I was with you all the way until the last paragraph. Rule 101 states
this "Agora is a game of Nomic, wherein Persons, acting in accordance
with the Rules, communicate their game Actions and/or results of these
actions via Fora in order to play the game. The game may be won, but
the game never ends.". A game is a competitive activity, Competition
is a state in which a person tries to defeat others. It is the case
that a game with no players is no rule 101 game. It's also true that
rule 101 defines a game as an activity invlolving "persons, acting in
accordance with the rules". In this hypothetical, the rest of the
gamestate defines a game in which there are no players, at a lower
power than the rule which mandates players (or persons). Rule 101's
power-4 requirement of persons would override the hypothetical
power-3.9 action causing the rest of the game to recognize no persons,
at least to the extent that it, within the gamestate, destroys
humanity. (And the removal of Fora would also contradict rule 101).
It's the same with Rule 1698. You say that there is no time in this
hypothetical, so it has no effect. However, rule 1698 is power-4, it
overrides the rest of the ruleset, and its ordinary-language
definition of "weeks" can override the definition of time at 3.9 if it
must.

On Fri, Oct 27, 2017 at 9:01 AM, Kerim Aydin <ke...@u.washington.edu> wrote:
>
>
> CFJ 3580 statement:
>
> "If there were
> currently a power 3.9 rule purpoting to allow any person to destroy the 
> universe
> by announcement, without defining the effect of this action, and I announced 
> that
> I destroyed the universe in that way (all other aspects of the gamestate being
> as they are now), my announcement would, as far as the game is concerned, have
> the effect it purported to have."
>
>
> JUDGEMENT for CFJ 3580:
>
> The Caller’s statement involves a bit of question-begging, but we’ll try
> to get around that.  In order to know whether a Rules text does what it
> “purports” to do, we have to first figure out what it is purporting to
> do!  There are several possibilities, all of which require a pre-
> supposition of the scope and domain of the Rules.  I will try to
> explore the range of possibilities in this judgement, and offer
> potential judgements for each before selecting my final option.  For the
> purposes of this judgement, the “Protections” are defined as the power 4
> rules 101 and 1698.
>
> So, what is a Rule purporting to do if it “succeeds” at “destroying the
> universe”?
>
> The first possibility is that it purports to set the value of an
> undefined and untracked variable, and nothing else.  Under this
> supposition, if a “destroy the universe” clause is triggered, then we
> would simply say “there is now an untracked gamestate variable called
> ‘the universe’ and its value is ‘destroyed’.  Any CFJ asking whether the
> universe “has been destroyed” will now be true, and any future game
> conditional that says “if the universe has been destroyed, then X” will
> mean X is true.  Beyond that, nothing would happen.  Under this
> interpretation, this CFJ would be TRUE - we can clearly set such a
> variable without problem.  (Since this interpretation doesn’t damage
> anything that the Protections protect against, they aren’t relevant in
> this interpretation).
>
> I reject this possibility because words have meaning.  Rule 217 asks us
> to use common definitions for terms that are not rules-defined.  If the
> clause featured nonsense words, e.g. “all Slurgs are hereby Poiled”,
> then this would be the correct interpretation, because we would have no
> common sense interpretation other than to say, for CFJ purposes, that
> whenever we encounter Slurgs, they are Poiled Slurgs.  But since
> “universe” and “destroyed” both have common definitions, I reject this
> interpretation - setting a useless gamestate variable is not what a
> ‘destroy the universe’ clause is purporting to do (see CFJ 1500 for a
> similar rejection of this interpretation).
>
> The second possibility is that the clause purports that triggering it
> would actually, really, physically destroy the real world universe.
> There is no rules-internal logic that forbid the Rules from taking this
> interpretation.  In particular, if the clause were re-written to say
> “when this clause is activated, the actual, real universe is genuinely
> physically destroyed” then this, indeed, would set the rules up for a
> confrontation with reality that the Caller (in eir gratuitous arguments)
> clearly dreads.  Again, words have meaning, and words like “actual
> physical real” are hard to get around.
