On Fri, Jul 18, 2025 at 01:04:56PM +0200, Alejandro Vallejo wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> I like the new encapsulation, but I have a few questions.
> 
> On Wed Jul 16, 2025 at 4:04 AM CEST, dmukhin wrote:
> > From: Denis Mukhin <dmuk...@ford.com> 
> >
> > Introduce domain_console for grouping data structures used for integrating
> > domain's diagnostic console with Xen's console driver.
> >
> > Group all pbuf-related data structures under domain_console. Rename the 
> > moved
> > fields to plain .buf, .idx and .lock names, since all uses of the fields are
> > touched.
> >
> > Bump the domain console buffer allocation size to 256. No extra symbol for 
> > the
> > value since it is used only once during data structure declaration. All size
> > checks use ARRAY_SIZE().
> >
> > Allocate domain_console from the heap so that the parent domain struct size
> > stays below PAGE_SIZE boundary to account for more console-related fields
> > added in the future.
> >
> > Finally, update the domain_console allocation and initialization code.
> >
> > No functional change.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Denis Mukhin <dmuk...@ford.com>
> > ---
> > Changes since v7:
> > - use ARRAY_SIZE() for cons->buf checks
> > - update the commit message
> > ---
> >  xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c      |  2 +-
> >  xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c     | 18 ++++++++++--------
> >  xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c     |  2 +-
> >  xen/common/domain.c        | 19 +++++++++----------
> >  xen/drivers/char/console.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
> >  xen/include/xen/sched.h    | 22 ++++++++++++----------
> >  6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c b/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c
> > index 480fc664fc62..d0d17c76b72c 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c
> > @@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ int domain_vpl011_init(struct domain *d, struct 
> > vpl011_init_info *info)
> >      }
> >      else
> >      {
> > -        d->console.input_allowed = true;
> > +        d->console->input_allowed = true;
> >          vpl011->backend_in_domain = false;
> >  
> >          vpl011->backend.xen = xzalloc(struct vpl011_xen_backend);
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> > index 56c7de39778b..684d2c0c195c 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> > @@ -559,7 +559,8 @@ void hvm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v)
> >  static int cf_check hvm_print_line(
> >      int dir, unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes, uint32_t *val)
> >  {
> > -    struct domain *cd = current->domain;
> > +    const struct domain *d = current->domain;
> > +    struct domain_console *cons = d->console;
> >      char c = *val;
> >  
> >      ASSERT(bytes == 1 && port == XEN_HVM_DEBUGCONS_IOPORT);
> > @@ -571,16 +572,17 @@ static int cf_check hvm_print_line(
> >      if ( !is_console_printable(c) )
> >          return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> >  
> > -    spin_lock(&cd->pbuf_lock);
> > +    spin_lock(&cons->lock);
> > +    ASSERT(cons->idx < ARRAY_SIZE(cons->buf));
> >      if ( c != '\n' )
> > -        cd->pbuf[cd->pbuf_idx++] = c;
> > -    if ( (cd->pbuf_idx == (DOMAIN_PBUF_SIZE - 1)) || (c == '\n') )
> > +        cons->buf[cons->idx++] = c;
> > +    if ( (cons->idx == (ARRAY_SIZE(cons->buf) - 1)) || (c == '\n') )
> >      {
> > -        cd->pbuf[cd->pbuf_idx] = '\0';
> > -        guest_printk(cd, XENLOG_G_DEBUG "%s\n", cd->pbuf);
> > -        cd->pbuf_idx = 0;
> > +        cons->buf[cons->idx] = '\0';
