Hi Andrew, On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 03:06:12PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: > You have misunderstood a step. > > Dom0 can map all of guest memory. This is how `xl dump-core` is > implemented, as well as how Qemu emulates devices for the guest.
Ah, okay, thanks. That is what I feared. Due to details of the legal jurisdiction in which I operate, it would actually be useful to me to disable xl dump-core and be able to truthfully state that I do not know how to obtain a dump of a guest's memory. As it stands I do know that xl dump-core exists and I can be compelled to run it. I do not personally know how to write a program to do what xl dump-core does and would have no interest in finding out. But I appreciate that the more general concern would be an attacker who gains root access, and they could just run such a program, so I guess Xen developers would see little point in offering a way to disable dump-core. Cheers, Andy _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xen.org https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
