On 08/09/2018 05:41 AM, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Wed, 2018-08-08 at 10:35 -0700, Sarah Newman wrote:
>> commit b3681dd548d06deb2e1573890829dff4b15abf46 upstream.
>>
>> This version applies to v4.9.
>
> I think you can kill the 'xorl %ebx,%ebx' from error_entry too but yes,
> this does want to go to 4.9 and earlier because the 'Fixes:' tag is a
> bit of a lie — the problem existed before that, at least in theory.
The commit 2140a9942 "x86/entry/64: Relax pvops stub clobber
specifications" was what removed the "movl %ebx, %eax" line later on
originally, but it was the commit 3ac6d8c787b8 that removed the
'xorl %ebx,%ebx'. So these weren't matched.
I don't know if it's a concern, but if someone had gone to the effort of
backporting the original commit 3ac6d8c787b83, adding the removal of
'xorl %ebx,%ebx' to this patch would create merge conflicts.
For that reason and given the line is harmless, should it be left in?
>
>> From Andy Lutomirski, original author:
>>
>> error_entry and error_exit communicate the user vs kernel status of
>> the frame using %ebx. This is unnecessary -- the information is in
>> regs->cs. Just use regs->cs.
>>
>> This makes error_entry simpler and makes error_exit more robust.
>>
>> It also fixes a nasty bug. Before all the Spectre nonsense, The
>> xen_failsafe_callback entry point returned like this:
>>
>> ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
>> SAVE_C_REGS
>> SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
>> ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
>> jmp error_exit
>>
>> And it did not go through error_entry. This was bogus: RBX
>> contained garbage, and error_exit expected a flag in RBX.
>> Fortunately, it generally contained *nonzero* garbage, so the
>> correct code path was used. As part of the Spectre fixes, code was
>> added to clear RBX to mitigate certain speculation attacks. Now,
>> depending on kernel configuration, RBX got zeroed and, when running
>> some Wine workloads, the kernel crashes. This was introduced by:
>>
>> commit 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for
>> exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")
>>
>> With this patch applied, RBX is no longer needed as a flag, and the
>> problem goes away.
>>
>> I suspect that malicious userspace could use this bug to crash the
>> kernel even without the offending patch applied, though.
>>
>> [Historical note: I wrote this patch as a cleanup before I was aware
>> of the bug it fixed.]
>>
>> [Note to stable maintainers: this should probably get applied to all
>> kernels.]
>>
>> Cc: Brian Gerst <brge...@gmail.com>
>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <b...@alien8.de>
>> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <li...@dominikbrodowski.net>
>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mi...@redhat.com>
>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <h...@zytor.com>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
>> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrov...@oracle.com>
>> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com>
>> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
>> Cc: x...@kernel.org
>> Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
>> Fixes: 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for
>> exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")
>> Reported-and-tested-by: "M. Vefa Bicakci" <m....@runbox.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Sarah Newman <s...@prgmr.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 19 ++++---------------
>> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> index d58d8dc..0dab47a 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> @@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
>>
>> call \do_sym
>>
>> - jmp error_exit /* %ebx: no
>> swapgs flag */
>> + jmp error_exit
>> .endif
>> END(\sym)
>> .endm
>> @@ -1043,7 +1043,6 @@ END(paranoid_exit)
>>
>> /*
>> * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch gs if needed.
>> - * Return: EBX=0: came from user mode; EBX=1: otherwise
>> */
>> ENTRY(error_entry)
>> cld
>> @@ -1087,7 +1086,6 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
>> * for these here too.
>> */
>> .Lerror_kernelspace:
>> - incl %ebx
>> leaq native_irq_return_iret(%rip), %rcx
>> cmpq %rcx, RIP+8(%rsp)
>> je .Lerror_bad_iret
>> @@ -1119,28 +1117,19 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
>>
>> /*
>> * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up
>> pt_regs
>> - * as if we faulted immediately after IRET and clear EBX so
>> that
>> - * error_exit knows that we will be returning to user mode.
>> + * as if we faulted immediately after IRET.
>> */
>> mov %rsp, %rdi
>> call fixup_bad_iret
>> mov %rax, %rsp
>> - decl %ebx
>> jmp .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs
>> END(error_entry)
>>
>> -
>> -/*
>> - * On entry, EBX is a "return to kernel mode" flag:
>> - * 1: already in kernel mode, don't need SWAPGS
>> - * 0: user gsbase is loaded, we need SWAPGS and standard
>> preparation for return to usermode
>> - */
>> ENTRY(error_exit)
>> - movl %ebx, %eax
>> DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
>> TRACE_IRQS_OFF
>> - testl %eax, %eax
>> - jnz retint_kernel
>> + testb $3, CS(%rsp)
>> + jz retint_kernel
>> jmp retint_user
>> END(error_exit)
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Xen-devel mailing list
>> Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
>> https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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