For those of you who have been following this story and who are not
overloaded with things to worry about, here is some interesting information.
Ed
Is USAF Stand Down To
Find A Missing Nuke?
Someone, operating under a special chain of command within
the United States Air Force, just stole a nuclear weapon.
By Chuck Simpson
AboveTopSecret.com
9-12-7
Some History Barksdale Missile Number Six deserves far more public
attention than it's received to date. Missile Number Six is potentially
the major story of at least this year. Until 1968 under the Airborne
Alert Program, informally called Operation Chrome Dome, the Air Force
routinely kept about a dozen strategic bombers with nuclear weapons
flying at all times. One predictable result was crashes and incidents.
In 1968 the Department of Defense published a list of 13 serious nuclear
weapons accidents that occurred between 1950 and 1968. In 1980 the list
was revised to include 32 incidents through that year. Notably, the
Pentagon has not acknowledged any accidents since 1980. This alone
highlights the importance the Pentagon is placing on the recent
transportation of nuclear weapons from North Dakota to Louisiana.
Through 1968, several reported incidents involved plane crashes or
malfunctions, beginning with the crash of a B-29 near Fairfield,
California in August 1950. The resulting blast was felt 30 miles away.
In July 1950 a B-50 crashed near Lebanon, Ohio. The high-explosive
trigger for the nuclear weapon detonated on impact. The blast was felt
over 25 miles away. In May 1957 a nuclear weapon fell from the bomb bay
of a B-36 near Albuquerque, New Mexico. Parachutes malfunctioned and the
weapon was destroyed on impact. In October 1957 near Homestead, Florida
a B-47 crashed. The nuclear weapon was burned. In March 1958 a B-47
accidentally dropped a nuclear weapon near Florence, South Carolina. The
high-explosive trigger detonated on impact. In November 1958 a B-47
crashed near Abilene, Texas. The trigger of the nuclear weapon exploded
upon impact. In July 1959 a C-124 crashed near Bossier City, Louisiana.
Both plane and nuclear weapon were destroyed. In October 1959 a B-52
with two nuclear weapons was involved in a mid-air collision near
Hardinsburg, Kentucky. One weapon partially burned. In January 1961 a
B-52 broke apart in mid-air near Goldsboro, North Carolina. Two nuclear
weapons were released. The parachute on one weapon malfunctioned, and
contamination was spread over a wide area. The uranium core was never
recovered. Daniel Ellsberg reported that detonation was a very real risk
because five of six safety devices failed. In that month near
Monticello, Idaho a B-52 carrying nuclear weapons exploded in mid-air.
No information was made available as to the weapons. In March 1961 a
B-52 with two nuclear weapons crashed near Yuba City, California. In
January 1964 a B-52 carrying two nuclear weapons crashed near
Cumberland, Maryland. In January 1966 a B-52 carrying four hydrogen
bombs crashed after a mid-air collision near Palomares, Spain. Two
weapons exploded on impact, with resulting plutonium contamination. A
months-long program was undertaken to locate and extract the other two
weapons from the ocean. Major policy changes were taken under
consideration. In January 1968 a B-52 carrying four hydrogen weapons
crashed and burned near Thule AFB in Greenland. Explosives in one bomb
detonated, spreading plutonium contamination. Apparently, the other
three weapons have never been accounted for. Following large public
protests Denmark, which owns Greenland and prohibits nuclear weapons on
or over its territory, filed a strong protest. A few days later the
Secretary of Defense ordered the removal of nuclear weapons from planes.
After that order was issued, all aircraft armed with nuclear weapons
were grounded but kept in a constant state of alert. In 1991 by
Presidential order, nuclear weapons were removed from all aircraft.
Bomber nuclear ground alerts, during which nuclear weapons are loaded
onto bombers during test and training exercises, were halted. After that
time, all nuclear weapons to be delivered by plane were permanently
maintained in secure storage facilities. August 30, 2007 All of which
makes the transport of nuclear weapons in combat position on a combat
plane so newsworthy. On August 30, for the first time since 1968,
nuclear warheads in combat position were carried by an American bomber.
Numerous international treaty provisions were violated in the process.
