On 7/12/22 9:30 PM, Martin Duke via Datatracker wrote:
Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-09: No Objection
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COMMENT:
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(4.4) In the case of QUIC, it is not the case that a single decryption failure
leads to failure of the TLS connection.
Noted. I suggest the following fix:
OLD
The latter only applies to DTLS since TLS connections are torn down
on the first decryption failure.
NEW
The latter applies to DTLS and QUIC but not to TLS itself, since TLS
connections are torn down on the first decryption failure.
Peter
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