law is
> superior to the law that it governs. For greater certainty, rules to
> the contrary notwithstanding, the statutes of Agora govern all law and
> are governed by no law except themselves.
>
> With respect to interactions between separate bodies of law, a body of
> law is generally to be interpreted as acting harmoniously as a single
> whole. The precedence between, and organization of, instruments in a
> body of law are internal matters to that body of law and generally do
> not affect the effect of other bodies of law, except to the extent
> that they affect the body's operation as a whole.
>
> The definition of a body of law includes the definition if its scope,
> being the areas of the game that it governs. By definition, the scope
> of a body of law is no greater than the union of the scopes of the
> bodies of law that define it, nor does it include anything which would
> bring it into direct conflict with superior law. To the extent that a
> body of law's scope is not explicitly defined by superior law, it is
> as broad as possible while excluding any effect on any substantive
> aspect of any body of law, besides itself, that it does not govern.
>
> Every instrument is a direct member of exactly one body of law; if not
> specified in its definition, it is a body of law in itself. A given
> fixation of text may, however, be the text of multiple instruments,
> each in different bodies of law. The scope of an instrument is the
> scope of the body of law it forms a part of. To the extent that the
> provisions of an instrument are outside its scope, they are void and
> without effect.
> }
Ooh, this would make Fool Season a lot easier to implement.
>
> [This is the core of the reform: a base framework for multiple
> separate, scoped bodies of law. Rather than an explicit discussion of
> precedence between laws, a framework of scoping is used. This proposal
> does not define anything outside of rules and enacted proposals as
> being instruments and thus part of this framework, in order to allow
> gradual work on areas of the ruleset such as regulations and
> contracts.
>
> The reason for "bodies of law" as separate from "instruments" is that
> frequently, bodies of law express themselves collectively. The rules
> of Agora, for instance, can only be properly interpreted as a whole.
> Definitions of entities are often spread out, sometimes to the point
> where it's nearly impossible to pinpoint a single instrument as the
> source. Bodies of law capture this concept. They also allow more
> flexibility to be introduced in proposals to come, such as making
> clear that a body of law can modify definitions in superior law
> without a conflict. We can also make rules such as Rule 2125 more
> natural using this technology, see below.
>
> More importantly, it allows us to create contracts and similar
> documents that impose obligations and have other legal effect, but
> without that possibly "creeping" upwards and affecting things outside
> their scope. Contracts, for instance, can be safely defined without
> fear that they could be used to override lower-powered rules.
>
> Bodies of law can be nested. This is to allow for, say, the Rules and
> Regulations to collectively act as a single body of law, but the Rules
> to act as a body of law within it. In the future this could be the
> basis for something like Falsifian's modules. I would rather get the
> mechanism solid and well-tested before touching precedence between
> rules, however.
>
> I've worked hard to prevent any sort of bootstrapping scam by which a
> body of law could be brought into existence out of nowhere or
> otherwise come to govern a superior body without its permission.
> Please examine closely to see if I succeeded!]
>
> Amend Rule 2125 (Regulated Actions) to read:
> {
> An action is regulated by a body of law if (1) its performance is
> limited, allowed, enabled, or permitted by that body of law; (2) that
> body of law describes the circumstances under which it would succeed
> or fail; or (3) it would, as part of its effect, modify information
> for which some person bound by that body of law is required, by that
> body of law, to be a recordkeepor.
>
> If a body of law regulates an action, then to the extent that doing so
> is within its scope, that body of law prevents the action from being
> performed except as described within it, including by limiting the
> methods to perform that action to those specified within it. A body of
> law does not proscribed any action which it does not regulate.
> }
>
> [I'm sad about losing the SHALL NOT there. Violating that would surely
> have been one of the great Agoran crimes, along with failing to
> carefully consider the consequences of not reading the ruleset during
> RtRW.]
>
> Enact a new power-3 Rule entitled "Effects of Instruments" reading:
> {
> An instrument's effect is defined by its text, as amended from time to
> time in accordance with the law governing its operation. A
> "substantive" aspect of an instrument is any aspect that affects the
> instrument's operation. If an instrument's text contains clearly
> marked comments then, they have no effect on its interpretation or
> operation except as that instrument itself specifies, although they
> remain part of its text.