>
> If this were being purported by the clause, the Protections would
> protect us from facing this confrontation with reality.  If the universe
> were physically and “really” destroyed, the game would end/cease to
> exist, which would violate R101 and R1698.  So we could avoid the
> confrontation with reality and simply say FALSE, this clause would be
> blocked from taking effect by the Protections.
>
> However, without the Protections, the confrontation with reality would
> indeed be forced.  To find this CFJ FALSE on such grounds (due to the
> vast range of physical evidence that the rules are incapable of doing
> this) would greatly damage the scope of the rules and our perception of
> the game, as discussed by the Caller.  There is a logical out, though:
> if a clause were activated destroying “the actual physical universe” the
> after-the-fact interpretation could be:  “hey, the Universe *was*
> actually destroyed, but obviously a new universe was created with all
> our memories intact.”  This would allow us to keep faith with both the
> rules and reality, though at the price of accepting a scary degree of
> solipsism (and accepting that Agora is, in fact, Galactus) .  Since we
> couldn’t prove otherwise, we might accept some type of judgement like
> IRRELEVANT, INSUFFICIENT, or DISMISS, as ideas like “maybe we were just
> created 1 minute ago with our memories intact” are unprovable and/or
> irrelevant to our ongoing conduct of the game.  If we judged the clause
> before activation, I would pick IRRELEVANT, because if failed, we’d pick
> that kind of interpretation, and if it succeed, we wouldn’t be around to
> care.
>
> However, I reject this interpretation of what is being purported, for
> the less-specific “destroy the universe” phrase in question.  We have,
> in fact, through ratification, rejected the real world many times
> without worrying about such confrontations, and while I’m willing to
> make some philosophical decisions for the sake of practicality, taking
> that kind of solipsistic approach draws into question our legal approach
> to important standards like “beyond a reasonable doubt” (if we can
> assume the universe was destroyed and re-created just for us, then no
> doubt or line of argument is unreasonable by comparison).
>
> Mentioning ratification and legal standards leads us to the third
> option, which is the one I favor.  If the clause is activated, and the
> clause is “silent” on its explicit scope (by not saying things like
> “actual physical real”), that by default scope is to set up a legal
> fiction that the universe was destroyed for the purposes of rule and
> gamestate interpretation, without purporting to change “external”
> reality.  Setting up of legal fictions, mainly these days through
> ratification, has long been embraced by Agora, and so this, is what I
> find that (by default) such a clause would “purport” to do if
> successfully activated:  it would create a legal fiction that the
> universe has been destroyed.
>
> So, now that we (finally) know what such a clause purports to do, what
> would be the effect of accepting such a legal fiction?
>
> Well, that wholly depends:  is the gamestate itself a part of the
> Universe, or apart from it?
>
> Insomuch as the universe is defined as “everything”, it would seem at
> first to be a no-brainer that the gamestate is a part of the universe.
> If so, then activating the clause would destroy the game - the rules,
> the switches, the gamestate.  It would just end the game, and have the
> same effect as a simple high-powered statement “rules to the contrary
> notwithstanding, the game is over”.  Clearly the Protections stop this
> from happening (R1698 is explicit that Agora can’t cease to exist), but
> if the Protections weren’t there, the game would, in fact, end.
>
> However, I reject this supposition as well.  I do not believe we treat
> the gamestate as part of the universe.  In our words and deeds, we are
> committed Platonists with respect to the gamestate, as is evidenced by
> many aspects of our culture: our CFJs, our discussions of the “true”
> gamestate, and our very name of Agora, bringing to mind ancient
> philosophy, leads me to conclude:  The “gamestate” is part of Plato’s
> perfect forms - like infinity, it exists apart from our imperfect and
> quantized universe.  While we can never come to a true logical
> conclusion on the truth or existence of the gamestate’s Platonic form,
> we can make the decision to believe in it: just like we assume as an
> axiom the existence of free will (in R869, and philosophically in
> judgements such as CFJ 1895).  And thus, I find that one of our
> fundamental Agoran axoims, strongly held in our culture as evidenced by
> the Caller’s impassioned arguments, is that the gamestate exists “apart”
> from the physical universe in some kind of Platonic perfect state.
