On 11/6/07, Zefram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Your model contract would impose that sort of practical overhead for > any routine official action that is not by the Chair.
And how is that different than the current system? My model contract allows whoever the previous officer was to still have full control of the office. Partners other than the chair can be assigned other duties by contractual amendment. > > >A broken contract can easily be fixed by proposal. > > Not an enticing scenario. Also runs into constitutional problems > regarding consent to contract, as in fact does your rule text generally. > Again, under our current system a broken office can only be fixed by proposal, so what's the difference? Quite true on the constitutional issue though. Let me come up with a fix. > You're talking about one public contract per office, which makes quite a > lot of contracts for the notary to track. Also for everyone else to pay > attention to. Eleven(?) nearly-identical contracts are going to make > it difficult to find the relevant bits. We'll all be wading through > partnership boilerplate that should have been factored out into a rule. > But if this boilerplate is included in a rule as you suggest then it can not be amended, hence removing much of the fun of making them mutable contracts. > I think that's a bad idea. If we want to control how officers fulfill > their duties we should do this as by general agreement, as we already > can by proposal. It shouldn't be at the whim of the current officer. The Chair would have no ability to modify the office at will. To do so would require a minimum of 2 additional Partners or a proposal. Changes to an office would only occur with the consensus of the Partners (unless this provision in the base contract was modified). And again, it can still be modified through general consensus by proposal, which is still no different than our current method. BobTHJ
