On Thu, Oct 30, 2008 at 5:58 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Now you are extrapolating based on me leaving out the obvious. I meant > of course "If you make a contract whose TEXT says what the contents of > the reports must be, then no one who is not a member has to follow that > text BECAUSE OF THAT TEXT." There may of course be other texts that > the person has agreed to that create the same obligation, though not > texts that create the obligation by deferring to the not-agreed-to > text.
The fact that R2166 defers to the contract for definition does not mean that the officer is bound to the contract or that the contract is free to obligate the officer in any way. All it means is that the officer must report, as a service to the contract, on a list of assets defined by that contract. If the contract adds the text "The recordkeepor of bananas SHALL transfer all eir assets to the King Gorilla", it doesn't mean squat. The R2166 obligation persists, but the new one is ineffective. How then can the recordkeepor be considered to be bound by the contract? Perhaps this is a better analogy than the pledge I created. When an equity case is called, a person external to the contract is required to judge it. But both the subject and the appropriate judgements of the equity case depend on what the contract actually says. So wouldn't an equity judge be "bound" to the contract against eir will in the same manner as the recordkeepor of bananas? -root