>
> So:  Agora exists apart from the universe, and the universe is (legally)
> destroyed.  What happens?  Well, the gamestate ceases to recognize any
> inputs from the universe as being valid (how could they be valid if the
> universe is destroyed?)  In particular, the gamestate recognizes that
> fora are external (assumed in R478 to exist without being explicitly
> defined) as are natural persons (originators of free thought) -
> therefore the game would not recognize any persons nor fora nor
> communications as existing or valid.  So far so good.
>
> But a third thing is that the passage of time - an inherent part of the
> universe - would not continue to exist for legal purposes.  Without the
> Protections, this would put the game in a suspended state: existing, but
> refusing to recognize any external inputs or the passage of time - pure
> and perfect, it would be encased in its own solitary existence with no
> way to break out.
>
> With the Protections, it’s a bit more puzzling.  Since the game wouldn’t
> end or cease to exist, R101 would not be protective, nor would the
> “cease to exist” clause in R1698.  At first, it would seen that R1698
> would protect us as there would be no way for proposals to be adopted
> within 4 weeks.  However, if time has stopped, that may not be true!
> How do you measure whether something can happen “within 4 weeks” if that
> 4 weeks never passes?  (Any B-Nomic denizens remember the Game Clock?)
> After all, if time were to start again, it would mean the universe (and
> fora, and persons) were back and we could proceed as usual.
>
> This brings me to my final conclusion.  Quite simply, when Agora ceases
> to recognize the external universe, it ceases to recognize inputs from
> persons and fora and the passage of time, but it continues to exist.
> Therefore many of the clauses of R101 and R1698 are not triggered.  Time
> would stop, but since it would still be possible to pass rules *if* time
> became measureable again, the “within 4 weeks” clause of R1698 would not
> be triggered.  The “destroy the universe” clause would take effect in
> spite of the protections, and we would have finally achieved a perfect
> Agora, shining and trapped in metaphorical amber, perfectly capable and
> ready for playing, but waiting for a universe that no longer exists.
>
> TRUE.
>
>
> ARGUMENTS BY ARIS:
>
> On Wed, 25 Oct 2017, Aris Merchant wrote:
>> Arguments:
>>
>> The rules are, for game purposes, omnipotent. In coming together to
>> play this game, we do something amazing. We create reality. When I say
>> I give someone a shiny, it is not my intent merely to have everyone
>> pretend that I have given a shiny. It is my intent to actually give
>> that person a shiny. All players eventually come to believe that there
>> is a "platonic" reality that they affect with their game actions.
>> That's a major part of why I play. If "reality" disagrees with the
>> rules, there is a very real sense in which reality is wrong. The fact
>> that we can change something by agreeing upon it is truly amazing. On
>> the site it says that many players view Agora as "an experiment in
>> philosophy, political science, and group dynamics, rather than just a
>> game". I do, and the biggest part of the experiment for me is that we
>> change our vision of reality by passing a proposal. The fact that we
>> can change what we believe is an exhilarating experience. Changing
>> what one belives is not generally easy, but we've all agreed that
>> Agora means something and that the rules are true, and that's truly
>> special. I feel so strongly about this point that I somewhat regret
>> bringing it up, because I'm terrified that the ruling might be that
>> I'm wrong. If so, I don't really know what I would do. I might
>> deregister, I might moot, I might keep on playing and just not believe
>> the CFJ (they aren't inherently binding).
