Mohamed Boucadair has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-uta-require-tls13-09: Yes
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-require-tls13/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks Rich for this document. Thanks also to Samier for his first opsdir review. I fully support. Some clarity is needed to unambiguously characterize which "new protocols" we are covering. A fix for this and other edits were shared with Rich using a PR. I'm removing that link and include the changes in the ballot itself. Apologies for the inconvenience. # Title ## Clarify this is for TLS-based protocols OLD: "New Protocols Must Require TLS 1.3" NEW: "New Protocols with TLS Support Must Require TLS 1.3" # Section 1 ## Clarify this is for TLS-based protocols OLD: For these reasons, new protocols must require and NEW: For these reasons, new protocols with TLS support must require and ## minor edit OLD: Note that addressing them usually requires bespoke configuration. NEW: Addressing them usually requires bespoke configuration. ## minor edit OLD: removing most cryptographic primitives considered dangerous. Importantly, TLS 1.3 enjoys robust security proofs and provides excellent security without any additional configuration. NEW: removing most cryptographic primitives considered dangerous. Importantly, compared to TLS1.2, TLS 1.3 provides better security without any additional configuration. ## Clarify this is for TLS-based protocols OLD: This document specifies that, since TLS 1.3 use is widespread, new protocols NEW: This document specifies that, since TLS 1.3 use is widespread, new protocols with TLS support # Section 3 ## nit OLD: Implications for post-quantum cryptography NEW: Implications for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) ## clarify impact + nits OLD: have a huge impact on TLS traffic. To mitigate this, TLS applications will need to migrate to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) [PQC]. Detailed consideration of when any application requires PQC, or when a CRQC is a threat they need to protect against, is beyond the NEW: have a huge impact on TLS traffic (see, e.g., Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers]). To mitigate this, TLS applications will need to migrate to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) [PQC]. Detailed considerations of when an application requires PQC or when a CRQC is a threat that an application need to protect against, are beyond the ## nit OLD: For TLS it is important to note that the focus of these efforts is TLS 1.3 NEW: It is important to note that the focus of these PQC efforts for TLS is TLS 1.3 ## Clarify this is for TLS-based protocols OLD: This is one more reason for new protocols to default to TLS 1.3, where NEW: This is one more reason for new protocols requiring TLS service to default to TLS 1.3, where # Section 4 ## nit OLD: then clients SHOULD specify just the minimum NEW: then clients SHOULD specify the minimum # Section 5 ## nit OLD: RFC 9325 provides recommendations for ensuring the security of deployed NEW: [RFC9325] provides recommendations for ensuring the security of deployed ## nit OLD: At the time it was published, it described availability of TLS 1.3 as "widely available." The transition and adoption mentioned in that documnent has grown, and this document now makes two small changes NEW: At the time it was published, it described availability of TLS 1.3 as "widely available". The transition and adoption mentioned in that document has grown, and this document now makes two small changes ## clarify this is for tls-based protocols OLD: That section says that TLS 1.3 SHOULD be supported; this document says that for new protocols it MUST be supported. NEW: That section says that TLS 1.3 SHOULD be supported; this document mandates that TLS 1.3 MUST be supported for new TLS-based protocols. ## nit OLD: That section says that TLS 1.2 MUST be supported; this document says that it MAY be supported as described above. NEW: That section says that TLS 1.2 MUST be supported; this document says that TLS 1.2 MAY be supported. # Section 6 ## nit OLD: See [I-D.draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex] for details. NEW: See [I-D.ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex] for details. ## nit OLD: years exploiting CBC cipher suites; refer to e.g. [CBCSCANNING] OLD: years exploiting CBC cipher suites; refer to, e.g., [CBCSCANNING] Cheers, Med _______________________________________________ Uta mailing list -- uta@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to uta-le...@ietf.org
