On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 6:22 AM, Razvan Cojocaru <rcojoc...@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> This patch adds support for memory-content hiding, by modifying the > value returned by emulated instructions that read certain memory > addresses that contain sensitive data. The patch only applies to > cases where MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE or MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE_NOWRITE have > been set to a vm_event response. > > Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojoc...@bitdefender.com> > Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dun...@eu.citrix.com> > > --- > Changes since V3: > - Renamed MEM_ACCESS_SET_EMUL_READ_DATA to > VM_EVENT_FLAG_SET_EMUL_READ_DATA and updated its comment. > - Removed xfree(v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data) from > free_vcpu_struct(). > - Returning X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE from hvmemul_cmpxchg() when > !curr->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data. > - Replaced in xmalloc_bytes() with xmalloc_array() in > hvmemul_rep_outs_set_context(). > - Setting the rest of the buffer to zero in hvmemul_rep_movs() > (no longer leaking heap contents). > - No longer memset()ing the whole buffer before copy (just zeroing > out the rest). > - Moved hvmemul_ctxt->set_context = 0 to hvm_emulate_prepare() and > removed hvm_emulate_one_set_context(). > --- > tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c | 2 +- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c | 138 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/event.c | 50 ++++++------- > xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 92 +++++++++++++---------- > xen/common/domain.c | 2 + > xen/common/vm_event.c | 23 ++++++ > xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 2 + > xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/emulate.h | 10 ++- > xen/include/public/vm_event.h | 31 ++++++-- > 9 files changed, 274 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-) > Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tleng...@novetta.com>
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