And from that assertion what practical action or policy should follow? Fred
> Fred, > > Sorry, there is no us. As far as the United States is concerned they > allowed themselves to spy on any person who is not one of US to be speid > on. Given that our movement is a global movement, the fact that it is > based > in the US is incidental. > Thanks, > GerardM > > > On 3 September 2013 14:36, Fred Bauder <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Any censor from the United States or European governments that works >> directly with us (I have no personal knowledge of this, I just know it >> has to be) is concerned with classified information, not someone's >> opinions or factual information about historical events or political >> personalities. >> >> Detailed information about construction of advanced nuclear weapons or >> the details of military or intelligence operations cannot be on >> Wikipedia >> just as child pornography cannot be; on the other hand, a distorted, or >> devastatingly accurate picture, of the Iraq War, or Obama, can be. >> >> So, while the details of material removed for legitimate security >> reasons >> cannot be published; in China the identity and any personal information >> we have gathered such as the ip address of an editor and the content of >> their edits to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 article would be >> of >> interest to the security apparatus and classified. Any local employee >> or >> volunteer of ours who shared that information with others even within >> our >> organization could be prosecuted. It is quite impossible to work with >> the >> Chinese government in the manner suggested and maintain a scintilla of >> integrity. A request by them to remove details about their advanced >> nuclear weapons or specific details of their military deployments >> would, >> of course, be legitimate. >> >> The Chinese government has legitimate reason to avoid extensive public >> attention to past errors and disasters; one has only to look at the >> history of the Soviet Union to observe the effect of focusing on past >> outrages on public morale, but that is their burden to bear not ours to >> share. >> >> Fred >> >> > Hoi, >> > >> > Fred, what is different in your scenario from what happens in the USA >> ? >> > >> > Thanks, >> > GerardM >> > >> > >> > On 3 September 2013 00:23, Fred Bauder <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> > >> >> > On 31/08/13 15:17, Erik Moeller wrote: >> >> >> It could be argued >> >> >> that itâââ‰â¢s time to draw a line in the sand - if >> youâââ‰â¢re >> >> prohibiting >> >> >> the >> >> >> use of encryption, youâââ‰â¢re effectively not part >> of the web. >> >> Youâââ‰â¢re >> >> >> subverting basic web technologies. >> >> > >> >> > China is not prohibiting encryption. They're prohibiting specific >> >> > instances of encryption which facilitate circumvention of >> censorship. >> >> > >> >> >> So, what to do? My main suggestion is to organize a broad request >> >> for >> >> >> comments and input on possible paths forward. >> >> > >> >> > OK, well there's one fairly obvious solution which hasn't been >> >> > proposed or discussed. It would allow the end-to-end encryption >> and >> >> > would allow us to stay as popular in China as we are now. >> >> > >> >> > We could open a data centre in China, send frontend requests from >> >> > clients in China to that data centre, and comply with local >> >> censorship >> >> > and surveillance as required to continue such operation. >> >> > >> >> > It would be kind of like the cooperation we give to the US >> government >> >> > at the moment, except specific to readers in China instead of >> imposed >> >> > on everyone in the world. >> >> > >> >> > It would allow WMF to monitor censorship and surveillance by being >> in >> >> > the request loop. It would give WMF greater influence over local >> >> > policy, because our staff would be in direct contact with their >> >> staff. >> >> > We would be able to deliver clear error messages in place of >> censored >> >> > content, instead of a connection reset. >> >> > >> >> > -- Tim Starling >> >> >> >> Their orders would be classified; disclosure of them would be a >> crime. >> >> Not a problem for us, but a big problem for staff on the ground in >> >> China. >> >> >> >> Fred >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Wikimedia-l mailing list >> >> [email protected] >> >> Unsubscribe: >> https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, >> >> <mailto:[email protected]?subject=unsubscribe> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Wikimedia-l mailing list >> [email protected] >> Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, >> <mailto:[email protected]?subject=unsubscribe> >> > _______________________________________________ Wikimedia-l mailing list [email protected] Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, <mailto:[email protected]?subject=unsubscribe>