> > +        guest_printk(d, XENLOG_G_DEBUG "%s\n", cons->buf);
> > +        cons->idx = 0;
> >      }
> > -    spin_unlock(&cd->pbuf_lock);
> > +    spin_unlock(&cons->lock);
> >  
> >      return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> >  }
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c
> > index bc2a7dd5fae5..bd29c53a2d34 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c
> > @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ void __init pv_shim_setup_dom(struct domain *d, 
> > l4_pgentry_t *l4start,
> >       */
> >      d->max_pages = domain_tot_pages(d);
> >  
> > -    d->console.input_allowed = true;
> > +    d->console->input_allowed = true;
> >  }
> >  
> >  static void write_start_info(struct domain *d)
> > diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
> > index 303c338ef293..caef4cc8d649 100644
> > --- a/xen/common/domain.c
> > +++ b/xen/common/domain.c
> > @@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ static void _domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
> >      BUG_ON(!d->is_dying);
> >      BUG_ON(atomic_read(&d->refcnt) != DOMAIN_DESTROYED);
> >  
> > -    xfree(d->pbuf);
> > +    xvfree(d->console);
> 
> XVFREE() to avoid a dangling pointer. But look at the end. I'd just remove the
> pointer altogether.
> 
> >  
> >      argo_destroy(d);
> >  
> > @@ -835,8 +835,6 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid,
> >          flags |= CDF_hardware;
> >          if ( old_hwdom )
> >              old_hwdom->cdf &= ~CDF_hardware;
> > -
> > -        d->console.input_allowed = true;
> >      }
> >  
> >      /* Holding CDF_* internal flags. */
> > @@ -866,8 +864,6 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid,
> >      spin_lock_init(&d->shutdown_lock);
> >      d->shutdown_code = SHUTDOWN_CODE_INVALID;
> >  
> > -    spin_lock_init(&d->pbuf_lock);
> > -
> >      rwlock_init(&d->vnuma_rwlock);
> >  
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PCI
> > @@ -877,6 +873,14 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid,
> >  
> >      /* All error paths can depend on the above setup. */
> >  
> > +    err = -ENOMEM;
> > +    d->console = xvzalloc(typeof(*d->console));
> > +    if ( !d->console )
> > +        goto fail;
> > +
> > +    spin_lock_init(&d->console->lock);
> > +    d->console->input_allowed = is_hardware_domain(d);
> > +
> >      /*
> >       * Allocate d->vcpu[] and set ->max_vcpus up early.  Various per-domain
> >       * resources want to be sized based on max_vcpus.
> > @@ -959,11 +963,6 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid,
> >      if ( (err = argo_init(d)) != 0 )
> >          goto fail;
> >  
> > -    err = -ENOMEM;
> > -    d->pbuf = xzalloc_array(char, DOMAIN_PBUF_SIZE);
> > -    if ( !d->pbuf )
> > -        goto fail;
> > -
> >      if ( (err = sched_init_domain(d, config->cpupool_id)) != 0 )
> >          goto fail;
> >  
> > diff --git a/xen/drivers/char/console.c b/xen/drivers/char/console.c
> > index ba5a809a99fb..b0d50a910e27 100644
> > --- a/xen/drivers/char/console.c
> > +++ b/xen/drivers/char/console.c
> > @@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ struct domain *console_get_domain(void)
> >      if ( !d )
> >          return NULL;
> >  
> > -    if ( d->console.input_allowed )
> > +    if ( d->console->input_allowed )
> >          return d;
> >  
> >      rcu_unlock_domain(d);
> > @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static void console_switch_input(void)
> >          {
> >              rcu_unlock_domain(d);
> >  
> > -            if ( !d->console.input_allowed )
> > +            if ( !d->console->input_allowed )