That Thursday, a B-52H Stratofortress flew from Minot AFB in North
Dakota to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana while carrying twelve cruise
missiles. Either five or six of those missiles were armed with nuclear
warheads. Cruise Missiles The missiles on the B-52 were AGM-129 Advanced
Cruise Missile units, specifically designed to be launched from wing
pods of B-52H planes. A total of 460 units were manufactured by
Raytheon. A total of 394 units are currently maintained by the Air
Force. Apparently, 38 are to be modernized and upgraded in Fiscal Year
2008 and the other 356 are to be decommissioned pursuant to the 2002
Moscow treaty. Raytheon has publicly announced the AGM-129 missiles are
to be modified to accomplish a "classified cruise missile mission". This
has widely been interpreted to mean conversion to bunker-busters, most
likely for use in Iran. This widely accepted explanation is being used
to explain why armed cruise missiles are being flown in American
airspace. Nuclear Warheads The AGM-129 was specifically designed to
deliver a W-80 nuclear warhead. The W-80 weapon has a variable yield
capability, of 5 to 150 kilotons. For comparison purposes, the bomb used
on Hiroshima was 13 to 15 kilotons, or equivalent to 13,000 to 15,000
tons of TNT explosive. News Stories and Flawed Explanations The story of
the B-52 flight was first reported by Army Times, owned by Gannett, on
Wednesday September 5. Gannett relied on information provided by
"anonymous officers". The story was picked up by Yahoo Wednesday
morning, published by USA Today and The Washington Pos, and then quickly
spread. In response, the Pentagon quickly spread an official
explanation. The Air Force admitted to an inadvertent error: The intent
was to transport ACMs without weapons. According to military officers,
the nuclear warheads should have been removed before the missiles were
mounted on the pylons under the wings of the bomber. In the words of the
Pentagon: "There was an error which occurred during a regularly
scheduled transfer of weapons between two bases. The weapons were safe
and remained in Air Force control and custody at all times." For almost
the first time in the history of the nation, the military has publicly
and promptly admitted it "made a mistake". This in itself is truly
astounding. To reinforce the military's claim that a mistake was made, a
system-wide stand-down was ordered for September 14. That official
explanation was quickly explained away. The mistake was made
intentionally, so a "deliberate leak" of a secret operation could occur.
The CIA and the Office of Counter-Terrorism in the State Department
explained that Barksdale AFB is a "jumping off point" for re-supply of
the Middle East. The "deliberate leak" was intended to serve as a veiled
warning to Iran. This deliberately misleading explanation is evidently
intended to lead the public or Iran or both to logically conclude the
missiles are bound for Iran. Bluntly, State and the CIA converted a
whistleblower leak by true American patriots into a deliberate leak by
official Washington, to scare Iran. By this means Washington has led the
public to forget or overlook the real issue. To begin, the multiple
official explanations reek to high heaven. They collectively read
suspiciously like flimsy cover stories concocted in hasty desperation.
And no amount of pretty lipstick will be able to make the official
explanations pretty. Transportation Violations More conflicting
explanations followed. These missiles are part of a group scheduled to
be decommissioned. This would explain why they were shipped out of North
Dakota. But the missiles were not transported on their way to
decommissioning. Missiles are normally decommissioned at Davis-Monthan
AFB at Tucson. Nuclear weapons are decommissioned at the Department of
Energy's Pantex facility near Amarillo, Texas, accessed through Kirkland
AFB in New Mexico. And military policy requires minimization of the
number of flights made with nuclear weapons aboard. So the weapons
should not have been mounted on the missiles, flown to Louisiana,
un-mounted and flown to New Mexico. The mode of transportation is also a
major issue not defused by official explanations. Per standard operating
procedures, or SOPs, both missiles and nuclear warheads are transported
primarily by air, in specially modified C-130s or C-17s. Under no
peacetime circumstances do military SOPs allow transport of nuclear
weapons mounted in cruise missiles mounted in combat positions on combat
planes. Department of Defense Directive Number 4540.5, issued on
February 4, 1998, regulates logistic transportation of nuclear weapons.
By delegation of Commanders of Combatant Commands, movement of nuclear
weapons must be approved by commanders of major service commands.
