Kerim Aydin wrote: >What you're missing is that you've crippled R1742 by removing this text >(taken from 1742/4):
Let's go through these judicial options one by one. > (i) order the defendant to perform according to the agreement Under the new system, parties are already required by the rules to perform according to the agreement. I see no benefit in requiring the intervention of a judge in order to make the agreement binding. And if the agreement is binding without a judicial order, then the order doesn't change the defendant's obligations anyway, so it's null. > or perform substitute acts that would fairly serve the > interests of the agreement; Here's the equity bit. True, that's not in the rules in the current system. But as I said, it can be achieved via an independent arbitration entity and be just as legally binding. > (ii) order the other parties of the agreement to perform such > acts as may be necessary to preserve fairness and > justice; More equity. Intependent arbitration again. I think the restorative bits could never work well. Our contracts, to the extent that they are breachable, almost always involve specific performance obligations, not simple transfers of property. I think it is not often that there will be a suitable substitute act that would restore the wronged party to eir rightful position. Usually I expect the only equitable course of action is to require the specific performance that the contract originally demanded, which takes us back to the first (null) option. > (iii) order that additional ("punitive") penalties or actions > be applied to the defendant, if and only if the agreement > in question explicitly specifies punitive penalties for > the type of breach. So this is ordering that certain parts of the agreement take effect, under the circumstances that, er, the agreement says they take effect. Null again. Declaratory judgement (that a certain condition specified in the agreement has been met) suffices to adjudicate activation of contractual penalties. It seems to me that you're largely complaining that the restorative options, because they are no longer in the rules, aren't available by default to a contract under Agoran law. I don't think it's such a big deal to require the contract to name an arbitrator, in the few cases where there are reasonable substitute acts. (from another message) > the previous R1742 (I'll >standardize on R1742/4) allowed contracts and agoran courts to recognize >each other as relevant to each other, without requiring non-players obey >or be bound by the rules as a whole. Under the old system, a judicial order was binding only by virtue of rule 1810. So if, as you suggest, a non-player accepts the judgements of the Agoran courts but doesn't consider the rules generally binding, e'd have no reason to obey the order that accompanies the judgement that e breached the contract. A restrictive interpretation of R1503 gives the same result. (Aside: the MMIified R1810, unlike the previous version, places the obligation to obey orders explicitly only on players. An oversight?) Of course, the status of non-players w.r.t. rule obligations wasn't a problem for contract law for most of the time that Civil CFJs existed. It was less than two months ago that we allowed non-players to enter into contracts. I said at the time enforcability would be a problem. -zefram