A new list SETTLE has been created to discuss securing access to TLS local
resources. This is to continue discussion of a problem that originated in ADD
and discussed on IOTOPS and at the IETF121 AllDispatch meeting. The problem and
solutions have been discussed on and off in W3C and IETF since at least 2015.
This new list was also announced on ietf-announce on 23 November (*).
Purpose:
TLS typically authenticates servers using public key infrastructure,
specifically certificates signed by a certificate authority already
trusted by the TLS client. In local domains (e.g., home) obtaining
such a certificate for printers, internet of things devices is
problematic due to technical complexity, IPv4 NAT and IPv6 firewalls,
lack of domain ownership, and other reasons.
This list is intended to discuss alternative technologies to identify
and authenticate servers so that TLS can be used with those servers
on local domains.
List address: set...@ietf.org
Archive: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/settle/
To subscribe: https://mailman3.ietf.org/mailman3/lists/settle.ietf.org/
-d
(*)
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/50FrWLPNfen9sFpxr48Lz9jbwsg/
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