On 2018/8/20 16:30, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 20.08.18 at 05:32, <zhenzhong.d...@oracle.com> wrote:
When TBOOT enabled, acpi_parse_dmar() zap a copy of DMAR table rather
than the real table, so make it controled by config option based on the
fact that we already have done the real zapping in tboot_parse_dmar_table().
Is this just a cosmetic change, or is there any harm done by the extra
zapping?
Cosmetic change, I feel it isn't necessory to zap a copy of DMAR table
which is freed later.
Thanks
Zhenzhong
As said above, acpi_parse_dmar() doesn't zaps APCI DMAR signature in
real TXT heap table, fix the stale comments.
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.d...@oracle.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/tboot.c | 3 +--
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
You've again failed to Cc maintainers (included now).
Jan
--- a/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c
@@ -490,8 +490,7 @@ int __init tboot_parse_dmar_table(acpi_table_handler
dmar_handler)
rc = dmar_handler(dmar_table);
xfree(dmar_table);
- /* acpi_parse_dmar() zaps APCI DMAR signature in TXT heap table */
- /* but dom0 will read real table, so must zap it there too */
+ /* Dom0 will read real DMAR table, so must zap it there */
acpi_dmar_zap();
return rc;
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
@@ -866,8 +866,10 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_dmar(struct acpi_table_header
*table)
}
out:
+#ifndef CONFIG_TBOOT
/* Zap ACPI DMAR signature to prevent dom0 using vt-d HW. */
acpi_dmar_zap();
+#endif
return ret;
}
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
