On 25/03/15 16:39, Jan Beulich wrote: > When a device gets detached from a guest, pciback will clear its > command register, thus disabling both memory and I/O decoding. The > disabled memory decoding, however, has an effect on the MSI-X table > accesses the hypervisor does: These won't have the intended effect > anymore. Even worse, for PCIe devices (but not SR-IOV virtual > functions) such accesses may (will?) be treated as Unsupported > Requests, causing respective errors to be surfaced, potentially in the > form of NMIs that may be fatal to the hypervisor or Dom0 is different > ways. Hence rather than carrying out these accesses, we should avoid > them where we can, and use alternative (e.g. PCI config space based) > mechanisms to achieve at least the same effect. > > Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xen.org http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
