Spencer Dawkins has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp-09: Yes
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- This is great. Thanks for putting it together. Just for my own edification, why would o Implementations MUST support, and SHOULD prefer to negotiate, cipher suites offering forward secrecy, such as those in the Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Ephemeral Diffie- Hellman ("DHE" and "ECDHE") families. not also be "MUST prefer to negotiate"? I found it strange that there's no hint of 5.2. Unauthenticated TLS and Opportunistic Security In summary: this document does not apply to unauthenticated TLS use cases. until about halfway through page 15. If it's important to say this, maybe it's better to say it earlier in the document? _______________________________________________ Uta mailing list Uta@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta
