>>> On 29.08.17 at 11:23, <aisa...@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> In some introspection usecases, an in-guest agent needs to communicate
> with the external introspection agent. An existing mechanism is
> HVMOP_guest_request_vm_event, but this is restricted to kernel usecases
> like all other hypercalls.
>
> Introduce a mechanism whereby the introspection agent can whitelist the
> use of HVMOP_guest_request_vm_event directly from userspace.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisa...@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.l...@citrix.com>
For the pieces it applies to
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com>
However, as I keep looking at pieces which shouldn't really require
my attention, I've noticed one more cosmetic issue:
> --- a/xen/include/asm-arm/monitor.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/monitor.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,12 @@
> #include <public/domctl.h>
>
> static inline
> +void arch_monitor_allow_userspace(struct domain *d, bool allow_userspace)
> +{
> + return;
> +}
I don't see the point of the return statement here. But I'll leave
it to the ARM maintainers, and it would be easy to drop while
committing if no other issues are going to arise.
Jan
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