Is there a chance that domain being destroyed can also get here with
proper timing?  I don't think it's currently possible, as the freeing
of the buffer is done in the last leg of domain destruction, which is
not preemptible.

However there might a race in console_switch_input(), as the rcu lock
is dropped before checking d->console.input_allowed, which could allow
for the domain to be destroyed in the middle?  I don't think this is
realistic under a normal scenario, but could be possible if running
Xen nested or similar, where Xen CPUs can get de-scheduled.

> >                  continue;
> >  
> >              console_rx = next_rx;
> > @@ -744,6 +744,7 @@ static long 
> > guest_console_write(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) buffer,
> >          else
> >          {
> >              char *kin = kbuf, *kout = kbuf, c;
> > +            struct domain_console *cons = cd->console;
> >  
> >              /* Strip non-printable characters */
> >              do
> > @@ -756,22 +757,22 @@ static long 
> > guest_console_write(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) buffer,
> >              } while ( --kcount > 0 );
> >  
> >              *kout = '\0';
> > -            spin_lock(&cd->pbuf_lock);
> > +            spin_lock(&cons->lock);
> >              kcount = kin - kbuf;
> >              if ( c != '\n' &&
> > -                 (cd->pbuf_idx + (kout - kbuf) < (DOMAIN_PBUF_SIZE - 1)) )
> > +                 (cons->idx + (kout - kbuf) < (ARRAY_SIZE(cons->buf) - 1)) 
> > )
> >              {
> >                  /* buffer the output until a newline */
> > -                memcpy(cd->pbuf + cd->pbuf_idx, kbuf, kout - kbuf);
> > -                cd->pbuf_idx += (kout - kbuf);
> > +                memcpy(cons->buf + cons->idx, kbuf, kout - kbuf);
> > +                cons->idx += kout - kbuf;
> >              }
> >              else
> >              {
> > -                cd->pbuf[cd->pbuf_idx] = '\0';
> > -                guest_printk(cd, XENLOG_G_DEBUG "%s%s\n", cd->pbuf, kbuf);
> > -                cd->pbuf_idx = 0;
> > +                cons->buf[cons->idx] = '\0';
> > +                guest_printk(cd, XENLOG_G_DEBUG "%s%s\n", cons->buf, kbuf);
> > +                cons->idx = 0;
> >              }
> > -            spin_unlock(&cd->pbuf_lock);
> > +            spin_unlock(&cons->lock);
> >          }
> >  
> >          guest_handle_add_offset(buffer, kcount);
> > diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> > index fe53d4fab7ba..f7bb44328bbc 100644
> > --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> > +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> > @@ -371,6 +371,17 @@ struct evtchn_port_ops;
> >  
> >  #define MAX_NR_IOREQ_SERVERS 8
> >  
> > +/* Domain console settings. */
> > +struct domain_console {
> > +    /* Permission to take ownership of the physical console input. */
> > +    bool input_allowed;
> > +
> > +    /* hvm_print_line() and guest_console_write() logging. */
> > +    unsigned int idx;
> > +    spinlock_t lock;
> > +    char buf[256];
> 
> I'd rather see things a bit shuffled. Like:
> 
>       /* hvm_print_line() and guest_console_write() logging. */
>       spinlock_t lock;
>       unsigned int idx;
>       char buf[255];
> 
>       /* Permission to take ownership of the physical console input. */
>       bool input_allowed;
>       
> That way the struct is fully packed (note the s/256/255/) and input_allowed
> remains visually away from the other group of fields.
> input_allowed remains away from the lock, indicating that input_allowed
> 
> Note that the lock is 64bit aligned when CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_PROFILE is set.
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
> > +};
> > +
> >  struct domain
> >  {
> >      domid_t          domain_id;
> > @@ -562,12 +573,6 @@ struct domain
> >      /* Control-plane tools handle for this domain. */
> >      xen_domain_handle_t handle;
> >  
> > -    /* hvm_print_line() and guest_console_write() logging. */
> > -#define DOMAIN_PBUF_SIZE 200
> > -    char       *pbuf;
> > -    unsigned int pbuf_idx;
> > -    spinlock_t  pbuf_lock;
> > -
> >      /* OProfile support. */
> >      struct xenoprof *xenoprof;
> >  
> > @@ -653,10 +658,7 @@ struct domain
> >  #endif
> >  
> >      /* Console settings. */
> > -    struct {
> > -        /* Permission to take ownership of the physical console input. */
> > -        bool input_allowed;
> > -    } console;
> > +    struct domain_console *console;
> 
> Why a pointer? domain_console is a fixed-size type, so unless the domain is
> overflowing PAGE_SIZE (which we very definitely don't want either) I'd 
> consider
> making it a regular member Simplifies memory management too. No alloc/free nor
> potential dangling pointers.

The buffer can be variable in size in principle, so we should better
keep that as a separate allocation.  Also note that system domains
avoid allocating this buffer altogether, which we want to keep doing.
I don't have a strong opinion whether to allocate all the fields, or
just the buffer, but at least the buffer needs to be kept as an
external allocation from struct domain.

Thanks, Roger.

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