> On Sep 26, 2017, at 12:58 AM, VJ Rada <vijar...@gmail.com> wrote: > > BTW whose idea was it that paying agora for proposals and cfjs would > cost LESS when agora had LESS money? Can we like insta-fix that?
This was an intentional design decision. From a discussion I had with nichdel at the time: On 06/13/17 23:39, Owen Jacobson wrote: > So, in short, these actions get less expensive as Agora runs out of money? > Interesting. The incentives aren’t totally clear to me - which is probably a > good thing. On Jun 14, 2017, at 1:38 AM, Nic Evans <nich...@gmail.com> wrote: > Do you mean 'incentives' as in 'encouraging/discouraging gameplay' or do > you mean it as 'economic strategy'? For the former, a high FV comes from > a high reserve which happens either because of stamp creation or because > more work is being made (CFJs and unpassed proposals) than is being > resolved to the benefit of Agora (judged CFJs and passed proposals). > High FV discourages making more work while encouraging success. Note > that w/o objection actions don't stop the other end resulting in pay, so > a prohibitively high cost should resolve itself. nichdel has commented elsewhere that a boom-bust cycle was an intentional choice, and is not a defect. However, G.’s critique that FV fluctuations are too abrupt to be a meaningful incentive system probably applies to FV as backpressure, too. That said, if you think it’s not working, change it! It’ll take at least a couple of weeks to get a proposal through that replaces FV with some other system, so we’d still have time to live with FV for a bit longer and decide whether it’s working for us. If someone (hi) feels strongly e can also float a counterproposal that makes some other change. -o
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