On Tue, 19 Feb 2008, Zefram wrote: > Anyway, I wrote it as a counterfactual conditional, I'm somewhat surprised > that Goethe interpreted it differently.
I think we're in broad general agreement here, but it's clear from this an your previous comments that I need to strengthen and clarify my "sane argument". :) I understood your conterfactual conditional. However, without saying it in the judgement, I put "if Zefram were BobTHJ" in the same category as "if 1+1=3". In other words, the physical/logical impossibility of the being another person is an extension of the same reasoning which holds that "persons" are fundamental qualities not subject to being "positions", and that being a particular (natural) person, is, as you put it, a fundamental mode of thought. For all *practical* purposes you can "be" BobTHJ in terms of satisfying eir duties, but you can't take the final leap and actually *be* BobTHJ in terms of assuming all of eir guaranteed R101 (or other natural, inalienable) rights. The impossibility of the last jump is enough to trigger all kinds of Ex contradictione conclusions that would come of actually being BobTHJ, but in practical terms we don't have to take that jump. It turns out to be of little importance in game practice and more important in developing a theory of legal identity. For example, I can accept that not only is it possible for you (Zefram) to be a "player", but it is possible for you to hold the R2160 'position' of "a player who signed a contract, sold a ticket, and incurred an obligation that can be satisfied by deregistration" . I accept that this is R2160 POSSIBLE even though you haven't done it, and you might not be able to (someone else would have to buy the ticket). Actually, hmm, that's a good point. If you were in the above 'position', wouldn't it require *your* deregistration to satisfy the terms of the contract? Just as you publish a Report "for" someone else, wouldn't you have to deregister "for" someone else? Troublesome. Thoughts? -Goethe
