For additional context, here's s research study we published a few years back on OCSP must-staple in the Web context: https://cbw.sh/static/pdf/chung-imc18.pdf
Nick On Wed, Jan 19, 2022 at 11:58 AM Mohit Sahni <mohit06...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi, > > So for the new BCP, we have three options: > > > > Add a SHOULD-level requirement (for TLS 1.3 implementations, possibly > also TLS 1.2 implementations) to fail the handshake if the OCSP response is > missing or invalid. (As far as we can tell, RFC 8446 is silent on this.) > > Remove the whole discussion of OCSP, saying that in its current form > it’s not adding value. > > Maintain the status quo, where many people implement OCSP on the server > side, but clients rarely benefit. > > > I don't think that OCSP is not adding value in its current form. I > have seen a lot of OCSP implementations with hard fail, especially on > the server side for authenticating clients using private PKI > certificates. Although OCSP does not add much value on the client side > as it's a bit fragile for public PKI and client side checks because of > the matrix of multiple OCSP status producers and consumers at scale. > > -Mohit > > _______________________________________________ > Uta mailing list > Uta@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta >
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