[I have substantially changed my opinion as a result of the recent
conversations]
A set of proto-judgements...
On Mon, 18 Feb 2008, Ed Murphy wrote:
> ============================== CFJ 1895 ==============================
> BobTHJ is an R2160 'position'
Agora, by long tradition, is fundamentally governed by the logic (be it fact
or legal fiction) of Aristotle's Telos: that there is a final cause (telos)
for which actions (efficient cause) are sent over an electronic medium
(material cause) that affects Rules (formal cause). One way of stating
the uniqueness of nomic is that the causalities interact and change each
other, especially the formal cause (Rules).
But the final cause (telos) for the game's existence is not so mutable. Put
simply, is that this is a game for the entertainment(?) of unique individuals
("natural" persons or conscious entities with free will, although R2150
currently restricts this to biological English speakers). The overall telos
is the sum of the individual desires of these unique individuals (hereafter
"persons", meaning first-class persons only) to play.
To this end, these persons may create and hold positions of authority, duty,
or responsibility and governed by the Rules (efficient or formal agencies).
However, these persons, as embodiments of final cause, are irreducible; they
cannot in themselves be made into such positions. We have repeatedly rejected
"avatar theory" in Agora and instead abide by the Philosophy of Action; that
is, we assume that all efficient actions (i.e. "messages") ultimately emanate
from the telos of a particular person's (the sender's) Intention, even if a
formal agency (Rule) allows that message to act on another person's behalf
(i.e. in executorship).
It is a longstanding principle of Agora that fundamental telos, the Intention,
is non-assumable, irreducible, and non-transferable. Every assumed act of
free will can be traced to a particular person's desire. Thus, as final
cause and intention, this intention, and free will is, also non-transferable,
in the most fundamental sense.
In terms of the Rules, and in light of the definitions cited by the caller,
"holding a position" is to be granted specific duties, powers or recordkeeping
status by the Rules. This is different from being guaranteed "rights or
privileges" by virtue of one's identity (these are guarantees, not grants,
of the rules). That we accept the Being of a (particular) person as an entity
recognized and guaranteed rights created within the game is to recognize
the irreducible units of telos and intention that ultimately cause the
game to function. This recognition amounts to a fundamental postulate (or
if you prefer, "Agoran Custom") rather than a derived theorem that arises
from the Rules, that a Person is not a position that can be "held" by others.
R2160(d) allows us to assume counterfactual conditions; that is, we are
permitted to treat certain, untrue conditions *as if* they were true. But we
also reject the impossible (you can't "do something an infinite number of
times" or act "as if 1+1=3", so it's meaningless to act "as if you can").
Some assumptions are so counterfactual that to "assume" them is to undermine
the very nature of the game. As root points out, Ex contradictione sequitur
quodlibet; if we assume that Zefram is BobTHJ, whom do we assume is Zefram?
Note that executorship, a different mechanism currently governed by contracts,
is not subject to this same constraint: for this, we allow one intender
to "act for" another, we don't assume that one intender "is" another as
R2160 requires.
To remove the free-will postulate would be similar to removing the parallel
postulate from Euclidean geometry; it would transform it into a "different
game", "not nomic" over which the Rules have no formal constraints, and
therefore any counterfactual conditioning that the Rules try to apply is
meaningless. As a metagame, we could follow the axioms of such a game to
logical conclusions, but it would be outside the realm of the counterfactual
conditions allowed by R2160(d) which is clearly a part of the postulates of
Agora.
Note that is possible, as a matter of practicality, to become arbitrarily
"close" to being a person in terms of position. Being a party to a contract,
or even "being a party to contract X who sold a ticket and incurred a
specific obligation", IS holding a position that another person could hold.
But for the purpose of this judgement, arbitrarily close is not close enough.
This Court finds FALSE.
> ============================== CFJ 1899 ==============================
> BobTHJ CAN register.
Proto: I am going to judge this case as if I was judging the statement
"BobTHJ is a Player" (CFJ 1897), as the (possibly-) judge of that case
has deferred the issue to me. Did the following set of messages by Zefram
successfully deregister BobTHJ?
> I intend to deputise for BobTHJ to deregister em. (E is required to
> deregister emself by virtue of being BobTHJ, a party to the Vote Market
> who has thereby contracted an obligation to deregister. Eir week to
> deregister has long expired.)
> Deputising for BobTHJ, I hereby deregister BobTHJ.
First, I offer this clarification. It is not, strictly speaking, by virtue
of "being BobTHJ" that Zefram is taken to deputize, it is by virtue of BobTHJ
holding the position of "party to the Vote Market who has sold a particular
ticket and thus incurred an obligation". I offer three, wholly independent
but related lines of reasoning which reach the same conclusion. To refute
the overall judgement requires rejecting ALL three of the following:
REASON 1
Judge Zefram wrote, in CFJ 1886: "BobTHJ's obligation was specifically to
deregister emself, not merely to be deregistered." Since, by CFJ 1895,
we can't extend a delegation of position to "being BobTHJ", a deputised
deregistration does not satisfy the obligation to deregister emself as
an act of will. If the agent of Registrar (through Cantus Cygneus) doesn't
satisfy, neither would the agent of a deputy. Therefore, the act is not one
that can be deputised by R2160, as it wouldn't fulfill the obligation any
more than the Writ of FAGE did.
REASON 2
The wording of the obligation itself was as follows: "Action: If all five
sell tickets posted in this message are filled, I will deregister."
The act verb is "deregister", in the same way the verb "submit a report"
or "assign a judge" is used in other obligations. Therefore, anyone
deputizing to fulfill the obligation does so by simply "deregistering",
not by "deregistering someone else." It is not "being BobTHJ" but "the
position of holding a sell ticket with the obligation to deregister" which
would be transferred wholesale to the deputy.
REASON 3
If the deputy takes on this obligation, but is unable, even as a
"counterfactual condition", to "be BobTHJ" as required by R2160d, then this
arbitrary closeness described in CFJ 1895 is not enough to give the deputy
the ability to deregister another player, as no mechanism exists.
END RESULT
Zefram's attempted deputization failed. BobTHJ is still a player. By
implication following this precedent, CFJ 1897 must be TRUE, and this court
finds CFJ 1899 FALSE (if the CFJ 1897 doesn't match, that that one or this
one must be appealed).
-Goethe
