Taral wrote: >How about if you keep them if you use them AGAINST, but not if you use them >FOR?
Mm, that's more interesting. I suppose one would have a voting-limit-AGAINST-ordinary-proposals and a voting-limit-FOR-ordinary-proposals; one can raise the former permanently, but the latter only for one proposal at a time. It avoids providing an incentive to duplicate. The incentive that it provides is a more subtle one: to put as much of one's controversial stuff into one proposal as possible, spend one's VCs on voting FOR it, and thus make the most efficient use of the VCs spent on extra FOR votes. This contrasts with the current system, of no per-proposal influence mechanisms, where it makes no difference whether equally-controversial rule changes are in one proposal or two (or seven). On the whole I like fine-grained voting. Monster reform proposals are more like voting for political parties than voting for rule changes: a lot of people will compromise and vote for bad stuff because of the good stuff that comes with it. That's a feature of real-world `democracies' that I'd rather we not duplicate. I prefer to follow good software engineering practice, of putting logically-unrelated changes in separate patches. I spot another feature of your asymmetric system: with VLAOP increasing without bound and VLFOP reset for each proposal, there's a likelihood that the former will dominate. Once everyone's VLAOP has grown a bit, only unanimously-favoured proposals will pass without VC spending. Not an appealing vision. Perhaps that could be countered by making VLAOP (and VCs?) decay, which is something I proposed back in April but was voted down with VI > 2.3. -zefram
