>>> On 05.02.17 at 06:51, <firemet...@users.sourceforge.net> wrote:
> I finally get some spare time to collect the debug info.
As I continue to be puzzled, best I could come up with is an
extension to the debug patch. Please use the attached one
in place of the earlier one, ideally on top of
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-02/msg00448.html
to reduce the overall amount of output (and help readability).
Jan
--- unstable.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c 2016-11-09 15:17:11.000000000 +0100
+++ unstable/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c 2017-02-06 13:32:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -1048,10 +1048,37 @@ int set_identity_p2m_entry(struct domain
gfn_lock(p2m, gfn, 0);
mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn, &p2mt, &a, 0, NULL, NULL);
+if(!(gfn & 0xff)) {//temp
+ static domid_t last;
+ static unsigned long cnt, thr;
+ if(d->domain_id > last) {
+ thr = cnt = 0;
+ last = d->domain_id;
+ }
+ if(++cnt > thr) {
+ thr |= cnt;
+ printk("d%d: GFN %"PRI_gfn" -> %"PRI_mfn":%d:%d\n", d->domain_id, gfn, mfn,
p2mt, a);
+ }
+}
if ( p2mt == p2m_invalid || p2mt == p2m_mmio_dm )
+{//temp
ret = p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, _mfn(gfn), PAGE_ORDER_4K,
p2m_mmio_direct, p2ma);
+ if(ret || !(gfn & 0xff)) {//temp
+ static domid_t last;
+ static unsigned long cnt, thr;
+ if(d->domain_id > last) {
+ thr = cnt = 0;
+ last = d->domain_id;
+ }
+ if(ret || ++cnt > thr) {
+ thr |= cnt;
+ mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn, &p2mt, &a, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ printk("d%d: GFN %"PRI_gfn" -> %"PRI_mfn":%d:%d (%d)\n", d->domain_id, gfn,
mfn, p2mt, a, ret);
+ }
+ }
+}
else if ( mfn_x(mfn) == gfn && p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct && a == p2ma )
{
ret = 0;
--- unstable.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c 2017-01-19
17:27:05.000000000 +0100
+++ unstable/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c 2017-02-06
13:21:42.000000000 +0100
@@ -897,8 +897,23 @@ static int iommu_page_fault_do_one(struc
kind, fault_reason, reason);
if ( iommu_verbose && fault_type == DMA_REMAP )
+{//temp
+ static domid_t last;
+ static unsigned long cnt, thr;
+ const struct pci_dev*pdev;
+ pcidevs_lock();
+ pdev = pci_get_real_pdev(seg, PCI_BUS(source_id), PCI_DEVFN2(source_id));
+ if(pdev && pdev->domain && pdev->domain->domain_id > last) {
+ thr = cnt = 0;
+ last = pdev->domain->domain_id;
+ }
+ pcidevs_unlock();
+ if(++cnt > thr) {
+ thr |= cnt;
print_vtd_entries(iommu, PCI_BUS(source_id), PCI_DEVFN2(source_id),
addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ }
+}
return 0;
}
@@ -1890,6 +1905,7 @@ static void iommu_set_pgd(struct domain
static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct domain *d, bool_t map,
const struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr,
+u16 bdf,//temp
u32 flag)
{
unsigned long base_pfn = rmrr->base_address >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
@@ -1914,6 +1930,7 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct
if ( map )
{
++mrmrr->count;
+printk(XENLOG_GUEST "d%d: RMRR [%lx,%lx] count %u\n", d->domain_id, base_pfn,
end_pfn, mrmrr->count);//temp
return 0;
}
@@ -1928,6 +1945,7 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct
}
list_del(&mrmrr->list);
+printk(XENLOG_GUEST "d%d: RMRR [%lx,%lx] zapped (%d)\n", d->domain_id,
mrmrr->base >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K, end_pfn, ret);//temp
xfree(mrmrr);
return ret;
}
@@ -1941,11 +1959,32 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct
int err = set_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn, p2m_access_rw, flag);
if ( err )
+{//temp
+ printk(XENLOG_GUEST "d%d: RMRR [%lx,%lx] map error %d @ %lx\n", d->domain_id,
rmrr->base_address >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K, end_pfn, err, base_pfn);
return err;
+} else {
+ static domid_t last;
+ static unsigned long cnt, thr;
+ if(d->domain_id > last) {
+ thr = cnt = 0;
+ last = d->domain_id;
+ }
+ if(!(base_pfn & 0xff) && ++cnt > thr) {
+ const struct pci_dev*pdev = pci_get_pdev(rmrr->segment, PCI_BUS(bdf),
PCI_DEVFN2(bdf));
+ const struct acpi_drhd_unit*drhd = pdev ? acpi_find_matched_drhd_unit(pdev)
: NULL;
+ thr |= cnt;
+ printk(XENLOG_GUEST "d%d: RMRR [%lx,%lx] mapped %lx\n", d->domain_id,
rmrr->base_address >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K, end_pfn, base_pfn);
+ if(drhd)
+ print_vtd_entries(drhd->iommu, PCI_BUS(bdf), PCI_DEVFN2(bdf), base_pfn);
+ if(hap_enabled(d))
+ ept_walk_table(d, base_pfn);
+ }
+}
base_pfn++;
}
mrmrr = xmalloc(struct mapped_rmrr);
+printk(XENLOG_GUEST "d%d: RMRR [%lx,%lx] alloc -> %p\n", d->domain_id,
rmrr->base_address >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K, end_pfn, mrmrr);//temp
if ( !mrmrr )
return -ENOMEM;
mrmrr->base = rmrr->base_address;
@@ -1987,7 +2026,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add_device(u8 dev
* Since RMRRs are always reserved in the e820 map for the hardware
* domain, there shouldn't be a conflict.
*/
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, 1, rmrr, 0);
+ ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, 1, rmrr, bdf, 0);
if ( ret )
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d: RMRR mapping failed\n",
pdev->domain->domain_id);
@@ -2032,7 +2071,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_remove_device(u8
* Any flag is nothing to clear these mappings but here
* its always safe and strict to set 0.
*/
- rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, 0, rmrr, 0);
+ rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, 0, rmrr, bdf, 0);
}
return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, devfn, pdev);
@@ -2199,7 +2238,7 @@ static void __hwdom_init setup_hwdom_rmr
* domain, there shouldn't be a conflict. So its always safe and
* strict to set 0.
*/
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr, 0);
+ ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr, bdf, 0);
if ( ret )
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX,
"IOMMU: mapping reserved region failed\n");
@@ -2356,7 +2395,7 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
* Any RMRR flag is always ignored when remove a device,
* but its always safe and strict to set 0.
*/
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(source, 0, rmrr, 0);
+ ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(source, 0, rmrr, bdf, 0);
if ( ret != -ENOENT )
return ret;
}
@@ -2446,7 +2485,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
PCI_BUS(bdf) == bus &&
PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn )
{
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr, flag);
+ ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr, bdf, flag);
if ( ret )
{
reassign_device_ownership(d, hardware_domain, devfn, pdev);
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