With the addition of per-device quarantine page tables the sink page is now
exclusive for each device, and thus writable. Update the documentation to
reflect the current implementation.
Fixes: 14dd241aad8a ('IOMMU/x86: use per-device page tables for quarantining')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
---
docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
index 604650aaeeef..9121d8a29404 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
@@ -1520,15 +1520,14 @@ boolean (e.g. `iommu=no`) can override this and leave
the IOMMUs disabled.
should be enabled. Quarantining can be done in two ways: In its basic
form, all in-flight DMA will simply be forced to encounter IOMMU
faults. Since there are systems where doing so can cause host lockup,
- an alternative form is available where writes to memory will be made
- fault, but reads will be directed to a scratch page. The implication
- here is that such reads will go unnoticed, i.e. an admin may not
- become aware of the underlying problem.
+ an alternative form is available where accesses to memory will be directed
+ to a scratch page. The implication here is that such accesses will go
+ unnoticed, i.e. an admin may not become aware of the underlying problem.
Therefore, if this option is set to true (the default), Xen always
quarantines such devices; they must be explicitly assigned back to Dom0
before they can be used there again. If set to "scratch-page", still
- active DMA reads will additionally be directed to a "scratch" page. If
+ active DMA operations will additionally be directed to a "scratch" page.
If
set to false, Xen will only quarantine devices the toolstack has arranged
for getting quarantined, and only in the "basic" form.
--
2.42.0
