Some initial pieces for guest support. Everything will currently malfunction
for VMs which explicitly opt in to CET_SS/IBT.
Still TODO as a minimum:
* Teach the pagewalk logic about shadow stack accesses and errors.
* Emulator support for the new instructions. WRUSS is an irritating corner
case, requiring a change to how we express pagewalk inputs, as
user/supervisor is no longer dependent on CPL.
* Context switching of U/S_CET state. Recommended way is with XSAVES, except
the S_CET has broken sematics - it ends up as a mix of host and guest
state, and isn't safe to XRSTOR without editing what the CPU wrote out.
The above ought to suffice for getting some XTF testing in place. For general
guest support:
* In-guest XSAVES support. Windows is the only OS to support CET at the time
of writing, and it cross-checks for XSAVES. Linux expected to perform the
same cross-check in due course.
Stretch features (not for initial support):
* Adding EPT/NPT Supervisor Shadow Stack protections into mem_access, so
introspection can block aliasing attacks.
Andrew Cooper (3):
x86/hvm: Introduce experimental guest CET support
x86/svm: Enumeration for CET
x86/VT-x: Enumeration for CET
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c | 2 ++
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 6 ++++++
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.h | 10 ++++++++--
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 11 ++++++++++-
xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 4 ++--
8 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--
2.11.0
