>>> On 23.02.18 at 06:23, <kevin.t...@intel.com> wrote: >> From: Paul Durrant [mailto:paul.durr...@citrix.com] >> Sent: Tuesday, February 13, 2018 5:25 PM >> > From: Tian, Kevin [mailto:kevin.t...@intel.com] >> > Sent: 13 February 2018 06:52 >> > > From: Paul Durrant >> > > Sent: Monday, February 12, 2018 6:47 PM >> > > + } >> > > + >> > > + ctxt->nr_entries++; >> > > + >> > > + return 1; >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > +static int iommuop_query_reserved(struct >> > > xen_iommu_op_query_reserved *op) >> > >> > I didn't get why we cannot reuse existing XENMEM_reserved_ >> > device_memory_map? >> > >> >> This hypercall is not intended to be tools-only. That one is, unless I >> misread >> the #ifdefs. >> > > I didn't realize it. Curious how Xen enforces such tools-only policy? What > would happen if calling it from Dom0 kernel? I just felt not good of > creating a new interface just for duplicated purpose...
It's not enforced for Dom0; Dom0 (including its kernel) is trusted. How would Xen know whether a request came from user land (through the privcmd driver) or directly from some kernel component? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
