On Thu, Oct 30, 2008 at 6:09 PM, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Thu, Oct 30, 2008 at 5:58 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Now you are extrapolating based on me leaving out the obvious. I meant >> of course "If you make a contract whose TEXT says what the contents of >> the reports must be, then no one who is not a member has to follow that >> text BECAUSE OF THAT TEXT." There may of course be other texts that >> the person has agreed to that create the same obligation, though not >> texts that create the obligation by deferring to the not-agreed-to >> text. > > The fact that R2166 defers to the contract for definition does not > mean that the officer is bound to the contract or that the contract is > free to obligate the officer in any way. All it means is that the > officer must report, as a service to the contract, on a list of assets > defined by that contract. If the contract adds the text "The > recordkeepor of bananas SHALL transfer all eir assets to the King > Gorilla", it doesn't mean squat. The R2166 obligation persists, but > the new one is ineffective. How then can the recordkeepor be > considered to be bound by the contract? > > Perhaps this is a better analogy than the pledge I created. When an > equity case is called, a person external to the contract is required > to judge it. But both the subject and the appropriate judgements of > the equity case depend on what the contract actually says. So > wouldn't an equity judge be "bound" to the contract against eir will > in the same manner as the recordkeepor of bananas?
Another thought. R2166 currently only extends the obligation to officers. So the "right to refuse to become party to a binding agreement" is preserved by the ability of the officer to resign. -root
