Hi Hannes, Just saw your review. Should have pointed to yours as we found similar nits.
Regarding to your last point. The text stated in Section 7 was used to show how the draft is referenced in the IEC documents. It was incorporated in the draft IEC document to make the reader aware that there is work ongoing in IETF to update syslog security. The referenced IEC 62351-3 is a document providing TLS options to be used in the power system environment. Beyond other, it also lists TLS cipher suites to be supported and the one defined in draft-ietf-uta-ciphersuites-in-sec-syslog is also contained. This means that there are no conflicting requirements from both documents. In any case the text for the IEC document needs to be reworked as I guess that draft-ietf-uta-ciphersuites-in-sec-syslog will be an RFC before the IEC document will become a standard. As the text will not appear in the RFC, I don't see the need for updating it here. Best regards Steffen From: Uta <uta-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig Sent: Montag, 1. August 2022 16:49 To: uta@ietf.org Subject: [Uta] draft-ietf-uta-ciphersuites-in-sec-syslog-01 During the IETF UTA session I volunteered to review draft-ietf-uta-ciphersuites-in-sec-syslog-01. Here are my notes: ------------ Abstract It might be good to say something about syslog in the first paragraph and then in a second paragraph talk about the updates in the draft. For example, " The Syslog Working Group published two specifications, namely RFC 5425 and RFC 6012, for securing the Syslog protocol using TLS and DTLS, respectively. This document updates the cipher suites in RFC 5425, Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog, and RFC 6012, Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog. It also updates the transport protocol in RFC 6012. " Introduction The Syslog Working Group produced Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog [RFC5425] and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog [RFC6012]. This sentence sounds a bit broken. I would write: " The Syslog Working Group published RFC 5425, Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog, and RFC 6012, Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog. " Both [RFC5425] and [RFC6012] MUST support certificates as defined in [RFC5280]. Here I would write: Both specifications, [RFC5425] and [RFC6012], require the use of RSA-based certificates and the use of out-of-date TLS/DTLS versions. Please update the reference to [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] with RFC 9147. IMHO DTLS 1.3 cannot be an informative reference. Please update [I-D.salowey-tls-rfc8447bis] to draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-01. Please update [I-D.saviram-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex] to draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex Why are you not recommending the use of TLS 1.3 instead of TLS 1.2? Likewise, you are recommending DTLS 1.2 when the most recent version is DTLS 1.3 You have a note in Section 5 about "EDITOR's NOTE: Need to address 0-RTT considerations." while the subsequent section talks about 0-RTT. I would suggest to delete the note. I don't understand the author's notes. Is the idea to incorporate the marked text? If so, I don't think it is a good idea because the text cannot be understood unless a reader also reads or knows the IEC 62351-3 specification. Is there some actionable advice that could be re-used from that specification? ------------ Ciao Hannes IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
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