On Fri, Jul 21, 2017 at 2:40 PM, Nic Evans <nich...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 07/21/17 10:58, grok (caleb vines) wrote:
>> At the beginning of the second week of each month, the acting CEO
>> SHALL initiate an AEB Board Election with a voting period of at least
>> 4 days and no longer than 7 days. All members in Good Standing or on
>> Official Warning at the calling of each AEB Board Election are
>> eligible voters and valid selections for that AEB Board Election. At
>> the end of each AEB Board Election, if there is a clear winner, the
>> winner of the AEB Board Election SHALL flip the CEO switch to eir own
>> name.
>
> Is there an enforceable punishment for ignoring a SHALL in an org? I
> know this org includes one (with its own flaws below), but is there a
> default?
>

There's one that comes later. I assume there isn't a default because
org charters aren't part of the ruleset.

>> In the event of a tie, the acting CEO SHALL initiate an AEB Instant
>> Run-Off Election immediately, with a voting period of at least 4 days
>> and no longer than 7 days. The set of valid voting selections is equal
>> to the set of players who recieved the most votes in the most recent
>> AEB Board Election, and all members in Good Standing or on Official
>> Warning are eligible votesr. If an AEB Instant Run-Off Election is
>> held and there is a clear winner, the winner of the AEB Instant
>> Run-Off Election SHALL flip the CEO switch to eir own name.
>
> Why not always do it IRV instead of two-step?

Including immediate calls to vote provides more information. I do need
to edit this section to include a shorter timeframe for the runoff
election, though. Its intended design would ensure that all voting for
CEO positions wraps up in 14 days. I also am planning to include a
punishment for failing to initiate a voting period, which will come in
the next draft.

>
>>
>> If there is no clear winner following an AEB Instant Run-Off Election
>> and the CEO switch is not set to 0, the current CEO remains the CEO
>> until the results of the next AEB Board Election are assessed.
>>
>> The acting CEO is the assessor for all AEB voting procedure.
>
> As will be mentioned below, this charter doesn't stop CEOs from
> violating SHALLs and so I think the CEO can just refuse to ever assess.

I mean, it does. But like you say, we'll get there.


>> If the Standing switch for the pair of a member and AEB is set to
>> Suspended, that player may pay ten shinies to AEB at any time. If e
>> does, e MAY flip the Standing switch for the pair of emself and AEB to
>> Good Standing.
>
> Weirdly I think this makes Official Warning a worse punishment. After
> you get flipped to it (ie, after 'a timely manner') you can't pay the
> normal 5 and you can't pay the 10 that you can pay for Suspended.

Right, except members on Official Warning have all of the same
privileges as members in Good Standing. Your votes still count if
you're on Official Warning, and you can still make a pledge to
activate the primary effect of the org.


>> If a member did not vote on the last Agoran Decision, the acting CEO
>> may flip the Standing switch for the pair of that member and AEB to
>> Idle. The next time that player votes on an Agoran Decision, e may
>> Invoke AEB Privilege and pledge not to change eir vote on a specific
>> voting matter. If e does, the CEO may flip the Standing switch for the
>> pair of that player and AEB to the value it had before it was most
>> recently set to Idle.
>
> Depending on the results of our discussion about switch-flipping, it may
> end up that the last state before Idle was also Idle.

That's true. I'll have to fix that.


>>
>> A player's Standing switch may only be flipped once per month unless
>> it is flipped by a Suspended player paying ten shinies to AEB.
>
> This makes the 'pay 5 shinies and your switch can't be flipped again'
> clause redundant. Though there's something to say about clarity above
> parsimony.

I'd rather keep the two explicit clauses, even if they overlap. It's
possible that you can scam the system and flip someone from Good
Standing all the way to a Suspension in one period depending on how
the CFJ plays out, so I'd rather nip it here.



>> ==EXPULSION==
>>
>> Expulsion is a set of switches belonging to (AEB, Player) pairs with a
>> default value of 0 and legal values of the set [0,Expelled]. All
>> Expulsion switches are tracked by the acting CEO.
>>
>> If a player breaks a pledge which Invokes AEB Privilege while e is a
>> member, the acting CEO MAY initiate a vote to place that player into
>> Expulsion, with Consent among members that are not named in the voting
>> issue. This action may be taken up to one month after the pledge is
>> broken. If the motion passes, the acting CEO MAY flip the Expulsion
>> switch for the pair of the named player and AEB to Expelled.
>>
>> If a player violates a SHALL NOT outlined in this charter while e is a
>> member, the acting CEO MAY initiate a vote to place that player into
>> Expulsion, with Consent among members in Good Standing or on Official
>> Warning that are not named in the voting issue. This action may be
>> taken up to one month after the SHALL NOT is violated. If the motion
>> passes, the acting CEO MAY flip the Expulsion switch for the pair of
>> the named player and AEB to Expelled.
>
> Only the acting CEO can trigger these punishments. Thus, a corrupt CEO
> is unchecked. Made worse by the fact that e can veto charter changes.

Right, except elections happen every month, and the action to Expel
can be taken up to one month after the pledge is broken. So the CEO
would have to successfully delay elections for a long time to stay
corrupt. The will of the members would easily prevent a corrupt CEO
from being corrupt more than once.


>> The CEO may transfer any number of estates from AEB to emself without
>> objection among members in Good Standing if the following conditions
>> are all met:
>>
>>  - All members who are not Suspended, Expelled, or Idle have voted on
>> one voting issue.
>>  - All players who voted this way have voted for the same legal voting
>> option or have endorsed a member who has unambiguously voted for the
>> same legal option.
>
> 'this way' = what way? I think it's supposed to relate to AEB privilege,
> but the connection isn't clear.

The clauses are sequential. All members who voted on one voting issue
have passed the first check, and become "all players who have voted in
the way outlined in the first bullet of this three-part check,"
shortened to "all players who voted this way."



>>  - All players who have voted this way have made an announcement
>> Invoking AEB Privilege and pledging not to change eir vote on the
>> unanimous voting issue.
>>
>> If the CEO transfers one or more estates from AEB to emself, the CEO
>> SHALL use all estates transferred this way to increase eir voting
>> strength on an issue which meets the conditions which allowed the CEO
>> to transfer one or more estates to emself in the same message in which
>> e transferred one or more estates from AEB to emself.




On Fri, Jul 21, 2017 at 2:49 PM, Alex Smith <ais...@alumni.bham.ac.uk> wrote:
> The intended use of Organizations was that people are punished via
> increasing their Expenditure and/or preventing them from leaving, as a
> method of creating an Expenditure economy. People don't seem to
> actually be using them like that, though.

I was looking at that, but as far as I could tell adjusting a user's
Budget switch was reserved. I could be wrong though?


> (Theory about Agora: no matter how you try to design the actual rules
> around an agreement-like system, people will attempt to force it to act
> like a contract. We've already seen that with Agencies that create
> pledges, which is pretty much a pure contract-equivalent. It happened
> with Promises too.)


I'm curious what these intended use cases would look like. Creating a
contract organization was just the first interesting way to use
Organizations that I could think of, and pledges seemed like the most
effective way to hold people to that contract.



On Sat, Jul 22, 2017 at 5:12 AM, Josh T <draconicdarkn...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I wrote an effective dispute resolution clause into 蘭亭社. It's in Japanese
> and isn't actually very good (it's effective, though!), so it's not likely
> that it'd matter; I just wanted to mention that it's a thing.
>
> 天火狐

my BA is in English, so I'll take your word for it.


-grok

Reply via email to