George Dunlap writes ("[PATCH for-4.13] docs/xl: Document pci-assignable
state"):
> =item B<pci-assignable-remove> [I<-r>] I<BDF>
...
> +Make the device at PCI Bus/Device/Function BDF not assignable to
> +guests. This will at least unbind the device from pciback, and
> +re-assign it from the "quarantine domain" back to domain 0. If the -r
> +option is specified, it will also attempt to re-bind the device to its
> +original driver, making it usable by Domain 0 again. If the device is
> +not bound to pciback, it will return success.
> +
> +Note that this functionality will work even for devices which were not
> +made assignable by B<pci-assignable-add>. This can be used to allow
> +dom0 to access devices which were automatically quarantined by Xen
> +after domain destruction as a result of Xen's B<iommu=quarantine>
> +command-line default.
What are the security implications of doing this if the device might
still be doing DMA or something ?
(For that matter, presumably there are security implications of
assigning the same device in sequence to different guests?)
Ian.
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