Ian Campbell writes ("[PATCH XEN v6 29/32] tools/libs/call: Use O_CLOEXEC when
opening /dev/xen/privcmd on Linux"):
> We stick with using FD_CLOEXEC on the legacy /proc/xen/privcmd
> fallback device since it was present in older kernel where O_CLOEXEC
> may not be assured.
This is a lot of effort and may not be needed. I don't object, but
some of the statements are (I think) rather too fierce:
> + /*
> + * This file descriptor is opaque to the caller, thus we must take
> + * responsibility to ensure it doesn't propagate (ie leak) outside
> + * the process, by using CLOEXEC.
> + */
For example, I don't think this is a `must' at all, although not
propagating irrelevant fds is (nowadays) seen as polite.
Ian.
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