Commanders of Combat Commands or service component commanders must
evaluate, authorize and approve transport modes and movement routes for
nuclear weapons in their custody. The Air Force is required to maintain
a Prime Nuclear Airlift Force capability to conduct the logistic
transport of nuclear weapons. Under SOPs, combat planes with
combat-ready nuclear weapons can only be flown on the authority of the
Commander in Chief, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Military
Command Authority. All of these transportation regulations were
flagrantly violated on August 30. Handling Violations Violations of
regulations concerning handling of the nuclear weapons in North Dakota
are worse. A sophisticated computerized tracking system is used for
nuclear weapons. Multiple sign-offs are required to remove the weapons
from their storage bunkers. The AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile was
designed to carry nuclear weapons. No non-nuclear warhead is available
for this missile. So the only possible error could have been loading
nuclear warheads on the missiles instead of practice dummies. The
practice warheads have standard blue and yellow signs declaring "Inert,
non-nuclear". The nuclear warheads have at least three distinctive red
warning signs. This error is therefore highly improbable, absent
tampering with signage. Nuclear weapons are transported from the storage
bunker to the aircraft in a caravan that routinely includes vehicles
with machine guns front and rear and guards with M-16s. All steps in the
process are done under the watchful eyes of armed military police. Rules
require that at least two people jointly control every step of the
process. If one person loses sight of the other, both are forced to the
ground face-down and temporarily "placed under arrest" by observant
security forces. All progress stops until inspections are made to assure
the weapons weren't tampered with. All nuclear weapons are connected to
sophisticated alarm systems to prevent removal or tampering. They could
only be removed from the storage bunker by turning the alarm off. And
the squad commander clearly would not have authority to turn off the
alarm. The Impossible Mistake Bluntly, the mistake of loading nuclear
weapons on a combat aircraft in combat-ready position is simply not
possible to make. Safeguards are far too stringent and far too many
people would be involved. Particularly given that the mounting was in
violation of policy that's been in place without exception for almost 40
years. No discipline is expected to be meted out. The New York Times
tried to imply the commanding general had been fired. Actually, the
squad commander in charge of munitions crews at Minot was "relieved of
duty pending an investigation". He has not been removed from his
position or disciplined. The crews involved have been "temporarily
decertified pending corrective actions or additional training" but have
not been disciplined. No mention has been made of the wing commander.
Note carefully: These actions amount to nothing at all. The wing and
squad commanders are still in place and the crews can easily be
re-certified. Successful Confusion Washington's efforts to confuse the
public have been successful. Attention has shifted from the crucial
issue. This news has already become non-news. The August 14 stand-down
will momentarily become news, followed by announcements of more
stringent restrictions, improved safeguards and additional training. The
public always has been and always will be safe. One of the major issues
will be avoided: Someone in an irregular chain of Air Force command
authorized loading and transport of nuclear weapons. And that would
never have been done without a reason. Given the magnitude of regulatory
violations involved, the reason must be extremely important. The
paramount issue will be avoided, if necessary with repetition of the
reassurance that the Air Force was in control at all times. The weapons
were only missing during the 3.5-hour flight. At Barksdale, the missiles
were considered to be unarmed items headed for modernization or the
scrap heap, and of no particular importance. They were left unguarded
for almost ten hours. According to one report, almost ten hours were
required for airmen at Minot AFB to convince superiors that the nuclear
weapons had disappeared. According to information provided to Congress,
this time lapsed before airmen at Barksdale "noticed" the weapons were
present. News reports will continue to overlook this fact also. Even
here the focus is on time. The number of missiles and warheads issue was
overlooked. Early news reports spoke of five nuclear warheads loaded
onto the bomber. Apparently, this information was provided from
Barksdale. That number was later updated to six weapons missing from
Minot, apparently based on anonymous tips provided to Military Times by
people at Minot. This information has also been forgotten. Conclusion
Six nuclear weapons disappeared from Minot AFB in North Dakota. Five
nuclear weapons were discovered at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana. Which
leads to my chilling conclusion: Someone, operating under a special
chain of command within the United States Air Force, just stole a
nuclear weapon. What next? The answer has been provided several times,
most recently by CIA Director and General Michael Hayden. On September
7, dressed in full military uniform, Hayden told assembled members of
the Council of Foreign Relations: "Our analysts assess with high
confidence that al-Qaida's central leadership is planning high-impact
plots against the U. S. homeland." "We assess with high confidence that
al-Qaida is focusing on targets that would produce mass casualties,
dramatic destruction and significant aftershocks." An eye for an eye.
Use of nukes will justify use of nukes. A perfect excuse to wage nuclear
war against Iran. I suspect Hayden is absolutely correct, except for his
mistaken identification of the "central leadership" that is planning
detonation of a nuclear weapon on American soil.