A set of proto-judgements...

On Mon, 18 Feb 2008, Ed Murphy wrote:
> ==============================  CFJ 1895  ==============================
>    BobTHJ is an R2160 'position'

Proto:  In terms of the Rules, and in light of the definitions cited
by the caller "holding a position" is to be granted specific duties,
powers or recordkeeping status by the Rules (this is different from being
guaranteed "rights or privileges" by virtue of one's identity; these are
guarantees, not grants, of the rules).

Being a (particular) person is an identity outside the game that is
recognized and guaranteed rights within the game, but not a position
created within the game.  Particularly, it is not POSSIBLE for another
individual to "hold the position of being BobTHJ" as required by R2160(d).  
I find FALSE; however, being a player, or being a party to a contract, IS 
holding a position that another person could hold (of "player" and "party 
to contract X" respectively) and thus "player" and "party to contract"
ARE R2160 'positions'.

> ==============================  CFJ 1898  ==============================
>    Zefram is a player.

> ==============================  CFJ 1899  ==============================
>    BobTHJ CAN register.

> ==============================  CFJ 1900  ==============================
>    Zefram CAN register.

Proto: Zefram's message of intent read:

> I intend to deputise for BobTHJ to deregister em.  (E is required to
> deregister emself by virtue of being BobTHJ, a party to the Vote Market
> who has thereby contracted an obligation to deregister.  Eir week to
> deregister has long expired.)

It is not, strictly speaking, by virtue of "being BobTHJ" that Zefram was 
permitted to deputize, it is by virtue of BobTHJ holding the position of 
"party to the Vote Market".  Holding the position of party to this contract
did indeed impose upon em a duty of deregistration on BobTHJ that was still 
outstanding (CFJ 1886, 1895).  I find that while the first sentence of the 
intent was, strictly speaking semantically inaccurate, the parenthetical 
explanation provides enough clarity for a reasonable person to decide that 
the notice satisfies R2160(c) on the basis of BobTHJ holding a specified 
contractual position in the Vote Market.  The later notice of 3-Feb re-
included this parenthetical explanation, so that:

> Deputising for BobTHJ, I hereby deregister BobTHJ.

again while semantically directed at the individual not the position, was 
reasonably clear enough in context to be successful.

By implication following this precedent, CFJ 1897 must be FALSE, otherwise
these judgements or that one must be appealed.  Assuming the finding
of FALSE in CFJ 1897 based on reasoning similar to the above, I judge:

CFJ 1898: TRUE   Even if CFJ 1897 is reversed, Zefram's message clearly
                 could not be taken to apply to emself, and would instead
                 be a failed action.  Either way, Zefram remains a player.
                 Historically (for the past several years), the language
                 and semantics of "acting on behalf of" has been sufficiently
                 tricky to get "semantically perfect" that we should make
                 reasonable allowances for intent.  This is a reasonable
                 allowance.

CFJ 1899: FALSE  The action was on 3-Feb, and the CFJ called later on
                 the same date.  The R869 timing limitation is in fact
                 transferred, as it is this mechanism that empowers
                 the deregistration:  the contract supplies the SHALL,
                 and R869 supplies the CAN and therefore also supplies
                 the continuing CANNOT.

CFJ 1900: FALSE  Trivial given CFJ 1898.

-Goethe



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