>>> On 19.08.16 at 18:00, <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> wrote:
> PoD is supposed to be entirely transparent to guest, but this interface has
> been left exposed for a long time.
>
> The use of PoD requires careful co-ordination by the toolstack with the
> XENMEM_{get,set}_pod_target hypercalls, and xenstore ballooning target. The
> best a guest can do without toolstack cooperation crash.
>
> Furthermore, there are combinations of features (e.g. c/s c63868ff "libxl:
> disallow PCI device assignment for HVM guest when PoD is enabled") which a
> toolstack might wish to explicitly prohibit (in this case, because the two
> simply don't function in combination). In such cases, the guest mustn't be
> able to subvert the configuration chosen by the toolstack.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com>
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