On Wed, May 7, 2008 at 9:24 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Noticed that afterwards, but I don't think it changed my argument. For > one thing, even though you enumerated some clauses separately, the fact > that you considered the result to be a contest was essential to your > perceived equity of the situation, therefore that declaration was a > material part of the agreement. Previous equity judgements were not so > cleanly enumerated and yet all material considerations contained therein > were part of the agreements.
No, it was only paragraph 1) that created equity. Everything else about the contract was gravy. > In fact, the whole thing is funny. According to R2169, the whole judgement > is the agreement. This would include definitions relevant to the > functioning of the contract (if necessary). ais312 states: > > > "My judgement is the following contract, which is a contest, and has root > as contestmaster:" > > 1. If the second half of the sentence is not part of the judgement, > then it has no effect, and it isn't a contest with root as contestmaster. It's a description of various attributes of the contract. You could choose to view it as pragmatically part of the judgement or as simply platonically describing the judgement, but the difference seems largely semantic to me. > 2. If we are generous, ignore the minor semantic mistake, and and allow > that the preamble is a part of the judgement, then the declaration of > contest-ness is part of the agreement. > > If it *is* part of the agreement, the agreement of contest-ness is simply > between the parties. So the judgement is essentially saying "root agrees > [is required to agree]* that the following is a contest." That has as much > legal effect as me making a pledge right now that "this pledge is a contract. > You get 5 points." If I make that pledge, I'm required to "agree to it", > but no one else is, and again it has no legal effect. Something can be part of the agreement without being part of the *text* of the agreement. -root