>>
>> I humbly request that your honor does not rule that the rules as a
>> whole can be wrong. This is a point so basic that it cannot be proven
>> using rule text, for obvious reasons. If you want to rule that you are
>> restricted to interpreting rule text, and want to stick to the
>> requirements that the rules are "unlimited in scope", have the
>> "capacity to govern the game generally", and that "when interpreting
>> and applying the rules, the text of the rules takes precedence" then
>> that's fine. If you want to rule that the point is non-falsifiable, or
>> is a matter of personal interpretation, and is therefore out of scope,
>> then that's also fine. I submit to you however, that a ruling that the
>> rules as a whole couldn't do something would be along the same lines
>> as a judge ordering that a section of eir constitution was
>> unenforceable because it was wrong. You would be attempting to use the
>> power of the rules (as a judge) to take away power from the rules
>> themselves. In taking away the absolutely binding status of the rules,
>> you would, in my opinion, strip the game of meaning.
>>
>> The other aspects of the case are irrelevant by comparison. I would
>> suggest the resolution that the destruction of the universe would be
>> irrelevant to gameplay, because the rules and that which they define
>> would continue to exist platonically in the void (ideas don't need the
>> universe or physical reality to function). The only issue is that the
>> destruction of the universe could be interpreted as also destroying
>> the players. Whether this would trigger Rule 1698 is a matter of how
>> you interpret the definition of ossification:
>>
>> "Agora is ossified if it is IMPOSSIBLE for any reasonable combination
>> of actions by players to cause arbitrary rule changes to be made
>> and/or arbitrary proposals to be adopted within a four-week period."
>>
>> What is the effect of an action that makes it impossible for there to
>> be any players? It's somewhat ambiguous if Rule 1698 bars the
>> deregistration/destruction of the last player, or only really has
>> meaning if there are players. My suggested resolution is that the rule
>> does indeed bar the elimination of players, because that would make it
>> impossible for them to take actions, thus making it possible to do
>> what is described. This position is supported by common sense and the
>> interests of the game, which disfavor actions likely to cause the
>> game's effective nonexistence and permanent stasis, which is after all
>> what Rule 1698 is specifically designed to prevent. However, I would
>> not necessarily disagree with an alternate interpretation.
>>
>> -Aris
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 4:07 PM, Kerim Aydin <ke...@u.washington.edu> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Mon, 23 Oct 2017, Aris Merchant wrote:
>> >> On Sat, Oct 21, 2017 at 5:04 PM, Kerim Aydin <ke...@u.washington.edu> 
>> >> wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> > On Fri, 20 Oct 2017, Aris Merchant wrote:
>> >> >> Actually, given that this makes things more interesting... I SH-CFJ 
>> >> >> (or AP-CFJ
>> >> >> if the action would otherwise fail due to lack of shinies) "If there 
>> >> >> were
>> >> >> currently a power 3.9 rule purpoting to allow any person to destroy 
>> >> >> the universe
>> >> >> by announcement, without defining the effect of this action, and I 
>> >> >> announced that
>> >> >> I destroyed the universe in that way (all other aspects of the 
>> >> >> gamestate being
>> >> >> as they are now), my announcement would, as far as the game is 
>> >> >> concerned, have
>> >> >> the effect it purported to have."
>> >> >
>> >> > This is CFJ 3580.  I assign it to G.
>> >> >
>> >> > [note to Aris:  despite yesterday's discussion, while I believe a judge 
>> >> > would
>> >> > not be *wrong* in finding this case irrelevant, I am in fact quite 
>> >> > interested
>> >> > in the philosophical underpinnings, so I "favored" it and and I plan to 
>> >> > give
>> >> > it a full consideration as per your request.  I don't actually know 
>> >> > where I'll
>> >> > end up with it at the moment].
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> Thank you. I want to provide arguments, but it may take a few days.
>> >> There is one point that I feel very very strongly about (either the
>> >> rules are omnipotent or, alternately, the issue is out of scope), and
>> >> I have a few suggestions about how to deal with everything else.
>> >
>> > Hi Aris,
>> >
>> > I pretty much need to write this one up tomorrow or I won't get to it 
>> > before
>> > the deadline, just a friendly warning if you still feel "very very 
>> > strongly"
>> > about stuff!  (I think I know where I'm going with it so don't feel 
>> > obliged,
>> > but of course I'll study & consider anything provided).
>> >
>> > -G.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>>



-- 
>From V.J. Rada

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