Terry
size limit for posts on vortex, which I think is 40 kb - is that correct?
Affirmative.
Maybe I will reword some of the content.
Uh, you *could* split the post.
OK I split the 70 kb chapter in half and sent it. I hope it comes through, but in my Sent folder, half of it still shows up as being 70 kb...kinda sounds like a certain miracle, but its not loaves and fish... just bizarre and fishy... as in Outlook Express needs an update ... anyway, it may not come through. Not my day it seems. Perhaps my computer senses its own sympathetic condition of caffeine withdrawal.
Assuming attachments are not permitted, I am back to square one ... but better yet , since AI is off-topic for Vortex anyway, and of limited interest to many readers, here is a solution.
If anyone wants to pursue this in a very detailed way, send me you email address.
I can send an attachment of either this chapter (70 kb), or the whole manuscript (about 1 Mb) directly to you if you are interested in AI and its philosophical implications. The whole manuscript is entitled "Deus ex Machina"... and having just now revisited it, after a dozen years of neglect, it seems to be a bit stilted and in need of an update. Anyway, it is still an interesting subject, although I was either wildly optimistic, or just "ahead of his time."
Jones
Here is the first few paragraphs, having lost the formatting:
Chapter IV.
Pure Thought, Brains, and Artificial Intelligence
"Of course machines can think They just don't - yet And perhaps when they can they will choose not to; just like us."
-Oliver Selfridge
Until the advent of electronics, the most compelling reason to be precise in defining intelligence was pedantic, but with the introduction of advanced computers, it seems that vanity has become a revealing issue. In the last few decades, humans have exerted great effort to erect a contrived barrier that would sanctify only one kind of intelligence.
The sanctification of a particular class goes beyond the limits of science, of course, but more alarmingly, it obscures the profound and consequential question: our true essence and identity. As mentioned, a crucial debate in twenty-first century morality will likely center on whether our future as thinking beings is irrevocably tied to the adaptability of an animal species, or alternatively whether technology will deliver us from that heritage, should it ever become unquestionably advantageous. We can scarcely afford to limit our options in this regard, given the demonstrable frailty of biological life.
Intelligence is more than problem solving. The ability to observe and generalize, to form analogies and think symbolically, to be creative and to communicate ideas orally and visually all signify a degree of intellect. The psychologist J.P. Guilford cataloged 120 different types of responses that are associated with intellectual ability.[i] If one could weight these factors properly, it might be possible to arrive at an adequate but overly complex method for certifying intelligence. Howard Gardner has systematically grouped intelligence into seven broad types, which has helped to structure the objective indicia.[ii] A more simplified but adequate definition has been suggested by Christopher Evans, that being the ability of a system to adjust to a changing world.[iii] A similar conclusion is Jeremy Campbell's notion of "worldliness."[iv] Yet these simple definitions may be unnecessarily subjective.
Defining any reasonably broad term can involve a certain amount of semantic recursion, and intelligence and information are reflexive words that can be mutually dependent upon each other for meaning. Any system that utilizes information in a goal-directed way has some claim to intelligence - and even the "goal" part of the equation is only important to demonstrate that the information, the critical element, has objective significance. Using self-contained information to alter a future state, particularly for gain, is the key to intelligence; but information perceived and retained, even if it is not used immediately, can also signify a latent level of intelligence.
Information has both epistemological and theological connotations, as it conveys the substance, more so than the details, of relationships from an accumulated past, more specifically of habitual occurrence. Information should be distinguished from mere data - which is temporal, random, unorganized and sterile - rather, it connotes essence, record, symbol, and generalization. It is from an overly narrow perspective that data-information has been argued to useless without the subjective concept of "meaning." From this viewpoint, Theodore Roszak asserts that "ideas create information,"[v] but there is a more inclusive level of understanding. In an expansive field-delineated sense, information can be seen as an end into itself, its own idea, incorporating both data and "virtual" meaning - suggestive, even, of a free-floating agency without other participation. Virtual meaning is not only potential meaning but the ability to self-generate individual collaborators, information accumulators, over time. It will be used in this broad context throughout this analysis.
The difference in perspective on the nature of information adds a new dimension to the famous solipsism of Bishop Berkeley that suggested that the falling tree makes no sound if there is no one present to hear it. The pragmatist has always maintained that the falling tree creates an objective flurry of vibrations at certain acoustic frequencies, even if there is no person present to confirm a subjective sound, for several related reasons. Most obviously, it would be extreme conceit to suppose that all sentient forms, seen or unseen, present or future, could be identified, if not nullified, by one narrow class of observer, Homo sapiens. For the traditionalist, of course, it negates most perceptions of divinity to suggest that some intelligence is not always present. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i]J.P. Guilford, The Nature of Human Intelligence (McGraw Hill, 1967)
[ii]Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1983), and The Mind's New Science (New York: Basic Books, 1985)
[iii]Christopher Evans, The Micro Millennium (Washington Square Press, 1979), p. 182
[iv]Jeremy Campbell,The Improbable Machine (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989)
[v]Theodore Roszak, The Cult of Information (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 105
