On 04/08/17 12:32, Alexandru Isaila wrote:
> In some introspection usecases, an in-guest agent needs to communicate
> with the external introspection agent.  An existing mechanism is
> HVMOP_guest_request_vm_event, but this is restricted to kernel usecases
> like all other hypercalls.
>
> Introduce a mechanism whereby the introspection agent can whitelist the
> use of HVMOP_guest_request_vm_event directly from userspace.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisa...@bitdefender.com>

Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com>, with one note to
whoever commits it...

> diff --git a/xen/common/monitor.c b/xen/common/monitor.c
> index 451f42f..21a1457 100644
> --- a/xen/common/monitor.c
> +++ b/xen/common/monitor.c
> @@ -79,6 +79,20 @@ int monitor_domctl(struct domain *d, struct 
> xen_domctl_monitor_op *mop)
>          break;
>      }
>  
> +    case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_USERSPACE_EVENT:
> +    {
> +        bool_t old_status = d->monitor.guest_request_enabled;

bool.

~Andrew

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