>
> An enduring instrument is one that it is always taking effect, to the
> extent it is permitted to so by the Rules and any other applicable
> instruments. An enduring instrument is always speaking; uses of the
> present tense in an enduring instrument are interpreted contextually
> according to the applicable rules of interpretation.
>
> An ephemeral instrument is one that takes effect only briefly, to
> effect a number of changes on the game. When it takes effect, the
> changes specified in its text are applied, provided that the
> instrument has the power to effect them. If not otherwise specified by
Should this be something more broad, such as “provided that the instrument CAN
effect them”?
> the instrument, the changes are applied sequentially in the order they
> appear in the instrument. Unless otherwise specified by the
> instrument, the provisions of an instrument is applied sequentially
> and regardless of whether any other provision succeeds or fails in its
> effect.
>
> An ephemeral instrument has no ongoing effect, except to the extent
> that the changes it makes have ongoing consequences. It cannot, except
> by way of an enduring instrument, extend or delay its own effect. An
> ephemeral instrument can, where explicitly permitted to do so by the
> law governing it, override the effect of an enduring instrument within
> its scope by modifying, suppressing, or postponing it. Such an
> override is INEFFECTIVE unless the overriding instrument clearly
> specifies the nature and scope of the override.
> }
>
> [This consolidates the existing rules about proposals and rules into
> one place, since they will need to be reused for other instruments. It
> also provides explicit override language, mainly intended to ensure
> that proposals have free reign over gamestate modification. This might
> be improvable, for instance by taking the point of view that, since a
> proposal is part of the statutes of agora while taking effect, it
> necessarily automatically overrides subordinate law.
>
> Amend Rule 2141 (Role and Attribute of Rules) to by replacing the
> first two paragraphs with the following:
> {
> A rule is an enduring statute. Every rule has a power between 0.1 and
> 4.0, inclusive. Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, it is
> IMPOSSIBLE to enact a rule with power outside this range, or to change
> the power of an existing rule to a nonzero value outside this range.
> The set of all currently-existing rules is called the ruleset.
> }
>
> Retitle Rule 106 (Adopting Proposals) to "Adopting Proposals" and
> amend it to read as follows:
What a creative retitling!
> {
> When a decision about whether to adopt a proposal is resolved, if the
> outcome is ADOPTED, then the proposal in question is adopted, its
> power is set to the minimum of four and its adoption index, it takes
> effect as an ephemeral instrument, and then its power is set to 0.
> This rule defers to rules that would prevent a proposal from taking
> effect.
> }
>
> [While this proposal does not immediately define any non-rule,
> non-proposal entities as instruments, the intent is that the creation
> of subordinate instruments comes implicitly. Thus, for instance, a
> contract can define a "sub-contract" within the scope of its own
> effect, and this would be recognized within law. Proposals ignore all
> subordinate law except as specified otherwise; this is a safety
> provision.
>
> Note that the deference provision is equivalent to the existing
> provision about preventing proposals from taking effect being secured,
> because deference does not override power as a determiner of
> precedence. So it will defer to any rule of power 3 or greater but
> take precedence over any lesser-powered rule.]
> }}
>
> Repeal the rule "Statutory Instrumentation Simultaneity" enacted
> earlier in this proposal.
Might be safer to repeal this after the simultaneous batch, so we’re sure it
has effect the whole time.
> }}}. It overrides non-statute instruments implicitly, except to the
> extent that it specifies otherwise, but overrides statutes only
> explicitly."
Got some stray text here.
>
> Proposal: Administrative Discretion. II. Temporary Suspension of Rules (AI=3)
> {{{
> Amend Rule 106 (Adopting Proposals) by appending a new paragraph
> reading "A proposal CAN override the effect of any rule which it is
> capable of amending."
>
> [This is a small side proposal to allow proposals to temporarily
> override rules without having to do so by the enactment and subsequent
> repeal of a helper rule. It must be explicit.]
> }}}
>
> -Alexis
