Reviewed: https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/ossa/+/882879
Committed:
https://opendev.org/openstack/ossa/commit/d62fe374e42538e11abc9b34f5c38258e8279f40
Submitter: "Zuul (22348)"
Branch: master
commit d62fe374e42538e11abc9b34f5c38258e8279f40
Author: Jeremy Stanley <fu...@yuggoth.org>
Date: Wed May 10 14:39:22 2023 +0000
Add OSSA-2023-003 (CVE-2023-2088)
Change-Id: Iab9cca074c2928dbecbe512f813fe421a744c592
Closes-Bug: #2004555
** Changed in: ossa
Status: In Progress => Fix Released
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2004555
Title:
[OSSA-2023-003] Unauthorized volume access through deleted volume
attachments (CVE-2023-2088)
Status in Cinder:
In Progress
Status in glance_store:
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova):
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova) antelope series:
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova) wallaby series:
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova) xena series:
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova) yoga series:
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova) zed series:
In Progress
Status in os-brick:
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Security Advisory:
Fix Released
Status in OpenStack Security Notes:
Fix Released
Bug description:
Hello OpenStack Security Team,
I’m writing to you, as we faced a serious security breach in OpenStack
functionality(correlated a bit with libvirt, iscsi and huawei driver).
I was going through OSSA documents and correlated libvirt notes, but I
couldn't find something similar. It is not related to
https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2020-006.html
In short: we observed that newly created cinder volume(1GB size) was
attached to compute node instance, but an instance recognized it as a
115GB volume, which(this 115GB volume) in fact was connected to
another instance on the same compute node.
[1. Test environment]
Compute node: OpenStack Ussuri configured with Huawei dorado as a storage
backend(configuration driver is available here:
https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/rocky/configuration/block-storage/drivers/huawei-storage-driver.html)
Packages:
v# dpkg -l | grep libvirt
ii libvirt-clients 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16
amd64 Programs for the libvirt library
ii libvirt-daemon 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16
amd64 Virtualization daemon
ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16
amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver
ii libvirt-daemon-driver-storage-rbd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16
amd64 Virtualization daemon RBD storage driver
ii libvirt-daemon-system 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16
amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files
ii libvirt-daemon-system-systemd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16
amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files (systemd)
ii libvirt0:amd64 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16
amd64 library for interfacing with different
virtualization systems
ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1
all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support
ii python3-libvirt 6.1.0-1
amd64 libvirt Python 3 bindings
# dpkg -l | grep qemu
ii ipxe-qemu
1.0.0+git-20190109.133f4c4-0ubuntu3.2 all PXE boot
firmware - ROM images for qemu
ii ipxe-qemu-256k-compat-efi-roms 1.0.0+git-20150424.a25a16d-0ubuntu4
all PXE boot firmware - Compat EFI ROM images for qemu
ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16
amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver
ii qemu 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23
amd64 fast processor emulator, dummy package
ii qemu-block-extra:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23
amd64 extra block backend modules for qemu-system and
qemu-utils
ii qemu-kvm 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23
amd64 QEMU Full virtualization on x86 hardware
ii qemu-system-common 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23
amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (common files)
ii qemu-system-data 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23
all QEMU full system emulation (data files)
ii qemu-system-gui:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23
amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (user
interface and audio support)
ii qemu-system-x86 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23
amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (x86)
ii qemu-utils 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23
amd64 QEMU utilities
# dpkg -l | grep nova
ii nova-common 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1
all OpenStack Compute - common files
ii nova-compute 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1
all OpenStack Compute - compute node base
ii nova-compute-kvm 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1
all OpenStack Compute - compute node (KVM)
ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1
all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support
ii python3-nova 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1
all OpenStack Compute Python 3 libraries
ii python3-novaclient 2:17.0.0-0ubuntu1
all client library for OpenStack Compute API - 3.x
# dpkg -l | grep multipath
ii multipath-tools 0.8.3-1ubuntu2
amd64 maintain multipath block device access
# dpkg -l | grep iscsi
ii libiscsi7:amd64 1.18.0-2
amd64 iSCSI client shared library
ii open-iscsi 2.0.874-7.1ubuntu6.2
amd64 iSCSI initiator tools
# cat /etc/lsb-release
DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu
DISTRIB_RELEASE=20.04
DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal
DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS"
Instance OS: Debian-11-amd64
[2. Test scenario]
Already created instance with two volumes attached. First - 10GB for root
system, second - 115GB used as vdb. Recognized by compute node as vda - dm-11,
vdb - dm-9:
# virsh domblklist 90fas439-fc0e-4e22-8d0b-6f2a18eee5c1
Target Source
----------------------
vda /dev/dm-11
vdb /dev/dm-9
# multipath -ll
(...)
36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1
size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw
`-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active
|- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running
|- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running
|- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running
`- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running
(...)
36e00084100ee7e7ed6acaa2900002f6a dm-11 HUAWEI,XSG1
size=10G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw
`-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active
|- 14:0:0:3 sdq 65:0 active ready running
|- 15:0:0:3 sdr 65:16 active ready running
|- 16:0:0:3 sdp 8:240 active ready running
`- 17:0:0:3 sds 65:32 active ready running
Creating a new instance, with the same OS guest system and 10GB root
volume. After successful deployment, creating a new volume(1GB) size
and attaching it to newly created instance. We can see after that:
# multipath -ll
(...)
36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1
size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw
`-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active
|- 14:0:0:10 sdao 66:128 failed faulty running
|- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running
|- 15:0:0:10 sdap 66:144 failed faulty running
|- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running
|- 16:0:0:10 sdan 66:112 failed faulty running
|- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running
|- 17:0:0:10 sdaq 66:160 failed faulty running
`- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running
This way at instance we were able to see a new drive - not 1GB, but
115GB -> so it seems it was incorrectly attached and this way we were
able to destroy some data on that volume.
Additionaly we were able to see many errors like that in compute node
logs:
# dmesg -T | grep dm-9
[Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev
dm-9, sector 62918760 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 2 prio class 0
[Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev
dm-9, sector 33625152 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 6 prio class 0
[Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev
dm-9, sector 66663000 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0
[Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev
dm-9, sector 66598120 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0
[Fri Jan 27 13:37:51 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev
dm-9, sector 66638680 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 12 prio class 0
[Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev
dm-9, sector 66614344 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 1 prio class 0
[Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev
dm-9, sector 66469296 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 24 prio class 0
[Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev
dm-9, sector 66586472 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 3 prio class 0
(...)
Unfortunately we do not know what is a perfect test-scenario for it as
we could face such issue in less than 2% of our tries, but it looks
like a serious security breach.
Additionally we observed that linux kernel is not fully clearing a device
allocation(from volume detach), so some of drives names are visible in an
output, i.e. lsblk command. Then, after new volume attachment we can see such
names(i.e. sdao, sdap, sdan and so on) are reusable by that drive and wrongly
mapped by multipath/iscsi to another drive and this way we hit an issue.
Our question is why linux kernel of compute node is not removing devices
allocation and this way is leading to a scenario like that? Maybe this can be a
solution here.
Thanks in advance for your help and understanding. In case when more
details is needed, do not hesitate to contact me.
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