On Mon, 2017-07-24 at 12:39 -0500, grok (caleb vines) wrote: > On Fri, Jul 21, 2017 at 2:49 PM, Alex Smith <ais...@alumni.bham.ac.uk > > wrote: > > The intended use of Organizations was that people are punished via > > increasing their Expenditure and/or preventing them from leaving, as a > > method of creating an Expenditure economy. People don't seem to > > actually be using them like that, though. > > I was looking at that, but as far as I could tell adjusting a user's > Budget switch was reserved. I could be wrong though?
It's secured at 1.2 (rule 2459), but rule 2460 (also power 1.2) allows anyone to change the switch if the Organization gives permission (by stating that such a change is Appropriate). > > (Theory about Agora: no matter how you try to design the actual rules > > around an agreement-like system, people will attempt to force it to act > > like a contract. We've already seen that with Agencies that create > > pledges, which is pretty much a pure contract-equivalent. It happened > > with Promises too.) > > I'm curious what these intended use cases would look like. Creating a > contract organization was just the first interesting way to use > Organizations that I could think of, and pledges seemed like the most > effective way to hold people to that contract. The idea was intended to be similar to contracts, but using economic rather than judicial punishments. In other words, an Organization can do what it wants internally, but can only impose obligations on members, and can only do so by adjusting its own gamestate. The reason why such punishments are effective is that they can cause bankruptcy if a player has to pay fines to too many Organizations at once. The hard cap on Expenditure was intended to therefore create an asset that was actually backed by something (because Agoran assets that aren't backed by anything tend to be very volatile and/or worthless). -- ais523
